Persuasive Images is a visually stunning book. No other book comes close in terms of quality or, for that matter, quantity.

Viewed purely as an art book, it's a must-have. As a history book, it's jaw-droppingly intriguing. I have never found a book, website, or museum collection as appealing and thought-provoking as you will find in this book.

I teach high school -- I have had students stay 3 hours after school just to pore over the pages of this book. It's that good.

I was extremely pleased with this book. . .I was looking for images and I was not disappointed. From humorous to chilling it's filled with tremendously powerful works. . .many of which are as vivid and visceral now as I'm sure they were then. . .

This work is the study of a society as reflected in the life of Frederick the Great. The subject of interest is not so much the man per se but rather his interactions with the society he did so much to shape. Ritter's treatment allows the reader to learn about Frederick but not to know him as a man. In fact, the work serves largely to sublimate Frederick the man to the Prussian state. The reader sees Frederick as having succeeded not through divine placement but by luck, reason, and a commitment to the state above all personal and worldly considerations. But despite all Frederick's realism, as revealed by Ritter, he remains an enigma. Indeed, as Paret alludes to in his introduction, certain events of European history and aspects of Frederick's life are not explored in Ritter's European-oriented presentation. Certainly my own lack of understanding of the complicated alliance patterns of early modern Europe detract from my understanding of the book.

Frederick's reign seems to have marked a crucial turning point in history-- one toward the development of the modern European nation-state. Frederick utilized the French designs of emerging nationality to bring to life a state whose purpose was to further the good of all its inhabitants rather than to serve as an instrument of the prince's vainglory. From the mediaeval throes of dynamism was born the modern state. To a large degree, Frederick the Great was Prussia; he raised her to a level of power that would not long outlive him. This is what makes Ritter's biography history.

There was a certain ambivalence evidenced in Frederick's conception of warfare. He only pursued war to further the state, and he learned from war--especially his initial invasion of Silesia. Always, Prussia in the end seemed to prosper from her ruler's military actions. Central in Frederick's conception of the state was the need for a vigilant standing army. To oversee this grand army, Frederick developed a program for proto-modern statehood--in all aspects to be overseen by him personally. In his state, he sought to utilize the nobility in a paternalistic system. Patriotism was his goal; his military leaders were not to fight for him but for Prussia. Frederick was deeply involved in military strategy; as a soldier-king he demanded discipline and controlled aggression among his men. Significantly, over time he came to see the value of statecraft over military action; after his Silesian invasion, his wars seemed more defensive in nature; often no decisive victor emerged from battle. He came to realize that warfare was constrained by the state's national resources. As Ritter describes it, Frederician warfare was defined by maneuverability and limited aggression. It is the birth of patriotism in the form of Frederician absolutism that lies at the heart of Ritter's study. Compelled by the rise to power of Naziism, Ritter seeks to show how such German nationalism had originally been born.

Carl Boyd has produced an exceptionally lucid and revealing book that traces U.S. decoding attack on Berlin-Tokyo radio communications of Gen. Oshima Hiroshi, Japanese Ambassdor to the Third Reich, and its impact on the outcome of WWII. According to Boyd, these decoded diplomatic messages, known in the U.S. and Great Britain as MAGIC, were pivotal in Allied decision-making at critical junctures during the war. The author contends that, because the British were unable to read the secret communications of the top Nazi leadership, MAGIC filled a crucial gap in British ULTRA message decoding efforts. According to Boyd, Oshima was covertly converted into "an inadvertent informer of incalculable importance in leading the Allies to victory." Because Oshima had a very close personal relationship with Hitler and foreign minister von Ribbentropp, had their trust and respect, and had access to their higest level secrets, his MAGIC decoded radio messages were especially revealing and valuable for Allied planners. His military experience and analytical abilities also made his detailed characterizations of the disposition and condition of German forces in Europe and on the eastern front especially enlightening to the Allies and critical to planning for Operation OVERLORD. Boyd observes that "The margin of success on the Normandy beaches was narrow, but MAGIC and Anglo-American cooperation made the difference." Boyd's book is the first detailed account of Oshima's role as a primary source of Allied wartime intelligence through MAGIC. He draws heavily on declassified National Security Agency documents recently released to the National Archives. There is more, however, to this story of decoding covertly collected enemy radio intercepts that remains classified, especially in the British archives, which won't be declassified for more than twenty years. This is a thoroughly documented, superbly written, and rich account of the application of communications intelligence during WWII. It should be a stimulating read for all serious WWII historians and an entertaining read for all others.

Paret argues that the great Prussian military theorist Karl von Clausewitz was a realist with a life-long affinity to serve the nation-state and pursued a desire to understand this intricate and diverse concept. Clausewitz progressed from an idealized vision of statehood as a young man to a realist outlook in later life. This realism, argues Paret, is evident in Clausewitz's political writings as well as his mot famous treatise _On War_the ultimate extension of policy by concerted use of force. Yet it is the "Psychological and historical genesis" (p. 10) of Clausewitz's theories that Paret ultimately wants to convey. Paret concludes: "Clausewitz combined two very different callings-service to the state and scholarship-with remarkable success" (p. 436). Paret utilizes a contextual approach. Paret contends that in order to better understand Clausewitz's theories, the reader must first identify with the time frame that Clausewitz lived. Paret divides the book between biography and analysis of some prominent historical and political writings. Paret utilizes biography to illustrate Clausewitz's transformation from idealist to realist. Paret's analysis of Clausewitz's writings serves to show the differentiation between Clausewitz the political commentator and Clausewitz the military theorist. The printed materials available on Clausewitz are extensive though Paret leans more towards primary sources in this study. Besides the vast array of Clausewitz's own writings, Paret also makes extensive use of letters. Correspondence between Clausewitz and his fiancée/wife Marie v. Brühl and August von Gneisanau, collected in a plethora of German language sources are the most frequently cited. Paret makes it known, however, that new primary evidence dealing with Clausewitz is still surfacing though "widely dispersed." Source books and collections by Werner Hahlweg, Hans Rothfels and Walther Shering are also critically cited. It is obvious that Paret is enamored with Clausewitz and gives more than a sympathetic portrayal of his subject. Paret only passes lightly over criticisms of Clausewitz mainly the writings of W. Hahlweg and H. Rothfels and completely ignores the works of John Keegan and B.H. Liddle-Hart. Although the vast arrays of German language sources are impressive, they seem overdone for a book aimed at English speaking readers. As Paret mentions, this book provides an excellent companion volume to the M. Howard, P. Paret translation of _On War_ (Princeton: 1976) that is becoming a much-standardized text. Paret has succeeded in helping the reader to better understand Clausewitz by placing him in a contextual setting, especially his early experiences, influences, and education. Without a doubt, Clausewitz lived through some turbulent political changes in Europe between 1815-1831 and Paret illustrates this successfully. A major consensus seems to be that one can only understand Clausewitz by reading him. Paret certainly has created a thirst to do so in this book.

This book is a biography of a noteworthy but relatively obscure figure, Carl von Clausewitz, whose main claim to fame is having coined the famous dictum, "War is the Extension of Politics by other i.e. violent means" cited to by V.I. Lenin and others. This work, while dense and sometimes tedious in its explication of Clausewitz' views is fascinating in its description of its subject's life and times which facts serve to illuminate his ideas and their evolution.

Clausewitz was born into a middle-class family in Prussia in the late 18th Century. His father, not being a noble, was unable to retain his provisional officer rank of lieutenant he had achieved during the Seven Years War (known as the French and Indian War in the North American theater of operations). Thus a subtext of Clausewitz and his family's dubious pretentions to nobility that were finally "recognized" in the wake of his own and to a lesser extent his brother's-who also became a lesser known general-achievements.

Clausewitz and his older brother were farmed out to the military by their father in 1792 when Clausewitz was 12 years old as officer cadets during the Wars of the French Revolution and he served in the military throughout the entire Napoleonic period and thereafter rising to the rank of major general. It was this highly charged political atmosphere that conditioned Clausewitz' world view and made him-along with his mentor Gerhard Scharnhorst-realize that the old set piece notions of war which played out like a chess game held in a gentleman's club between rival aristocratic principalities were no longer viable. It also gave added fuel to his and the other "reformers" views that certain social changes were needed to neutralize the appeal of the French Revolution. Thus they called for the scaling back of aristocratic privilege and the building of a military based on broader nationalist and meritocratic bases. They also emphasized, ironically given the reputation of mindless obedience that Prussian militarism retained, the importance of inculcating troops with a spirit of self reliance which involved de-emphasizing dogma and promoting analytical thinking that could form the basis for decision making in unforseen circumstances of crisis. These ideas took on greater urgency after Prussia's stunning and swift defeat at the hands of Napolean in 1806 in a few weeks of fighting (when Clausewitz was taken prisoner and actually was granted an audience with the French Emperor)- a situation that ironically suggests the fate of France of 1940, but this in the era of horse cavalry!-resulting in Napolean and the Grand Armee marching triumphantly through the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. As a result Prussia was for a number of years reduced to a virtual vassal state of France, not unlike what Vichy France was to Germany a century and half later, and when war broke out again in 1812 it was forced to take the side of Napolean. This was deeply offensive to patriotic and nationalist advocates like Scharnhorst, Clausewitz and others like Field Marshal Gneisenau and ultimately Clausewitz decamped to Russia where he became involved with the "Russo-German Legion" which after Napoleon's reverses there was able to first convince the Prussian commander Yorck to switch sides and then Prussia-like Italy in WW2-to do the same. Clausewitz then went with the "Allied" armies all the way to Paris and thereafter fought in a rear guard action at Waterloo.

The sweetness of this victory for him and others (Sharnhorst having died on the field of battle in 1813) was muted by the extreme reactionary turn of the victors towards resurrecting old time aristocratic and monarchical privilege, something Clauswitz from his vantage point of a military instructor in Berlin saw as holding back both Prussia and Germany's social and political development internally towards becoming a modern nation state and only adding fuel to the fire of discontent throughout Europe. Moreover, his reputation as a bourgois, if not "liberal", reformer caused his career to stall. It was in this context, that returned to line duty, he died of cholera while observing the events of the revolutions of 1830 in Poland.

The book's shortcoming is its dense style which makes its ideas less accessible than they could be. Moreover, the ideas of its subject could be elucidated better; the author relies too heavily on extended quotations from his subject's work. For example, an entire chapter of On War is reproduced with little gloss.

After having read this book, I saw a documentary about James Cameron's recent mission to the wreck of the battleship Bismarck and was able to appreciate its references to two of the heavy cruisers in that great warship's battle group: Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Finally, for what it's worth, we can speculate about what Clausewitz' view of later German military history might have been but one conclusion seems inescapable: he would found Hitler's invasion of Russia a collosal blunder breathtaking in its ingnorance of the lessons of history which resulted in a similar outcome that snatched defeat from the jaws of victory.

Clausewitz was not a god of war, nor an advocate of the waging of war for war's, or conquest's, sake. He was a thoughtful, experienced soldier who saw much service, wrote about his experiences and tried to improve the armed forces of his country, Prussia.

This exceptional book by Peter Paret not only gives interesting information on Clausewitz the soldier and the man, but also explains the interesting enigma that was Prussia before, during, and after the Napoleonic Wars. This is not a companion book to anything, but a well-researched volume that stands on its own as authoritative history.

Paret goes into detail on why Prussia was defeated, and its army destroyed by Napoleon in the cataclysm of 1806. Conversely, the thoughtful, professional soldiers who sought to rebuild that army, 'with vengeance very much in mind' are developed to the extent that they are perceived as human without the false front of a textbook.

Excellently reserarched from original sources and credible secondary ones, Paret also goes in depth to cover the Prussian 'War of Liberation' of Germany from the French, the liberation in large part meaning annexation by Prussia. Additionally, he also explains that the Prussian civilian population, somewhat a thing apart from the Prussian army, was persuaded, by force if necessary, to participate in the wars in 1813-1814.

This book goes a long way into explaining Clausewitz and his times, is worth favorable, consideration, and belongs on the bookshelf of every thoughtful student.

Karl von Clausewitz's (1780-1831) masterpiece On War, has deservedly been translated into most major languages. The Everyman's Library Edition of On War introduced by Peter Paret is the perhaps most widely acclaimed English edition.

Long recognized as the classic the strategic principles of armed conflict, the book continue to influence military thinking. On War is an attempt to reach an understanding of the nature of war itself. The Prussian general defines war as violence intended to compel the opponent to fulfill the will of the proponent. Violence is the means; submission of the enemy is the object.

The ultimate goal of war is political - armed combat is the means to a political end, without which war becomes «pointless and devoid of sense». Another key thought is that the total defeat of the adversary is the essence of war. A critique often heard against this strain of thought is that Clausewitz's focus on decisive battle and over strategic maneuver invites bloodbath.

The book is experiencing a renaissance in the post-Cold War era -reading it may well help to explain the phenomenon of war also in the years to com

I have the Regnery edition- "War, Politics, and Power," but this edition surmising Clausewitz's writings seems more widely available. So I offer my review on his writings and recommend this book. This book was widely disseminated in Red China, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union.

Essentially, this book contains the best writings of the German military theorist. Clauswitz, the Prussian Sun Tzu, effectively brought the concept of total war into acceptability. Gone our the days Antonie Henri Jomini's chilvarious code of conduct and honor- Civilians will not only be subject to attack - they'll bear the brunt of the battle in an age of total war. Several points are made- which are crucial to surmising Clausewitzian theory- 1) "War is the continuation of state policy by other means;" 2) "All war is based on the art of deception;" 3) "No one starts war... without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by the war and how he intends to conduct it;" 4) War is "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." 5) "If the enemy is thrown off balance, he must not be given time to recover. Blow after blow must be struck in the same direction: the victor, in other words, must strike with all his strength... by daring to win all, will one really defeat the enemy."

To me this work is valuable in its historical context- and as an ardent student of military history.

Karl von Clausewitz's (1780-1831) masterpiece On War has deservedly been translated into most major languages. The Everyman's Library Edition of the work - introduced by Peter Paret - is the perhaps most widely acclaimed English edition.

Long recognized as the classic the strategic principles of armed conflict, the book continue to influence military thinking. On War is an attempt to reach an understanding of the nature of war itself. The Prussian general defines war as violence intended to compel the opponent to fulfill the will of the proponent. Violence is the means; submission of the enemy is the object.

The ultimate goal of war is political - armed combat is the means to a political end, without which war becomes «pointless and devoid of sense». Another key thought is that the total defeat of the adversary is the essence of war. A critique often heard against this strain of thought is that Clausewitz's focus on decisive battle and over strategic maneuver invites bloodbath. This can also serve to illustrate why the book has carried relevance over the centuries. -It focuses on the -how's of war rather than considerations that are bound to be influenced by Zeitgeist.

The book is experiencing a renaissance in the post-Cold War era -reading it may well help to explain the phenomenon of war also in the years to come.

As the title indicates, the Army's Command & General Staff College requires students to read Makers of Modern Strategy in the core history class. Professors can make best use of this book as a supplement. As other reviewers have noted, the chapters are disjointed with each other. Taken separately, however, many of the chapters help the history student or enthusiast to develop a depth of understanding on a particular subject. Authors such as John Shy, Douglas Porch, Michael Howard, and Condoleeza Rice, just to name a few, explore many of the strategic issues involved with the evolution of military thought.

From Machiavelli and Clausewitz to strategies of world wars and colonial wars, Makers of Modern Strategy adds value to any serious study of warfare. The high quality academic research and thought that underlies many of the articles is worth the price of the book. Highly recommended.

One of the essentials, a good starting point for the study of military history and strategy.

Although I agree with the reviewer preceeding me that this might not be as strong of a book as was the masterpiece which preceeded it (by Earle), it is still a strong book and does (generally) what it sets out to do: to provide an accounting of major developments in military thought (i.e. western military thought) from the Renassance to the modern age.

As a text or as a reference, this is still a powerful and useful book. Each of the chapters discusses a major figure's thought in a fashion that can be dealt with easily in a sitting: for those people who don't want to sit and sort through Jomini (though everyone reading this should sit down with Clausewitz! ) or Douhet, to see their rights and wrongs....

I like this book. I bought my copy for $8.00 in NYC and have had it with me through a number of moves since....