I was looking for a good overview book of the Vietnam War and this really fit the bill. The author put together a well thought out, easy to read and well-written book that does a good job of giving the reader the high points. The author was a solder in the combat and spent a number of years in the military so he has an authoritative position to speak from. He does a great job of keeping the book away from being overly laden with military jargon or the Rambo style of combat writing. The book is focused on the American effort and thus skims the pre U.S. troop entry into the war. If you are looking for a deeper history on the start of the war with the French or the overall American involvement in Asia then this book will disappoint.

The treatment he gave to the major battles was good. He presented an easy to follow account of the battle, what lead up to it and the outcome. He also touched on some of what was happening back home with the politics, but only briefly. I think the most interesting parts of the book for me was the details of the air war, more specifically how the bombing kept escalating and then the final bombing push by Nixon. My only complaint with the book is that it was an overview that was a bit too light on the facts for me. The book was only 270 pages long, and book size do not necessary determine quality, this book could have been a little bit more in-depth. It seemed to me that to get a better understanding a few more pages could have been added without the overview turning into a in depth study.

I don't read books hardly ever, but we read this for a military history class, and I finished it in 2 days. This book gave me new insight into a battle I knew nothing about..I had always heard we lost the war, which I took as a military loss. But, after reading this book, I believe we totally won militarily, but lost the war politically. It's hard to imagine how many people are without a brother, father, or husband because our government couldn't make one intelligent decision!!..Read this book and you will see it from someone who was there, not some historian who thinks he really knows what happened.

I highly enjoyed reading this book on the Vietnam War. So much in fact that I have read it more than once. It is easy to read and concentrates on military strategy. Those looking for a book relating to social and cultural upheaval in the States during the war will be disappointed since there is very little of that. This book is a purely political and military history. Not all of his comments may be welcome to some readers. He believes, for instance, that the U.S. could have won the war but politics and flawed strategy and tactics resulted in the U.S. withdrawing from South Vietnam.

Has history shortchanged General George Washington, the strategist? Dave Richard Palmer thinks so. "Historians have talked around rather than to the subject.... Washington's generalship and the war's strategic framework are inextricably spliced together.... It was he who executed it and, in most instances, planned it. It is he, therefore, who should receive credit or criticism" (p. xviii; 76).

The historiography of the Revolution offers a wide range of opinions regarding American strategy in the war and the role of Washington as strategist. Depending on which author you read, claims Palmer, Washington was "bold or cautious, brilliant or bumbling, judicious or just plain lucky" (p. xix). This debate provides the impetus for Way of the Fox. Palmer believes the issue is much more complex than the existing literature would have us believe; likewise, Washington possessed a much greater strategic acumen than history has credited him with.

Palmer dedicates part I to exploring the "various ingredients of strategy as they acted to shape the conduct of the Revolutionary War" (p. xix). Part II chronicles the actual planning and execution of American military strategy during the war. Although a sound approach, I have a problem with Palmer's execution: he gives equal weight to both parts of the book.

Part I begins with a general discussion of eighteenth century military strategy and tactics and ends with a specific description of the situation in North America in 1775. Although Palmer is a good writer, he offers six chapters of deep prose where one chapter would have sufficed. His description and analysis of the opposing sides in the American Revolution, particularly that of the English, is the only passage truly germane to part II.

Palmer's description of the British high command is on the mark. London fielded an incompetent war team that deserves much of the blame for the outcome of the war. Palmer correctly indicts the most culpable subjects: King George III, Prime Minister Sir Frederick North, and Secretary of State for Colonies Lord George Germain. Of the three, none "stands charged at the bar of history for possession of any unusual degree of wisdom" (p. 34). Palmer profiles Lord Germain, the central point for strategic direction, as an "ex-army officer convicted by a court-martial of malfeasance in the face of the enemy during the Battle of Minden in 1759" (pp. 35-36).

Part I closes with an assertion and a question. First, Washington could not have achieved either of his goals by pursuing a patently defensive strategy. America went to war with England because it sought territorial aggrandizement and independence. Both goals required aggressive action by Washington. However, Palmer asks, did America emerge free and enlarged because of or in spite of the strategy it pursued?

Part II is the meat of Way of the Fox. Here, Palmer neatly divides the war into four phases: (1) April 1775 to June 1776, when the Americans could attack without fear and had nothing to lose; (2) July 1776 to December 1777, the period when George Washington could not afford to risk his outnumbered Continental Army in pitched battle with the British; (3) January 1778 to October 1781, after the French intervened and provided a legitimacy to the American cause while also counterbalancing the Royal Navy; and (4) November 1781 to December 1783, the negotiation period when the Americans struggled to "win the peace." According to Palmer, General Washington consciously recognized each phase and adopted his strategy accordingly: "In the first period which called for audacity, he was audacious; when the second cried caution, he turned cautious; as decisive victory became feasible, he thirsted for a decision; when events after Yorktown required steadfastness, he became the nation's solid anchor [p. 202]."

General Palmer is a soldier and a scholar. He taught military history at West Point and among his other books focusing on military strategy, he is most famous for his work on the Vietnam War: Summons of the Trumpet (1978).

So, how does Way of the Fox grade out? Palmer presents some valid arguments. Yes, the vast literature of the war generally overlooks Washington's performance as America's principal strategist. General Washington is generally portrayed as a figurehead--an amateur who, with more inspiration and luck than skill, preserved the Continental Army and outlasted the British. Way of the Fox corrects this oversight while showing that yes, "even before the word [strategy] was coined, George Washington had become this nation's preeminent strategist" (p. 204). Although Palmer over generalizes and often lacks the in-depth analysis to carry his arguments to completion, Way of the Fox still passes scholarly inspection. In sum, as the only single-volume work devoted to American military strategy, Palmer's book deserves a space next to Don Higginbotham's War of American Independence (1971) in the war literature of the American Revolution.