Karl Donitz began his career as a Naval officer at about the age of twenty, being commissioned just prior to the outbreak of World War I, where he quickly earned an Iron Cross Second Class and his own command. He finished the war a British POW. Unlike other senior Nazis (Goring for example) Donitz never played socialite; he was a naval officer at heart and in deed from the age of twenty until the last days of World War II when he was appointed by Hitler just prior to his suicide to take his position as Chancellor of the Third Reich. He is best known as the commander of the German U-Boat forces during the entirety of the war and later (beginning in January, 1943) as Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy.
Padfield's biography is excellently researched. It is a detailed portrayal of Donitz as both man and officer and also presents a throrough review of naval (especially U-boat) strategy during the second world war. What's more, Padfield illustrates a strong link between the personal Donitz and the often fatal strategic decisions he made. There is evidence of Donitz's complicity in Nazi war crimes not seen in many other sources describing him.
Read this book if you are interested in the facts behind one of the deadliest aspects of the war in Europe (30000 of 40000 U-boat officers and men lost their lives) or if you'd like to know more about a key figure in the Third Reich not often remembered alongside more prominent names like Goebbels or Himmler. If you are hoping for a book that portrays Donitz as he was seen during his life, an officer who did his military duty and kept his hands clean of the atrocities of the Nazis, try another. Padfield is very harsh in his judgement of Donitz. If you dislike lots of statistics and are looking for nothing more than biographical data, I would try Donitz's memoirs.
In all, it is a vivid portrayal of Karl Donitz and a good read for Naval Enthusiasts.

I feel we spend too much time trying to psychoanylize the men around Hitler. They were normal men and women, who lived in a very contentious time in Germany and did the wrong thing. They were not "evil", they did things that were evil. Just as bad things happen to good people, good people do BAD things.

Himmler was not "evil", he believed in Hitler. What he did was evil, and he, as he should be, is held by most of the civilized world as a criminal.

The biography is great, the psychology and the desire to anylize all of what he wrote and thought is a bit too much.

A good read.

Peter Padfield's "Himmler" is an authoritative, enlightening and engrossing biography of a man, his (un)reality, and his role in the greatest mass murder spree of the 20th century. Padfield certainly makes no apologies for Himmler, yet he presents a balanced account of how Himmler might have come to the point of cold blooded extermination he was at in 1941-44 and then his "change of heart" at the end.

Padfield spends much of the early part of the book delving into Himmler's childhood, upbringing (by a strick disciplinarian professor father, and soft mother), early adult years and his time during the "day's of struggle" - the early Nazi years. This introduction does a lot to set the scence for Himmler's life. While we certainly can't forgive the man for hwat he did and stood for, we might be able to understand more clearly the mind set behind the decisions he made. Padfield's research paints Himmler as a man who was deeply scared by his upbringing and retreated into a fantasy world which he went deeper into as time went on. When he eventually gained respect and power as one of the Nazi elite he expressed his fantasy world overtly to the world.

Himmler's years in power in Nazi Germany are well documented, yet Padfield does a great job showing not just what Himmler ddid but how he did it - from establishment of the SS and Gestapo to the Holocaust. Himmler didn't do it on his own - again Padfield is carfule not to excuse him or even take blame from him, but rather to show how Himmler created a system within tthe Nazi power structure that allowed him to orchestrate such attrocities on man kind. He was a consumate suck up to others in power - keeping with him his whole life his feelings of insecurity and uselessness, even at the height of his power.

All in all, "Himmler" is a must read for those interested in understanding the how's of WWII's crimes and how a single human can, with the aide of others, so change history.

This is an excellent book, and indispensable to the library of anyone with a serious interest in Nazism or the Holocaust. Padfield has clearly done an enormous amount of research and he uses it with with great skill and perspicacity. He clearly explains Nazi ideology (as espoused by Himmler) and the projects which gave it shape and meaning. He presents plainly both the realpolitik of Nazi government, and the public policy under which it hid it's corruption. He chronicles the growth and spread of the SS both as Himmlers personal fiefdom and the power base he used to rise to the top. His portraits of the major 'players' both within the SS and in the broader regime are drawn from eyewitness accounts and are skillfully woven into the narrative in a way which empahasises both their personalities and their importance in the history of the period.

Padfield creates a narrative of Himmler's life that takes the reader on a first class tour of the Third Reich, the upper echelons of the SS heirarchy, and the 'hell on earth' of the Holocaust created by Nazi ideology. It is particularly gratifying that Padfield never succumbs to the temptation of 'adjectival' history. He never describes events or people as 'evil' or 'monstrous', preferring to let the facts speak for themselves. He is free to do so because of the extraordinary clarity with which he presents the facts for the reader.

A particularly brilliant example is the juxtaposition of Himmler's outrage at the brutality of a hunting party he took part in in October 1941 - "Nature is so wonderfully beautiful, and every animal has a right to live." which is followed by an account of the clearing of the Riga Ghetto in November of that year (just two weeks later) carried out under his orders. "it is not a Weltanschauungs-question to rid oneself of lice; it is a matter of cleanliness." (pages 351ff)

His presentation of the micro-processes of Einsatzgruppen mass-murder is probably the best I've ever read. The methodology of dehumanising both victim and murderer by a series of incremental steps, coupled to a 'normalising' tempo which leads inevitably to the pit is vital to understanding both the brutality of the crime, and it's essentially human, militarist, 'technically dispassionate' character. As an Organisational Development consultant I find this particularly fascinating given the extent to which corporations seek to 'normalise' human behaviours to suit their own goals.

Padfield is equally clear in tracking the larger history of the Holocaust as it developed over time. He deftly avoids falling into the 'intentionalist' or 'functionalist' camps by sticking to the facts available and presenting the series of orders, actions, refining of methods, and further orders in the context of both the organisations and individuals involved, and in the tempo of the times.

The book is weakest in it's attempts to psycho-analyze Himmler which come across as Freudian psycho-babble when set against the scale of Himmlers crimes, but this is a minor quibble. The honesty with which Padfield's analysis is developed from the facts is refreshing. Where he has a theory or explanation unsupported by the evidence available to him he labels it clearly as 'conjetcture' and returns to the historical record. I have read scores of books on the Nazism and the Third Reich and this is one of the very best. An excellent resource, clear, lucid and rich with the sort of detail that illuminates reather than clutters. Buy this book! ... Aristeas.

This book is pretty good but its not the best book I've seen.It only talks about the major events of the war and it does'nt have the tiny bits that nobody knows about thaat makes it interesting. I found some new stuff about the japanese but not that much. The major reason that I got this book was for the british and italian submarines which I could'nt find anything that I did'nt already know.Overall ehhhhhhhhhhh!!!!!!!!!!

This book gives a comprehensive account of submarine ops in World War II.Author being a renowned naval historian.Evolution of sub arm of leading naval powers is covered in detail especially doctrines which guided its employment.Padfield then goes on to give a sketch on the technical features of subs at the disposal of these powers.What I particularly liked was author's account of torpedo-aiming devices[vorhaltechner,TDC]developed by U boat arm of Kriegsmarine and Sub Command of US navy.Padfield has correctly pointed out the subs intially were not used the way it should have been used.This particularly applies to US navy.Mainly because naval staff was obsessed with Mahan's thinking of decisive fleet engagement involving capital ships with subs also pressed into attacking the same.IJN squandered its subarm making them serve as adjuncts to battle fleet instead of using them to assail AMERICAN SUPPLY LINES STRECHING out all the way from the western seaboard of US.Such a course of aCTION WOULD HAVE possibly scaled down the momentum of Adm Nimitz's Central Pacific offensive.I am appalled by how Japan ignored maritime security of its island empire.Like Britain Tokyo was vulnerable to naval blockade.Belatedly started sailing in convoys.But the convoy to be effective Japanese ought to know the disposition of US subs.This was not to be as American ciphers proved impenetrable which made evaasive routing difficult.As experience in both world wars have shown rerouting convoys was the best meathod for foiling sub attacks.Japanese were further handicapped by lack of radar.Hence ships escorting convoys were unable to locate surfaced subs. Japanese aircraft patrolling seaways never had RWR[radar warning receiver]which would have helped to detect emissions from target locating radars aboard US boats.Above faults compounded by reluctance of Japanese naval leadership to allocate destrs for escort duties.So the US subs came to exercise a stranglehold over Tokyo's seaborne trade. I must say much of American fatalities stemmed from the overconfidence of US subcommand.Padfield's account of U boat war is just a rehash of what had been written earlier by other historians and does not contain any fresh insights.Author's contention that U boat offensive to choke BritaIN'S SEABORNE TRADE HAD LOST ITS sting by mid 1941 ,I find difficult to concur.Rests his thesis on the succesful penetration of German naval enigma cipher which made rerouting possible around waiting U boat packs.While not belittling this development I feel Hitler's decision to divert boats to other theatres of war made a big impact on the course of campaign.MOre boats in the Atlantic wouldhave meant more eyes for locating convoys.Biggest flaw of this book is most of author's comments are ambigously couched.In the concluding portions of the book author has acknowledged the potency of German U boat arm;that it very nearly brought Britain to its knees.So is the case with atom bombing of Japan which Padfield justifies at the same time arguing that continuation of US sub campaign would have sufficed to bring its capitulation.Few of author's political pronouncements sound hypocritical especially on the build up of events climaxing in the outbreak of Pacific war.To conclude: book is biased ,subjective.

I found Mr. Padfields book to contain some excellent accounts of the various submarine forces' efforts during the Second World War. I also thought that he does a great job of placing the 1st hand accounts within the larger strategic issues he examines.

My only criticism of the work is that he does not treat the US efforts in the pacific with anywhere near the same breadth of analysis that he gives the British in the Med. I found it hard to accept his arguments fully, as he rarely if ever gives alternatives to his positions.

The first casualty in war - truth. Without it there will always be plenty of scope for the Violets, Roses, Gilberts, Manchesters, Irvings et al. A well focused study, difficult to put down once under way. Of course, no satisfactory conclusion, leaving me wondering whether I'll be around in 2017, and will the world then know the whole truth and nothing but the truth. I very much doubt it.

An extremely informative, accurate and unbiased account of one of Hitler's closest ranks. Peter Padfield does an excellent job of capturing, and often analyzing, the life of Himmler from his Catholic childhood, through his initial failures of military life, through his rise to become one of Hitler's inner circle and the most powerful person in the Third Reich. Padfield is consistent with his documentation of what is fact, his conclusions based on historical documentation, to what cannot be known with any level of certainty. It is particularly interesting to delve into Himmler's rationalizations for his actions. Padfield also gives insight into many of the additional cast of characters within the Nazi regime, including Hitler, Donitz, and Goebbels as well as the thoughts and strategies of those both inside and outside Germany during this particular period in history.

Peter Padfield's latest work, Maritime Supremacy and The Opening of the Western Mind is unlike many traditional naval histories, and is indicative of the innovative writing style of this accomplished author. While this work builds on many of his earlier books, in particular Guns at Sea, Tide of Empires, Rule Britannia, and Armada, Padfield has made the leap - quiet successfully - of merging the importance of naval and maritime topics with the larger picture of Western Civilization and the development of societies.

As its subtitle denotes, Maritime Supremacy examines the major naval campaigns that shaped the modern world. From the defeat of the of the Spanish Armada in 1588, to Beachy Head in 1690, to the Battle of the Saints in 1782, these are only some of the key battles that Padfield focuses on. Additionally he includes chapters that relate to the rise and fall of the key maritime nation states, including Spain, the Netherlands, England, and finally the United States.

What separates the author from his contemporaries is his ability to examine the clash of fleets and incorporate their successes, or defeats, into the larger scheme of history. He identifies nation-states as either supreme maritime or territorial powers and it is this interaction, both domestically and internationally that provides the structure for his thesis and according to him, for modern history. The book builds extensively on his two volume Tide of Empires: Decisive Naval Campaigns in the Rise of the West, but unlike this earlier work, which is nearly twenty years old, it incorporates many new historiographical sources, while still utilizing primary resources for much of his information.

The greatest drawback to Maritime Supremacy is its focus on a rather narrow time frame. While it spans nearly two hundred years, it leaves the reader questioning what other maritime influences have impacted on civilization. Also, the lack of an independent conclusion, to tie together many of the key points addressed in his earlier chapters, would have benefited the reader. Overall, Peter Padfield's Maritime Supremacy and The Opening of The Western Mind is an ideal selection for both historians and the general reading audience seeking information on the role of sea in the dawn of modern history. What the reader comes to realizes is that changes in society, politics, trade, and naval capabilities are not independent events, but forces in the development of civilizations.