I beg to disagree with only one sentence in the Kirkus editorial review above. But it is a big sentence to me, and a lot can be said to counter its main argument. And that is in the degree of responsibility for creating damage to US security, as abscribed to each the three british pies while posted in Washington. It is said that McLean's part, in the damage made, was the largest.
I could respect their views on that, but then we could not be talking about what they each did WHILST in America, could we? Philby's treachery, in itself and in America, which included deceiving both his FBI and CIA counterparts, created a split in anglo-american intelligence and security relations which, in many ways, is still felt even today. And lots of people died trying to reach Albania, and the Ukraine, too. And, although McLean had much to do with US Korean War losses during the 1950-1951 segment of the 1950-53 conflict, he did ALL of the damage whilst being Head of the American Department, in London, a full two years after he'd departed Washington, and a full six months after his return, for miscunduct, from his Egyptian posting ( 1948-late 1949). Surely, the one who first had the access on Korean estimates, etc, and who first acted upon it, while in America, was Burgess during his 1950-early 1951 stay at the same British Embassy in Washington. And General Mac Arthur knew he was being betrayed, but no one paid attention, either to the British Embassy, or later, to the American Department. But damage was also inflicted by Philby, who stayed as MI6 Representative, with a diplomatic cover in again, that same infamous Embassy ( from September 1949, until mid-1951) and only after he was recalled in the aftermath of the McLean/Burgess defection to Moscow, an event which in itself, caused his recall to London as he was linked to both, albeit separately. If their american stints is what we are really assessing, I believe Philby and McLean should each carry a 40% blame, with Burgess taking the remaining 20%. And, overall, which includes what they each did for Moscow, following their graduation from Cambridge ( early 30's) and up until their defection to Moscow ( 1951 for both Burgues and Mclean, 1963 for Philby), I believe Philby's active spy contribution to Soviet interests ( Austria 1932/Spanish Civil War 36-39/SOS 1940/ MI6 during WWII - both of the latter working ostensibly for Britain against Hitler but betraying to the Soviets the ULTRA secret in the process-, plus his MI6 Rep. posts in Turkey and Washington, yielding the penetration, and failure of every operation mounted by the US against the eastern block, and his betraying of every anti-Hitler operative ( about 5,000) so that the Soviets could then use for the next 40 years/as well as his double agent activities in Lebanon, from 1956 till his defection in early 1963, the assessment of which is STILL unclear),to be slightly more damaging than McLean's active spy stint for Moscow ( 1939-40 Paris FO work during WWII, Washington 1944-48 stint, by far his deadliest as he penetrated the Atomic Energy Commission, formation of NATO, the Japanese Peace Treaty, US bases exchange, etc, and including his work at Whitehall before, during and after WWI, which were also pretty deadly), with Burgess ( BBC/MI6, Korean War involvement in Washington), again being the least productive as an active spy. There are three more times (if not a higher number of) the amount of books written about Philby, than they are for the other so-called Cambridge spies COMBINED, and that includes Anthony Blunt (MI5) and John Cairncross (GCHQ), the other two comprising the so-called Ring of 5. And I still believe there is a reason for that. His breach, that of anglo-american trust at the highest level of secrecy, was and still is, in a way, far more lasting in its implications.