The book gives an excellent overview of the art in the Oceanic region with special emphasis on New Guinea.

The contributions are organised geographically and then by tribes. The book not only depicts extraordinary and seldom documented works of art from museums and private collections but also provides valuable information on the ethnological and social context of the works displayed.

Photographs and layout are outstanding and the printing is of the highest quality.

It is a must for all those interested in the art of the region or in tribal art in general.

In the public mind, the treaty of Versailles is considered a fine example of how NOT to conduct a peace treaty. However, for the past several decades, scholars have been arguing that the treaty was not unreasonable. Certainly, the way Hitler used the problems of Danzig and the Polish Corridor to kill two-ninths of the population of Poland encouraged people to think that Germany was not too hard done by in 1919. Many scholars have argued that French reparation plans actually were part of a complex and reasonable plan of reviving the European economy, and anyway the Germans whined their way out of all but a fraction of the bill. And, many argue, wouldn't an ever harder peace have done much to prevent Hitler from coming to power? Such are the arguments of the "realists" in defence of the treaty.

Douglas Newton's book deals with British policy towards the Weimar republic, both the first several months of the latter's existence, and British propaganda encouraging an overthrow of the Kaiser. It starts off rather dryly, but gets better as it goes along. It is massively documented, based on no fewer than 16 sets of Government papers, private papers from more than fifty archives, dozens of memoirs as well as dozens as newspapers. And it is a valuable work as it shows the failure of an earlier "realist" version of British diplomacy.

For propaganda purposes the British claimed, not inaccurately, to be fighting an aggressive Prussian autocracy, and at times they claimed to distinguish between the German government and its people. At times they claimed to desire a democratic government for Germany, which would hopefully encourage the peace of the world. In point of fact they cared little for this goal and had no serious strategy for encouraging it, achieving it or maintaining it. By 1917 the British government was dominated by Conservatives fronted by the charisma of Liberal prime minister Lloyd George. They failed to see that the threat was not from Germany, but from authoritarian and imperialist impulses. Being imperialist and authoritarian themselves, the Tories preferred to believe that all Germans were collectively guilty. The result was a whirlwind of cant and self-serving rhetoric. Massive amounts of well qualified evidence on the seriousness of Weimar's democratic beliefs and the hardships suffered by the Allied blockade were dismissed on the words of limited, unqualifed and secret sources; chauvinist publishers ignored or distorted the reports of their correspondents; "realists" spread rumours that a prostate Germany was funding strikes and subversion across Europe or that the Kaiser was to be restored and that the revolution was a simple fraud. Although Wilhelm II was denounced as a tyrant, Tories argued that the Germans were fully responsible for his acts, and when they did overthrow him, that was insufficient to remove their guilt. The revolution was declared to be unconvincing, yet at the same time the British denounced those revolutionary socialists who had always opposed the war, refused democratic town council elections and disbanded the soldiers' councils wherever they met them. The British opposed all advice to bolster the democratic government--yet they claimed that the revolution was insufficiently consolidated.

Newton is quite good on the subject of reparations. He points out that the British were aware that this violated the Lansing Note which they were morally bound to. He points out that Tories supported reparations from Germany because it was preferrably to levying higher taxes on the rich, and that instead of reforming British industry to make it more productive than Germany's they preferred to swamp Germany with trade restrictions. Newton also points out the British were not forced into a harsh stance by popular opinion. Much of the electorate was apathetic (turnout was only 57% and the soldier's vote was much less), by-elections soon turned against the government, the media were after all strongly Tory in the first place and were closely connected to the government, and in fact Lloyd George made key measures to encourage an irresponsibly high figure before popular opinion made any claim on the matter. Newton points out that there were good military reasons for the British accepting the armistice when they did, since there were strains in their forces, and a delay would only increase the United States' influence. Newton is very good, if somewhat tedious, in explaining the different factions within the government, such as the coalition parties, the Foreign Office, the Political Intelligence Department, the press and the economic lobbies. But would a softer treaty have made any difference? Trying to prove this would be impossible, and Newton's argument is somewhat weak here. But he points out that the British had no objections to the SPD alliance with the army when it was used against radicals. Most important he demonstrates that they never had any real interest in supporting a democratic government. The Allies only sought to impose external constraints on Germany, and never really considered internal ones. As one prominent official said "I don't care a
d--- about democracy; but I do care a great deal about beating the Hun." Ironically, many of those who most denounced the German Republic (Kerr, the media barons) were those most willing to appease Hitler. Disaster upon disaster.

I am a guidance counselor, and I am trying to get an elementary careers unit up and running in our school, and I was appalled when I read the page in this book about the musician. At the end of the verse, the author says "If the neighbors complain, they can lump it." Do I want my kids going around telling people to "lump it??" Is this what we should tell our students???? I hope not!! I also agree with the other review about the violence in becoming strawberry jam if you fall off a ladder. I had high hopes for this book, and the rest of it I loved. Take out the firefighter and the musician and you'll have a hit!

Funny and easy to use book. The children stayed interested with the poems that were in the book. What was really fun about the book was that there was a place to put a picture, so there was a face in all the illustrations. You could use a picture of yourself or one of the children. The poems were very humorous and gave a brief idea of what would be involved in a career. The book mentioned some jobs thta might interest young children and was very simple for them to understand. I would recommend this book to any teacher attempting a career guidance unit with young elementary school children.

This was a most hilarious and good natured book. For all ages, young and old. My children got a kick of seeing themselves in the book on each page. A big Bravo!

Unfortunately there are few texts that provide a survey of Indonesian art and culture. For that reason this book is a must-have for anyone interested in that area. However, the chapters are choppy and at times difficult to read. It is a challenge to determine each chapter's main point and how each chapter relates to the others. More than once I turned a page and thought I had missed a paragraph, because the next word in the sentence did not seem to make sense. This book is valuable for its photographs and for the information it does provide, if you don't mind a less than fluid read.