This book advocates a new force structure for the US Army. Current US forces are composed of heavy 2D mechanized forces, and light Airborne and Air Assault capable infantry units. The heavy forces have great tactical mobility, but no strategic or operational mobility. The light forces are opposite, with great operational and strategic mobility, but are foot mounted upon arrival on the battlefield.

This book proposes a helicopter transportable light mechanized force for the US Army. This force would give the Air-Mech troops much greater firepower and mobility than the current airborne/air-assault units have. It would also remain air transportable for vertical (3D) envelopment (impossible with heavy mechanized units), as well as having a much smaller logistics requirement than the current heavy mechanized force.

The concept is significant for the US, but is already employed (in a modified form) by Russia. The book is a bit heavy on specific details such as vehicle modifications, and weapons configurations rather than the theories or concepts showing how such a unit will be employed tactically (it covers operational deployment well).It also has little coverage of the USSR/Russian experience with this type of organization.

This is a multi-authored book, and takes the form of a series of chapters rather than an integrated work by one man. As a result many issues are covered in duplicate. As a side note, the book constantly assigns made up names to armored vehicles such as the M-113 or the German Wiesel. These are not officially assigned or recognized names. This ametuerish touch only confuses readers who might not be familiar with gimmicky renaming.

Had the book spent more time explaining the potential tactical employment of the ideas, along with how it will fit in with the new 4th Generation Warfare models now being explored I would have rated it higher. Coming up with a good military theory is only half the battle. Effectively conveying these ideas and why they are important is the other half. This book achieves the first requirement, but fails on the second.

Overall this is an important book in that it proposes significant and valid changes to US Army structure. It is a diamond in the rough, and if the reader can tolerate the various issues mentioned above it is worthwhile.

My first impression, thinking about 2 dimension warfare and three dimensions with lethal, airmobile fighting platforms, was how heavy Army forces have done the powerful, ground assaults in 2 dimensions, with huge linemen like 70 ton M1 tanks, but with Air Mech Strike, it's like technique called 'passing' has been made available. When passing (3D air mech maneuver) was introduced into football, many probably hated it, but where would NFL and college football be today with passing, interceptions, etc. 3D and 2D can 'work' together, just like football is the metaphor for War (principles are similar - Mass, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Economy of Force, Surprise, Simplicity, Security, Objective and Offense.....)

With 3D Air Mech and 2D heavy forces, we have more synergy and options to defeat the enemy, get the 'drop' on them, take the offense, make first downs and get in end zone. Now of course Air Defense can be very dangerous to Air Mech, but so are interceptions in passing game, there is RISK, and Quarterback and receivers DEMAND training, just as future Air Mech Strike troopers should be highly trained and have superb leaders, just like the couragous airborne and glider troops of the 101 Airborne and 82nd, led by great men like General Gavin and General Ridgeway. The brave troopers of 1-7 Cav at Ia Drang with then LTC Moore and other pioneers of airmobility in the First Cav, Big Red One and almost every unit in Vietnam pushed airmobility. Too bad our skills have withered, and it's time to renew those skills. This book is rich with materials, references, and graphics all well balanced to offer a 3 dimensional vision of future war, grounded on historical and current scenarios.

It's time for the Army and rest of DOD to get serious and find some good 'passing' QBs and great Receivers' to make this unique and bold doctrine effective for a powerful 2D and 3D American military on any field of battle, not just in the Superbowl!

Attention readers!

Remember March 15, 2002 well!

This was the day the U.S. Army conducted its first helicopter-based Air-Mech-Strike combat assault in Afghanistan during Operation Anaconda...just like described in the book. Co-author Major Charles Jarnot is in Aghanistan NOW and he emailed me the following description:

Air-Mech-Strike in Afghanistan!

The war in Afghanistan has seen several combat firsts for the U.S. Military, first use of an armed un-manned aerial vehicle and the first use of the B-1B Bombers in a close air support role to name just a few. Now in Operation Anaconda another first for the U.S. Army, the first employment of helo-based airmechanized forces by a U.S. field commander in combat, complements of the 3rd Battalion of the famed Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group.

On March 15, 2002, the Canadians attached to the U.S. Army's 2nd Brigade 10th Mountain Division, used U.S. Army CH-47D Chinooks to air assault their armored tracked BV-206 airmechanized vehicles into the operation Anaconda fight.

Airmechanization is a relatively new maneuver warfare doctrine extensively developed by numerous European armies. First theorized in the 1930s by Soviet Field Marshall Tuchachevskiy, today the Russian, British and German armies have fielded airmechanized brigade and division sized units. The concept involves the vertical insertion of tracked combat vehicles via helicopter and fixed wing para-drops. The idea is to use aircraft to break friction with the ground and cross vast treks of terrain and obstacles to quickly gain positional advantage. Once inserted, the mechanized vehicles provide the vertically inserted force with tracked terrain mobility, protection against small-arms and shrapnel and significant increase in firepower via the heavier weapons carried on the vehicles vice foot mobile troops inserted by parachute or helicopter.

The technical challenge to airmechanization is how to build a tracked combat vehicle that has sufficient protection and weapon capacity yet light enough to transported by helicopter or parachute. Advances in information/reconnaissance technology, weapon lethality versus weight and the increases in aircraft
lift performance have all contributed to the boom in airmechanization. Today five other countries beside Russia, Britain and Germany, are in the process of fielding airmechanized brigades, including China. The most expensive part of this concept is the fielding of large numbers of heavy lift helicopters and short field cargo airplanes. The vehicles themselves are relatively inexpensive. In the U.S. Military, the critical air component is already in place with over 600 heavy lift CH-47D Chinook and CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters and 500 plus C-130 Hercules aircraft in the inventory.

But what about the risk posed by ultra-light combat vehicles? Isnt massive armor needed to survive? Lightweight Airmechanized vehicles (AMVs), like those employed by the Canadians in Anaconda, might seem on the surface to be extremely vulnerable. But surviving on the battlefields of Afghanistan may demonstrate a shift in this traditional paradigm. For example, the greatest risk to vehicle movement in Afghanistan is not Taliban/Al-Quedas Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), but rather the millions of land mines laid throughout the country. The Canadian BV-206 AMV used in Anaconda mitigates this risk by virtue of the very light weight and tracked suspension that results in extremely light
ground pressure. This not only contributes to its excellent terrain agility but makes anti-tank mine detonation a very small probability since the BV-206 ground pressure is far below the minimum necessary to set off a typical anti-tank mine.

Wheeled combat vehicles on the other hand, are extremely vulnerable to land mines due to the high ground pressure characteristic of typical wheeled vehicles. The separate cabs of the BV-206 also lessens the potential casualty effects of RPGs by compartmentalizing the blast areas. The lightweight also means that it can approach the enemy from terrain deemed non-useable by heavier armor and thus lessens the chances of moving into a planned vehicular kill zone. These features combined with the lethality of high tech weapons like the Javelin anti-tank guided missile (50 pounds and 2,500 meters range) and light weight auto cannons and grenade launchers like the M-230 or ASP-30 30-mm and the Mark-19 40-mm make AMVs a deadly package for their size.

Airmechanization, a competitor for the Armys planned transformation based on the Striker wheeled armored vehicle? Intuitively all new ideas are intellectually competitive with older concepts and the same is true of the 3-Deminsional airmechanization idea versus the 2-Diminsional Striker program. But in practical application there is no conflict. As most professional Soldiers know, combat is a combined-arms affair where different weapons, platforms and the specialties of different organizations combine to have a collective greater effect than any one part. The Armys Striker transformation is slated for the light infantry divisions and some of the heavier formations. Airmechanization would be more applicable to the Armys Airborne and Air Assault units where the Striker is not scheduled for fielding. As the European armies who have fielded airmechanized formations will tell you. These agile forced-entry units are battlefield enablers to heavier forces and
not necessarily their future replacement.

Like the use of the armed predator UAV in Afghanistan, this first modest employment of airmechanized forces in Anaconda will undoubtedly generate heated debate on the utility of this new and controversial maneuver doctrine. This historical event may be the catalyst for the U.S. Army to convert its own airborne and air assault divisions along the European Airmechanized models or like the ill-fated Pentomic Divisions of the 1950s, be simply a flash in the pan. Still the question that this event will pose for the U.S. Army as whole is the continued validity of parachuting or helo-insertion of dismounted troops close to the enemys crucible of anti-aircraft fire, shoulder-fired missiles and RPGs. The American public and our enemies, should know that the U.S. Armys leadership in Afghanistan is not tied doggedly to any written doctrine. The first use of airmechanized forces in combat by an American commander demonstrates the mental agility and creative prowess of a unified effort that will "leave no stone unturned" in its effort
to defeat the Al Queda and Taliban, to include employing a Canadian airmechanized force!

Major Chuck Jarnot, 101st Airborne Division Liaison
Officer in Afghanistan

I cannot recommend this book to the beginning magician. The author of this book states that he assumes the reader is already familiar with the basic techniques of magic, and he backs up this threat. Therefore, the book is useless to everyone except people who are already magicians.

While there are a few chapters on other kinds of magic, this book is mostly about card tricks - and it immediately became useful to me only as a paperweight. The tricks sound interesting, I agree, but I cannot perform them, because I don't know the basic sleights that make them work.

The basic techniques that ARE described are described so poorly that I could not understand them ... and I am not a beginner at learning magic from books. Adding to the problem is the lack of illustrations and photographs, which are very helpful when learning some illusions.

There are texts on magic that start with the very basics, walk you through intermediate level illusions, and even go all the way to the most advanced, professional magic. From these kinds of texts, you can actually - with enough practice - become very versed in magic.

"The Art of Magic" by T. Nelson Downs is NOT such a text. I am sure that magicians who already know a bit about card magic would get a lot out of this book. They also probably value it for traditional reasons, since Downs was an acknowledged master magician - he even has sleight of hand coin tricks specifically named after him. But I suspect that other books on card magic that actually describe the basics of magic probably also cover most of the tricks in this book ... and do so with more thorough detail, illustrations, etc.

My area of practice is coin magic, and so - I am sorry - I cannot recommend another text on card magic. I suppose you could look at the reader reviews of other books to find a more appropriate learning manual for your skill level. HOWEVER, UNLESS YOU ARE ALREADY A MAGICIAN, I MUST TRY TO STEER YOU AWAY FROM THIS BOOK! Since I didn't already know card tricks, it was a waste of my money and time.

In today's time, words are not enough to describe a sleight. Reading this book is not very easy. I would appreciate more pictures, more details . Many pictures in the book are completly useless and should be replaced by detailed photos. Sorry, I don't like it.

I'm not sure why a beginner in magic would attempt to critize a classic of magic so thoroughly if he is just a beginner (above reviews)...while the book does not have many illustrations, its text does give enough detail to perform the sleights quite accurately. I also would like to say that if you are a beginner in magic, this books is not for you. You should already know what a top change is, bottom change, double deal, second deal, bottom deal, palm, rear palm, side slip, and so on are. If you do not know these, don't get this book.... Also, for the serious card conjurer, GET EXPERT CARD TECHNIQUE BY JEAN HUGARD AND FREDERICK BRAUE...it is THE best book on card magic written and it so thoroughly describes technique that I think a fly could do the tricks. Again, this book is a classic...I suggest you get it if you're an experienced amateur.