Very comprehensive biography of Nasser and deals with every aspect of his life from the domestic situation in Egypt to its foreign policy. Stephens tries to explain Nasser's life in terms of the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist minds such as his contemporaries Tito and Nehru. A great biography of Egypt's greatest leader.

During Gamal Abdel Nasser's difficult three-year period between the Six-Day War and his death, he employed Farid as the secretary-general of the Presidency of the United Arab Republic. Farid joined Abdel Nasser at most of his meetings and took minutes. He kept hold of those documents and now, a quarter-century later, has made them publicly available; these startling transcripts both round out the character of a charismatic figure and go far to setting the record straight on his final years.

The meetings reveal many aspects of Abdel Nasser's rule: we can cover three here. The Six Day War clearly traumatized him. The Middle East Quarterly has already published (March 1995, p. 93) excerpts from Abdel Nasser's candid repudiation of his own regime and his remarkable call for more democracy. This resulted from a deep shock: "I can't forget what I went through during the first few days after the war in June. I felt intensely, indescribably bitter."

Relations with the Soviets turn out to have been as tense as between Mafia dons, with each side constantly maneuvering to best the other, sometimes through trickery. As for Abdel Nasser's general approach to foreign affairs, he summed it up in February 1970 in advice proffered to his protégé, Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi: "try to work with more than one side and with more than one state so that you will guarantee an international balance and so that all of them will be competing to establish good relations with you."

Middle East Quarterly, June 1995

Mr. Copeland is a very seasoned operative. He writes with the straight-forward attitude because he doesn't care anymore. He tells about the many misguided U.S. policies without anger or prejudice. He doesn't try to draw grand moral lessons, but shows how intentions and hopes of U.S. leaders ignored the realities and possibilities of their Arab counterparts.