I highly reccomend this book. This book divided into several short chapters providing concise reviews on basic science and clinical diseases of bone. The book is well written and has many useful tables. This book is the official primer published by the American Society for Bone and Mineral Research. It is writen by many intenationally known scientists in the field of bone and mineral research. It is a book that belongs to any physician caring for patients with bone diseases not limited to osteoporosis.

This is an excellent study of the highest levels of the German Army during WWII. But I think the main lesson is that there was no high command, at least in the sense the British and the Americans had one. Hitler and the generals around him spent their time micromanaging the Eastern Front with occasional interference in African and European battles. Hitler acted as if he were the counterpart of Eisenhower, not Marshall or Brooke. It is as if Rosevelt were to have sent Eisenhower daily detailed instructions on where to attack and what to defend.

The problem was only partially Hitler's. The Germans never really created a staff to manage a global conflict. Hadler resented Hitler's inferference, but because it was usually stupid, not because Hitler should have been managing the war, not the battles. The Germans were superb at what they considered the "operational" level of command--the control of armies on a single battlefield. But they never looked at the "big picture."

The book also proves that the German army high command, such as it was, had serious failings. They simply did not understand the logistics of a campaign as vast as the Eastern Front. Nor did they have the intelligence gathering capacity to estimate what they were getting into when they attacked the Soviet Union. Worse, they did not even realize their problems.

This book can teach a lot about why people frequently fail to understand and act upon hard facts. Learning this can help avoid future disasters of any sort.

This book is an attempt to re-write what has been the conventional view of the relation between Adolph Hilter and the German General Staff. After the war, Hitler was conveniently dead and that allowed the German Generals to put out a version of history that was accepted for some years but was at odds with the truth. The German Generals had towed the line that they were politically neutral prior to the 1930?s and that they had not been supporters of Nazi aims. Further that they opposed some aspects of Nazi war aims and acted in a professional way. Lastly they were highly competent and might have won the war if it had not had been for Hitler continually interfering with their operational plans.

Megargee argues convincingly that the German Generals had a political agenda similar to the Nazis. That is they supported the abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles, they wanted an end to democracy and they wanted Germany to rearm and to become a great power again. A large number of Generals such as Rommel, Guderian, Zeitzler and Reichenau were if not committed Nazis, enthusiastic barrackers yelling support from the sidelines.

One interesting point is Megaree?s estimation of the ability of the German Generals. After the war a large number wrote memoirs in which they modestly estimated themselves as pretty good. Megaree concedes that from an operational point of view the German army did well. However it was vulnerable in a number of respects. The key mistake made by Germany in the war was the attack on the Soviet Union. It would seem clear that the planning for operation Barbarossa was deeply flawed. For instance the Germans knew nothing of the actual strength of the forces against them. (The Soviets had 5 million men, 20,000 tanks and 20,000 aircraft to the German?s 3million 3,200 and 3000 respectively) In addition the Germans had no clear plan of defeating the Soviets. Barbarossa was based on the hope that the bulk of Soviet forces could be destroyed near the Polish border. It was then hoped that the Soviets might give in or the government would collapse. However if this did not eventuate the Germans had massive supply problems. They had limited fuel, and they could not use the Soviet railway system until they changed the gauge. In fact when the Soviets failed to collapse the Germans suffered massive supply problems, not being able to supply their troops with winter clothing and struggling to maintain ammunition levels and fuel and spares for their vehicles and planes.

Thus throughout the war the German Army acted as if intelligence was not really worth worrying about and that supply was a problem which could be overcome by an act of will. This deficiency was not a problem in initial war in the west, as the distances were so small and the French and British acted incompetently when faced by the German advance. However against the Soviets it was fatal.

Megargee summarises the weakness of the German generals as one of a strategic weakness. It was one that they shared with Hitler and in fact it is clear that they had little insight into the reason for their defeat even after the finish of the war.

Another issue dealt with by the book is the question of the role of Hitler?s leadership in bringing about the loss of the war for Germany. Megargee clearly shows that it was only in the later part of the war (1944) that tensions arose between Hitler and the Generals. By this time the war was lost. Over the big decisions there was not a lot of disagreement.

This book although expensive is short and easy to read. It is interesting not just for those interested in the war, but it illustrates how history can be distorted by over reliance on self serving material.

Conventional wisdom regarding the fate of the Wehrmacht in World War Two has always been that it was Adolph Hitler's maniacal meddling in the day to day affairs of the armed forces that created the catastrophic defeats along the eastern front that lost the war. Indeed, many of the first hand post-war memoirs of those German generals and other staff officials supported this point of view, giving one the idea that if only the generals had had their way, Germany would have been victorious. There is much to commend such a view; certainly Hitler's decisions were often counter-intuitive and counter-productive, and he often seemed to change his mind and the tactics associated with a campaign in mid-stream. The results of these actions were indeed often disastrous. Yet, as the author of this scholarly investigation into the machinations of the General Staff and its decision making process brilliantly argues in this fascinating and informative book, the evidence supporting such a theory that Hitler single-handedly lost the war through his incompetence simply does not exist.

In fact, this book is quite well written; it is authoritative, informative, and extremely well documented. The author has managed to turn what could have been a historical curiosity for the amusement of other academic historians into a terrific reading experience for a more general audience. He approaches the subject with verve and a plethora of telling examples of how the general staff were involved and complicit in the day to day decisions that were so disastrous for the Wehrmacht; far from being helpless factotums who merely carried out Hitler's demands, they initiated debates and discussions in which Hitler often played the provocateur, attempting to gain a better idea of what each of the participants in the discussions really thought regarding a particular course of action. Also, in employing the kinds of primary evidence used here, he illustrates how involved and enthusiastic many of the generals were in making fateful decisions. As the author maintains, there is no credible evidence that they did in fact take any serious issue with Operation Barbarossa or with its conduct until things began to go awry.

The simple truth of the matter seems to be that they shared Hitler's myopic faith in the invincibility of the Wehrmacht, and seriously underestimated the capabilities, endurance, and determination of the Soviet forces. The fateful decision was the first one, the effort to invade the Soviet Union without recognizing the serious logistical and tactical problems that were ensue when prosecuting a fight over such a vast distance and with a front that was thousands of miles long. Likewise, the decision by Hitler and General Staff to declare war against the Americans seemed more the result of an arrogant disregard for facts in favor of self-serving ideology. Of course, to argue that the general staff itself was complicit is not to deny the degree of sloth and banality associated with Hitler's command and control of the armed forces. He brashly demoted men who had failed him and his wildly unrealistic expectations while promoting incompetent sycophants based solely on their loyalty. Such policies compounded the difficulties associated with attempting to execute a war that had turned into a much wider and more complex effort than Hitler or the General Staff had ever envisioned.

This is a wonderful book, one that gives fresh evidence of the dangers inherent in consensus management. Hitler's fateful problem was that by demanding the outrageous and the unrealistic, he increasingly gathered around him the worst liars, game-players, and toadies in the history of modern warfare. He consistently winnowed out anyone who told him the unvarnished truth, especially if it was negative. By doing so he guaranteed the desperate failure of his most audacious and precarious adventures into the realm of war, and brought the heavy weight of ruin and destruction upon himself, the General Staff, the Wehrmacht, and the German people. Of course, along the way, he managed to ruin most of Europe and kill tens of millions of people, as well. This is an excellent book, and is one I heartily recommend. Enjoy!

This book does not say much that will not be said later about China. The title is disingenuous. He give about 5 pages to defining China as a superpower, but then spends several chapters blowtorching it.

One thing that he understands is that the China has had a *very* long time to devlop a democratic model but they have never been able to do it. He also implicitly excuses their model of government as something necessary for people who have no concept of "rule of law" (and they certainly don't have that in China, nor is it established very well in the national psyche). At least not as well as the other traditions are (Confucianism, Maoism, Daoism, Legalism).

Strengths: He understands the complex factors that go into the building of a society and a sound economy, among them being the protection of property rights and impartial law enforcement. When he gives examples, he gives enough to let us know that he is not comitting the "fallacy of composition" mistake, but not too many to bog us down with 1,001 details of the same thing.

Weaknesses: Not enough analysis of the bank loan problems, for one. Nor enough analysis of the GDP numbers. At the time of this publication, people weren't publishing enough questioning reports of China's GDP statistics.

I also question his figures about the Chinese people not having the capability of feeding the whole country. That has a distinctly Malthusian sound--something that has recieved one of the most thorough refutations of any notion in social sciences.

The book could have been taken in any number of directions at greater length. For example: He talks of the social problems that are there, such as crime and prostitution. But he did not detail where else that has happened and whether China's experience is better or worse that than of other countries under similar circumstances.

Prescient Observations:

1. The Vietnamese have developed the skills of resistance fighting as a result of many years of trying to hold back the advance of the Han Chinese and their tendency to eclipse and absorb all other indigineous cultures into which they came in contact.

2. That the China of today resembles very much the imperial China of a long time ago.

3. In general, most of the worst abuses of the Chinese are at the hands of other Chinese. This includes successive governments making mistakes that everyone else had to pay for. And the abuse of the workers by corrupt Taiwanese and Hong Kong businessmen.

Foolish Statements:

1. No, American children do not sing the "Star Spangled Banner" and salute the flag every day in class.

2. "Deplorably stupid" is not a good phrase to use to describe people who haven't had the experience of living in a Western society under a system that took hundreds of years to develop. "Inexperienced" or "behaviorally inappropriate" would have been a more useful phrase...

I used this book as a reference for a paper I wrote about recent economic and political reforms in Vietnam (the full text of which can be found on my web site). I found it invaluable. It provides a good, though overly optimistic, account of reform since the mid 80's. The author takes the reader through the changes made under the "doi moi" reform program through to economic progress of the mid 90's.

Though published in 1997, the research seems to have ended in 1995 and so it is a bit out-dated. But it is still a useful, easy read for anyone who wants to know how Vietnam has been changing over the past decade.

I agree with the previous reviewer that this book has the look...but not the feel, particularly for jazz's most recent half-century. What is so difficult to understand? What happened with--not to--jazz in recent decades is merely that most of its genuine creative spirits believed that it should reflect its era of creation. Not to run and hide from it, or adhere to an orthodox, rear-view mirror definition. Ironically Duke Ellington, Louis Armstrong and other celebrated early greats are celebrated for breaking/remaking the pop culture paradigms of their day. Miles Davis does the same thing in a later era and he gets accused by a vocal minority--given much word-time in this book--of something akin to treason.

If in recent decades a particular "jazz" musician heard a connection with an avant-garde sensibility, then the better visionaries (Ornette, Coltrane) effectively bridged that gap. If one sensed a connection with other countries (Brazil, Nigeria, Japan, etc.), then some intuitive artists made THAT work (Stan Getz, Toshiko Akiyoshi, etc.). And if one had an affinity for the more creative efforts in contemporary popular culture, then you got a best-of-many-worlds hybrid, at least from such forward-thinkers as Davis, Cassandra Wilson, Monday Michiru (who is virtually unknown in the land that created jazz--FYI Toshiko is her mom), and others. Concurrently, some musicians seemed to react against this no-holds-barred eclecticism and pick up from points in the now-distant past. That's okay, too...but it's not the only "right" way to bridge jazz's past with it's present and future.

Of course, a majority of tag-along musicians dumbed-down all of these valid scenarios, with results that ranged from commercial-lite to cacaphonic-heavy. Yet particularly the former was true in jazz's early decades, too. Bottom line: the best recent efforts are no less aesthetically timeless than the indisputable great moments of jazz's first half-century.

Sorry to rant, but I think my opinions are far from unique among contemporary jazz fans...in fact, there was already a long line forming before I got in it. I would lukewarmly recommend this book to newcomers, because despite its faults it does attempt to deal with this unique art form in a serious manner, and with a stylish, photo-rich layout. I would just add that a lot of us fans would like to have seen our vision of contemporary jazz better-reflected, rather than not-too-subtly dissed. For one, the Grammy awards been there, done that.

I enjoyed listening to this extensive overview of the history of jazz. The reader, LaVar Burton, was excellent in his reading of the text. The quotations and remarks from various musicians through the years were refreshing and interesting. My only wish, as this was an audiobook, was more musical examples of the artists. For example, after explaining a style of a musician, having a short interlude illustrating it would be nice. Overall, I enjoyed listening to it and found it very interesting and informative.

As a jazz fan and a professional music retailer, I can recommend this book as a wonderful place to begin one's discovery of jazz or gain more knowledge of the cultural legacy of the music. In conjunction with the excellent video series and a box of cds by the titans written about by Ward, ie. Armstrong, Ellington, Davis, Parker, Holiday, etc., one can have a wonderful adventure either discovering the music for the first time or revisiting and expanding old passions. Those who quibble with its incompleteness run the risk of branding themselves cynics after the fashion of Wilde's definition: "A man who knows the price of everything but the value of nothing."