Through most of the last half century, the Allied Strategic Air campaign against Germany has been criticized as ineffective. Alfred C. Mierzejewski suggests that this was only true till late 1944. After that, bombing became devastating.

In 1942 and '43, the U.S. and Britain attacked arms factories and housing respectively. The Germans kept fighting and war production kept going up.

In 1944, the Allies increasingly turned to synthetic petroleum plants and the German transportation system. The result was a catastrophic breakdown in all areas of the German war economy.

We'll never know what would have happened if the railyards serving the Ruhr's coal fields had been hit starting in 1940, but Mierzejewski makes a good case that it would have seriously weakened Germany much sooner, and quite possibly ended the war in 1944.

This is a very good study, well worth reading and thinking about. I recommend it to all my fellow armchair strategists.

Alfred C. Mierzejweski, a university professor in Alabama, has attempted to write a political and economic history of the Reichsbahn (German National Railway) during the Third Reich. Although the book is impeccably researched, it is written in a very dry, academic style and too narrowly focused. The first chapter, on the initial "coordination" of the Reichsbahn by the Nazis when they came to power, is painful to read. The book has only 164 pages of actual text and most of this focuses on high-level bureaucratic and organizational issues, rather than the actual operations of the railway.

For those readers who hope to learn more about the Reichsbahn's role in supporting German military operations in the Second World War, the book is far too general and thus a disappointment. Although there are some useful statistics, many are too arcane - like the number of daily car placings or tons/kilometer - to be of real use to military historians. Mierzejweski does have a sub-chapter on the railways role in the invasion of the USSR in 1941, but there is little new information included. I was particularly interested in learning more about the Eisenbahn railroad repair units, but they are only mentioned in passing. Incredibly, there is no detailed discussion of the re-gauging issue in the occupied Soviet areas or how the supply difficulties contributed to the German defeat. Instead, the "winter crisis of 1941/2" is discussed more in terms of general statistics and leadership changes. However the author does convincingly demonstrate that the Reichsbahn was ignored in Hitler's war plans and was starved for resources, like steel and labor.

It is also clear that the Reichsbahn did poorly in the political in-fighting prevalent in the Third Reich. The over-age Reichsbahn leadership seemed more intent on maintaining organizational autonomy and balancing their financial budget than either fighting for resources or evaluating how the Third Reich was using their trains. This is particularly evident in regard to the Holocaust. Mierzejweski clearly shows that the upper leadership of the Reichsbahn was aware of the death camps and their own role in transporting the Nazi's victims. However, since the total number of cars required for the Holocaust was less than 5% of the total available and hence a small burden on the Reichsbahn, the railroad leadership ignored the moral issues. Significantly, Mierzejweski points out that only two Reichsbahn officials involved with transporting victims to the death camps asked to be re-assigned to other jobs (with no negative repercussions).

As a history, this book only succeeds on the organizational level. There are very few photos and only a handful of inadequate maps. There are too many useless statistics - like Reichsbahn financial information or investments - and not enough crucial information - like the number of trains lost due to military action, or produced each year as replacements. This book lays a solid foundation for understanding the subject, but then unfortunately builds very little atop it. The book is certainly not worth the price of admission.

A. C. Mierzejewski has provided an extremely useful insight into the workings of the Reichsbahn for a time period not well understood by many on both sides of the Atlantic. He does a good job of relating the internal railway business matters with the politics of the time, and shows an understanding of the broad variety of subjects that were interacting.

As sometimes is the case with histories, this book will not only provide the obvious aid in understanding what came next, but could also be recommended for reading by people who are working with the former COMECON countries. The author shows much about the "inside" reaction against pressure from outside for reform.

The book also will be useful for those of us working in public transit or government-owned railways, as it deals with many of the issues that we cope with today-- just made more extreme, and therefore visible, by the circumstances of the Weimar years.

The book would have merited 5 stars if it had a few more maps to support specific chapters. If a reader does not have a good handle on German geography, the book could still be educational, but I would recommend having a map of Weimar Germany handy to best understand some points.