Richard M. McMurry is best known to me as the principle modern biographer of John Bell Hood. His book on that general was judicious and intelligent, if short, but Hood wasn't a particularly prominent character in the Civil War, at least for the first half of the war, so it seemed reasonable. Atlanta 1864 is as far as I know his second book, and while it's good, it's also very short and cursory.

The book covers the campaign in the spring and summer of 1864, when Sherman challenged first Johnston and then Hood for the city of Atlanta, which turned out to be decisive in the outcome of the war. The campaign has been controversial ever since, not the least because the two principle Confederate commanders engaged in a vicious debate for some years after the campaign, and only ceased when Hood died suddenly. Frankly, this aspect of the campaign would have been interesting to go over again, but the author only briefly deals with it, instead concentrating on the campaign itself, and the events that occurred in 1864.

Sherman has a very good reputation as a general, and much of that rests on the Atlanta campaign that is the book's focus. Johnston too has a good rep, and Hood, by contrast, has a very poor one as an army commander. Much of the author's attention is taken up going over the performance of these three men during the campaign, looking at the decisions they made in a strategic sense, whether they could have chosen to do something else more advantageous, and how their decisions fared. All three generals come in for some criticism, though Sherman gets by with the least. Johnston is criticized for a variety of things, and praised for little, while poor Hood appears to have been out of his depth, in the mind of the author.

The campaign itself is detailed only briefly, with battles occupying a paragraph or two, and strategic maneuvers a page or so. The decision to fire Johnston and replace him with Hood, made by Davis in the midst of the campaign, gets a whole chapter. The campaign is put into context with a couple of chapters that detail what was happening in other parts of the country, politically and militarily. Everything is laid out so that it's easy to understand, and the discussion is reasonable.

I don't agree with all of the conclusions of the book (for instance, I think Grant's Overland Campaign of 1864 was a success, not a failure) but the discussion is interesting, and nothing's particularly out of place or unreasonable. I would recommend this book to any Civil War buff. It's a very good book.

Richard McMurry writes an interesting account covering the1864 military and political events in North Georgia stating "Gettysburg had brought no alteration in the relative strength or position of the opposing armies or in the course of the war" noting that Union successes at Gettysburg, Vicksburg and Chattanooga boosted Northern morale and assured that southerners couldn't gain a military victory and secure Federal recognition of Confederate independence. The author outlines the responses of the Confederacy and Union to this strategic dilemma with a narration of Sherman's North Georgia campaign that ultimately resolved the problem.

Lincoln appointed Grant commander of the Federal Armies and Jefferson Davis appointed Joseph E. Johnston, a general he did not trust; commander of the Army of Tennessee and the text states "All the Rebels would pay a very high price for Jefferson Davis long-standing evasion of the command personnel problems in the West." The author makes the fascinating observation that " By 1864 two irrefutable facts about the conflict should have been clear....neither side was likely to win the war in Virginia. The Confederates were too skilled to loose, at least as long as Lee lived, but not strong enough to win.The Northerners...were too strong to lose the war in Virginia but not skilled enough to win it there."

McMurry notes that Grant having nearly achieved military victory in the West, Grant made two decisions that made a Northern victory costly while enhancing Confederate independence chances. The strategy in Virginia to defeat Lee and prevent moving Rebel troops elsewhere; and two, appointing Sherman in Georgia instead of Thomas. Both decisions resulted in "Ten of thousands of Americans --North and South-- paid for this misjudgment with their lives...." and "The outcome of the war remained doubtful much longer..." The author observes that Thomas finished the war as a general "who never suffered defeat on a battlefield where he was in command" concluding "On the basis of his record, Sherman did not merit such a promotion...."

Both Sherman and Johnston had command personnel problems. Johnston inherited a command muddle which one historian described as a "pit of vipers". The narrative and analysis of Sherman's campaign from North Georgia to Atlanta is informative. Sherman dependence on the Western & Atlantic Railroad limited his strategic options to only advancing toward Atlanta because that was where the railroad ran.

The writer makes the intriguing statement that Union General McPherson's seizure of Snake Creep Gap on May 7th probably "determined the outcome of the campaign." adding the fascinating opinion "....if Grant had allowed Thomas to succeed to the command of the Military Division of Mississippi by seniority, the 1864 campaign in Georgia would have ended two or three weeks after its opening with "....a crushing Federal victory that, for all practical purposes would have ended the war in the West....ripping open the entire center of the Confederacy" and "save many lives during the last eleven months of the war."

As the campaign proceeded, Johnston would fortify a strong position and hope Sherman would attack. Sherman was not going to launch a massive assault against strong fortifications and moved against the Confederate left and flanked them out of every prepared position including Dalton, Resaca, Allatoona, Kennesaw Mountain, and Smyra. On July 8 Sherman crossed the Chattahoochee and the battle for Atlanta was imminent.

Davis replaced Joe Johnson with Hood on July 18, 1864 and the text notes "Rarely has a general assumed command of an army under more inauspicious circumstances than those facing John Bell Hood.... His army was backed up to a city it had to hold" which limited his strategic options and maneuvering room. Hood reversed Johnston's conservative policy striking Sherman at Peachtree Creek, Atlanta and Ezra Church but failed to cripple or destroy the opposing force.

Sherman ,after trying artillery for several days, realized the only way to force Atlanta's evacuation was to cut off all rail traffic into and out of the city. Interestingly, the text also notes "Hood too, sought some means of ....forcing his opponent to give up his position at Atlanta." Hood initiated an unsuccessful cavalry raid on railroads supporting the Federals. Sherman finding cavalry ineffective against railroads used infantry to cut the Macon & Western Railroad isolating Atlanta and Hood forcing the Rebels to abandon Atlanta. The Rebels after opening government warehouses to anyone (military or civilian) to take food, clothing etc.the Rebels burned what they couldn't take with them including five locomotives and 28 freight cars containing ammunition which exploded leveling adjacent buildings in a scene well depicted in the movie Gone With The Wind. Hood's infantry cleared Atlanta by 01:00 AM, September 2. Shortly after daylight Mayor James Calhoun rode north of Atlanta and surrendered the city.

The author concludes with an excellent analysis of the generalships of Sherman, Johnston and Hood noting that Sherman as a field general was "probably not much above average". However, by 1864 Sherman had developed a grasp of the geopolitical-psychological strategy, matched by few, realizing that a war can be won "by destroying the enemy's society and its logistical-economic-social infrastructure and he put that doctrine into practice on a grand scale...." McMurry states Davis contributed to the Rebel command failures in Georgia through his failure to involve himself in western matters.

McMurry concludes "Grant's much-vaunted plan did not work" and "It was a Confederate policy....that kept Lee from sending troops to reinforce the Rebels in Georgia, not the pressure of Grant's assaults on the Confederates in Virginia." Failure of Grant's plan resulted in tens of thousands of casualties.

A strong point throughout this work are the brief parallel accounts given of military and political activities in other areas providing a balanced account of the situations facing both Northern and Southern governments and their commanders. The books ends with two appendices analyzing Grant's strategy and Johnston's railroad strategy plus two excellent appendices titled "Numbers and Losses" and "The Atlanta Campaign and the Election of 1864".

Lots of military historians have gone over this ground, but McMurry takes an iconoclastic stance that yields fascinating results.

His broad argument is that Grant made an error in putting Sherman in charge of the "west" rather than Thomas. Grant made a second, and related, error in personally directing Meade, while leaving Sherman to himself. These goofs caused many thousands of lives on both sides. The war could have been brought to an end much sooner had the full weight of the federals been put behind a drive to and then beyond Atlanta, under Thomas' leadership and perhaps with Grant's supervision, with Meade left in control of the Army of the Potomac.

On the confederate side, I see this book as rehabilitating Hood, and as driving a stake through whatever remains of Joe Johnston's once-high but always undeserved reputation.

Mr. McMurry's purpose in writing this book was to try and explain why the Army of Northern Virginia was so successful, and why the Army of Tennessee so awful. Although I did not agree with some of his conclusions, he does provide some compelling evidence to support his arguments.

I found this book to be very informative, and an easy read. I recommend it for anyone looking to better understand how the South fought the war, why the two great rebel armies had such different levels of success on the battlefield, and possibly why they did not have the ability to win the war.

I'm not a student of the Civil War, so I cannot comment on the merit of McMurry's main points, but as a student of the Old South I thoroughly enjoyed this book. McMurry's analysis of the two armies is very well organized and easy to read. Simply, it's a page turner. This book is at once both highly focused on a single topic and illuminate of larger Civil War issues. I really enjoyed this book and will read it every so often in the years to come. I recommend McMurry's book without reserve.

The title definately underscores how masterful Mr. McMurray has been in detailing the main differences between the Army of Northern Virginia and The Army of Tennessee. From the basics of command on through key strategy and deployment, both armies are beautifully dissected by McMurray's research, mirrored with an easy to understand style of writing.

This book not only discusses how important the upper command structures were to both armies but how the various infrastructures such as railroads, food supply, communication and weapons production differed from east to west.

This book can be summed up as an impressive literary study of the two great armies. It sheds light on the many differences as well as similarities and gives the reader new insight into the complex study of military history.

I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in an intense study of both armies.

Well done Mr. McMurray!

The controversial defender of Atlanta gives his side of the story. Did he inherit a demoralized shell of an army and vainly attempt to restore its fighting spirit after the timid leadership of General Joseph E. Johnston or did he squander the lives of thousands against the fixed defenses of the Yankees? This book is best read in conjunction with Johnston's "Narrative" which it attempts to refute. Whether you agree with Hood's story or not, you will appreciate his passion for the subject.

For all of my time as a Civil War buff, I have thought that Gen. Hood was a scapegoat. I have always thought of him as a truly brave fellow who got in over his head...and was therefore a perfect target for accusation. Many people blame Hood for the disasters at Atlanta, Franklin, Spring Hill, etc, but this tome shows the reader a different side of the story (that other than Jefferson Davis and Joseph Johnston's side). Hood was truly a hero, but much more a fighting man than a scholar. However, he provides an argument against the charge of conspiring to take over the Army of the Tennesee from Joseph Johnston (perhaps his most infamous "act") with a plausible claim. I think that the best way to have a perspective in a debate is to know both sides, and the debate over John Bell Hood is continuing today. So buy this and read up!

One of the Civil War's most intriguing and controversial characters, Confederate General John Bell Hood offers a detailed rebuttal to post-war criticisms of Joseph E. Johnston and others. Much lauded as a combat commander of the famed Texas Brigade under Robert E. Lee, Hood lost use of his left arm at Gettysburg and lost his right leg at Chickamauga. In 1864 he replaced Johnston as commander of the Army of Tennesee before the fall of Atlanta, and late that year led that army on the ill fated invasion of Tennessee, culminating with the devastating defeats at Franklin and Nashville. In Advance and Retreat Hood offers detailed explanations of his controversial decisions. This book is a must read for any student of the Civil War.

This is a book on Civil War grand strategy during the last year of the war. It assumes the reader is familiar with the campaigns and battles mentioned, and so is not for a Civil War novice. The book begins with a counterfactual depiction of Early's raid, and the resulting consequences. It then segues to the author's previously published arguments that the West was the decisive theatre, and that Grant should have stayed there or at least put Thomas in command. ... The book then concludes with a short defense of Lee's grand strategic thinking. I found the book so interesting, readable, and short, that I finished it in one four hour sitting. At times the arguments seemed a little overwrought, and I'm sure those who feel the East was the decisive theatre will have their counter arguments, but none of this prevented my enjoying the book.

McMurry writes a solid bio of Hood in this book. McMurry traces the key turning points,in his mind, of Hood's career. In doing this he delves into the battle of Chickamauga, the Seven Days' Battles, the Atlanta Campaign, and the Tennessee Campaign of 1864, and Hood's courtship of Buck Preston while hardly mentioning the battles of Antietam or Gettysburg, in which Hood played a key role. Even so, it is still a very good book with some new views of Hood. One thing I found annoying was when McMurry dealt with the Atlanta Campaign he was very harsh and critical of J.E. Johnston (who he obviously dislikes) while basically claiming Hood could do no wrong during this campaign. Still, it is a interesting and good book, while being an easy read and giving some new views on Hood the man and Hood the general.