wow, after i ordered this book, i started to have second thoughts, but i decided to risk it; if i didn't enjoy it, i knew some of the new additions to my history class could use it. but when i recieved it, i was impressed--paul choi and his team must have worked pretty hard to look for some of these quotations (the only problem with this book is its use of the word "quote" instead of "quotation"). but overall, i think this book is great and i'm planning to order more from the series.

If you love Mao, you'll love this book! Choi has seemed to capture the beauty and brilliance that is the Chairman. His personality and charisma is brought to life in living color in this charming little edition. Two thumbs up!!

A friend recommended this book to me for introducing me to the history of modern China, as background for my first trip to China. I found it really helpful to get a good introduction to modern Chinese history and culture. As a result, I certainly got more cultural enrichment and insight out of my trip. So I am passing this recommendation along to others. Mao is fascinating and China is a great country to visit.

Thomas Kampen has a well-established reputation for solid, meticulous research into CCP history from his articles in journals such as China Quarterly, Republican China and the CCP Research Newsletter. In Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and the Evolution of the Chinese Communist Leadership he sets even higher standards for himself with an excellent expose of some of the myths behind Mao's rise to power and the various leadership struggles within the CCP in the 1920s-1940s. The book, his first, is based on Kampen's doctoral research at Heidelberg University. It is a compact work, only 144 pages long, with not a word wasted. The book is illustrated with relevant photographs of CCP leaders in the pre and early post-49 era, which give the reader time to pause and reflect on the import of the author's groundbreaking research. Kampen has utilised a wide variety of Chinese language sources available since 1979, to challenge long-conceived notions about Party history. His conclusions, the result of years of comparing and contrasting both Chinese language and Western language materials, rebut the standard line on points such as the alleged role of the 28 Bolsheviks and the two line struggle. Kampen argues - most convincingly and with meticulous detail - that on these and other crucial issues, much of what has been accepted as the standard line are myths, the result of delicate face-saving negotiations after internecine Party struggles. As Kampen states, though most of the material for his work came from Chinese language materials, the conclusions and assumptions made in his book will not be found in any PRC source. Obviously, this is for purely political reasons. Even in the current era, Party historians are under some pressure to present a politically correct view of the CCP past. As one senior Party historian told me recently, nowadays at least 90% of what is published in official accounts is true. What Kampen has done is to fill in the other 10%, not by presenting new material as such, rather by presenting material from a range of sources in one summary and drawing conclusions that Party historians are forbidden from making. As such his work is an implicit reproof to Western historians of the CCP who have tended to accept much of the standard formulas on Party history. Kampen's work will be essential reading for those interested in CCP history or in historiography in general. It will be useful for China specialists, undergraduate courses on Chinese politics and specialist courses on how history can be written and re-written to suit political purposes. It is a tremendous achievement that should have a far-reaching impact on how we understand the role of the CCP in China's modern history.

This book set me off on a binge of Chinese history reading. I had to know more about Kang Sheng, for example, and "Claws of the Dragon" helped shed light on this "immortal". Then there were: Zhou Enlai's hagiography 'Eldest Son' at the hands of Han Suyin; The White Boned Demon, about Jiang Qing; Mao's doctor's self-glorifying account; Deng's biography. Nothing compares to this book for readability and sense of magnitude. You meet the twenty or so people who decided the fates of a billion Chinese. Modern democracy has nothing to compare. The personalities in recent Chinese history, the importance of them, are staggering. The Great Leap, the Cultural Revolution--these hellish mass movements affected hundreds of millions of people. You get to see the tiny coterie which ordered the lives of a significant portion of the Earth's inhabitants for fifty years. An amazing book.
I wish Harrison Salisbury were still around to write an update. TNE stops in 1991 as the economy is slowing and the hardliners are asserting themselves. Deng visited the "new cities" on the South China Sea in 1993-4, invigorating them and the "capitalism with Chinese characteristics" which they represented. What followed, of course, is our recent history of China thinking itself as a great power.

What Mao and Deng did as China's "new emperors" are well known. For Mao, the Korean war, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the establishment of China as a nuclear power; for Deng, the Reform and Opening, and the Tiananmen Massacre.

Why did they do it? This is a question that is seldomly asked and when asked, never satisfactorily answered. Salisbury has attempted to answer such a qusetion with more depth than the simple-minded answer "because they want to stay in power". Salisbury carefully laid out for the readers how Mao and Deng's acts were shaped by their personal histories, by attitudes of other countries toward China, and by the burden of Chinese history and culture (unlike America, the Chinese leaders did not start from a clean slate, instead, they carried 5,000 years of history with them). In short, this book is about how history, culture, international hostility and personality has shaped modern China; how these factors brought out the "emperor instincts" in Mao and, to a lesser extent, Deng.

Indeed, what Mao did was almost right out of history books. The emperors' attempts to annhilate their enemies when they sensed danger, the emperors' attempts to better people's lives using means that were totally naive and against human nature, has happened numerous times in Chinese history. China has been too burdened with its history, and Mao was simply an emperor fulfilling his roles while the whole world was watching.

The book also touched upon an interesting (and sad) question: what blames should be placed on ordinary people? It was Mao who unleashed the darkest aspects of human nature during Cultural Revolution, but the darkest sides of some Chinese people were so dark that one has to wonder: why were these people worse than beasts? The Red Guards and the on-lookers who readily cheered as thousands and thousands of people were tortured and beaten (or drowned, pushed from high-rise buildings) to death has to make one wonder: why did they do it? why did they have no judgment of their own and could become the worst creatures on earth simply because of a few words from their leaders? I believe that, if China wants to prevents something like the Cultural Revolution from happening again, it will not be enough to openly admit Mao's role in these atrocities. Ordinary people will also have to do some soul-searching.

After reading this book, I felt extremely sad. I sensed that the disasters that happened to the Chinese people in the past decades could have been avoided. If only Mao had studied Western politics instead of focusing entirely on the deeds of Chinese emperors; if only Kim Ii-Sung wasn't such a fool as to start the Korean War; if only the Chinese people were exposed to Western culture earlier and possessed more qualities than blind patriotism and loyalty; if only more of Mao's subordinates were willing to be outspoken; if only Stalin was a bit less sinister toward China; if only America was a bit more open-minded and not refusing Mao's request for negotiations outright... The list is endless. History is full of missed chances, and ordinary people suffer. Although no reversal is possible, we may be able to learn from the past and avoid some disasters in the future. Because of this, I highly recommend this book.

I am a fan of Salisbury's works for a long time, and this book has not disappointed me. The writing is compelling, the materials well organized, and his unbiased reporting is as good as ever. This is one of the best books on the modern history of China.

Salisbury's book is so good, his reporting so valuable, that it will provide ample basic information to future historians as they attempt to sift through this period with some scholarly distance. Just prior to Tiananmen "incident" as it is called in China, he went and talked to the last surviving people who remember Mao and Deng, the two most powerful leaders of Communist China. It was a unique time, as China was open for just a moment during a reform period before shutting down again after Tiananmen and those people were about to disappear forever. Salisbury found them and recorded their memories.

The result is a masterpiece of reporting, bringing Mao and Deng to life and in detail like no other account that I have read - and I have read a lot of them! The book concentrates on government and power politics, leaving the details of policies to others, which strikes just the right balance.

Highly recommended.

American military planners would have done well to study Mao during the Vietnam War and applied such knowledge to creating a viable counter-guerrilla strategy. Perhaps things would have turned out a little differently (or maybe not). At any rate, although the prospects of Communist insurgency in the modern world are probably quite slim, anyone interested in military strategy and/or history would profit from reading this short treatise (only 75 pages). The central element of Mao's guerrilla warfare is to destroy the enemy while preserving one's own forces. To accomplish this, speed, deception, and other methods are necessary, and here, Mao draws largely from Sun Tzu. However, Mao makes clear the importance of politics. Nearly everyone is familiar with Clausewitz's dictum on war and policy (too often quoted out of context), but Mao brings it to a new level, recognizing that guerrilla warfare is both military AND political. Hence, guerrilla units must have political and military leadership, and special pains must be taken in order to secure the support of the people, who are the basis of any successful struggle. While its direct applicability may diminish, Mao's book will retain value in its discussion of the political nature of conflict and of the role of ideology--and, thus, how ideology may be attacked and countered. This latter point remains especially pertinent in our fight against Islamism.

I first read this book in Nam as a young Marine Sniper. I served two tours there and have written about it in my book. When Sept 11 happened and I heard all this stuff about the new tactics and new war and how we've never faced this stuff I pulled this book off my shelves and read some pieces to my wife without telling her what it was from and she thought I was reading what they were saying on tv. This is a book for our times to understand the tactics of Islam. All theyve done is go to Guerilla Warfare 3.0 just read Mao's book and you will see theyve added modern technology and are still coming at us. In this book is a key to understanding how to fight back but then America has not had leaders yet who understood guerilla warfare so why start now I guess. Worth reading folks.

It remains a timeless masterpiece. No person fighting either a guerrilla war or fighting in counter-guerrilla warfare operations should do so without having read and digested the contents of this book. This is what is meant by knowledge is power.

Terrill provides us with such a detailed picture of Jiang Qing as an individual that her erratic behavior becomes easier to comprehend. The vivid details of random persecutions and of the bureaucracy in general reinforce any misgivings you may have over the "beneficent" motives underlying the Communist movement in China. All in all, a remarkable book that we are lucky to read - that the author was able to conduct such detailed research, given the cultural impediments, is impressive.

Terrill made a very impressive life-account of Jiang Qing a.k.a. Madame Mao. I am very impressed by this truthful and honest account of Jiang Qing. Madame Jiang Qing is totally unlike any modern communist Chinese personality; she was a political wife, the woman behind the charismatic Chairman Mao Zedong. Who is this lady? How was she able to survived the turmoil of prewar Shanghai period, the Communist Revolution and lastly the Cultural Revolution. Modern China is famous for a few women, e.g. Madame Soong Qingling, Madame Wang Guangmei, Madame Deng Yingchao, and lastly Madame Jiang Qing. For all these women except for Madame Soong Qingling were women of power due to their husband who had privileged positions within the Communist Party. On the other hand, Madame Soong was the symbolism of the previous Republican Era, perhaps the torch-bearer of Dr Sun Yat Sen's idealism. Jiang Qing is a paradox in Chinese Communism, she was not the typical peasant woman nor is she the idealistic communist comrade. She was neither, instead she was an ambitious and budding film star, gaining popularity in the Shanghai prewar era. In all accounts, she is a true bourgeois and capitalistic person. But, nevertheless this lady rose to become the greatest revolutionary leader of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Li Shumeng, the infant name of Jiang Qing, was born in Shandong province in Northern China in 1914 where the Chinese Revolution was still in action. Athough the Chinese Revolution brought to an end to the 2000 years of Imperial China but nothing much change, it was very much like the old order. The Confucianist China was in fact retrogressing towards the Warlord Era where the might of the sword becomes the law in Peking. Jing Qing upbringing was not something to remember, she was a daughter or a minor wife (probably a concubine too), thus resulting in no special privileges. Her father Li Dewen was not the ideal parent, he drank heavily and enjoyed a rather poor reputation in Zhucheng. However, her mother was ambitious, perhaps an earlier version of the future Jiang Qing. Shumeng (pure and simple) was rather an ill-chosen name, it does not reflects upon the aggressive and outward looking Jiang Qing. Later, Jiang Qing's name was change by her grandfather to Li Yunhe (crane in the clouds), too rustic but yet one of the most suitable name for Jiang Qing. Jiang Qing was never the Confucianist demure woman but she challenged all avenues and made great inroads for the emancipation of women in China. I admire such strong character than made up the true nature of Jiang Qing. Li Yunhe, later to be christened again as Lan Ping (blue apple); life as an actress was seedy, perhaps too seedy for the communist comrade. Terill describe clearly her love affairs with her first three husbands from Mr Fei, Yu Qiwei and Tang Na. Her first marriage was a shamble, there was little love between this couple, it was with Yu Qiwei and Tang Na where she found true love. With Yu Qiwei, it was his idealistic and underground communist movement that made her fell for him, while Tang Na was their shared passion for the theatre as well as grasping the communist movement. True romantic love was never the context that brought together these two greatest revolutionaries figures in history. Mao Zedong, 45 was thrice married in 1937 and so was Lan Ping, 24 but it was the jest for political power, the jest for idealism that set in the nature of this long lasting relationship. In 1937, at the conclusion of the Long March and the end of the White Terror of Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong set up base in Yanan that soon to be the bastion of Chinese Communism. Yanan was the ideal romanticism of communist ideology, I would say the founding of the People's Republic of China has its greatest pillars of strength in Yanan. Although, communist leaders like Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai was not of favour of Jiang Qing as the consort of the "great'' leader, for these communist zealots, He Zizhen (Mao's 3rd Wife) was in their mind was the ideal communist consort, the revolutionary love mate of Mao Zedong. He Zizhen shouldered the brunt of the revolution and the sufferings of the Long March. But in the end, He Zizhen lost to Lan Ping the young and beautiful actress whereas He Zizhen was frail and perhaps on the brink of schizophrenia. Lan Ping's final name change to Jiang Qing (Blue River) was the start of a new Jiang Qing, the consort or the "ai ren" of Chairman Mao Zedong. Although known as Mrs. Chairman, she is still far behind in the list of the Communist hierarchy, she was to be known as the lady lover behind Mao not the women equal as He Zizhen. Nevertheless, her rise in the Communist Party was slow and never meteoric as continuos purges of of her was done in a symbolic way:- seeking medication and rest in Moscow. On each trip back from Moscow, her status diminished. However, the litmus test of Jiang Qing was the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, she headed the steering committee of the Cultural Revolution that become the de-facto politburo in China. The Cultural Revolution group plotted revenge, denouncing the rightist, the capitalist roaders like Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping etc. Together with their husbands, their wives eg Wang Guangmei was sent to the gallows as crimes in bed. Imagine that the Red Guards, agents of Jiang Qing became the dominant forces of the Cultural Revolution. Although many authors and sinologist might view Jiang Qing's action as outright evil, perhaps counter-revolutionary but in my humble opinion it is none of that sort:- it was plain political power struggle. Jiang Qing plotted and bided (although failed) for the prime post of Empress Wu Zetian of the Tang Dynasty. When Emperor Tai Zong died, his consort Wu Zetian usurped the throne in her favour, at first with the blessings of the heir apparent but later she became the "emperor" in her own right. Jiang Qing is perhaps the modern version of Empress Wu, in this case as the living "emperor" became weaker, Jiang became the mouth-piece of the 'emperor' "I was Mao's Dog, he asked me to bite and I bite", the most famous quotation that justified Jiang Qing as acting according to the wishes of Chairman Mao. How justifiable is this statement? Was Jiang acting as Mrs Mao or was she on her true account. After the purge of the Gang of Four, many historians view Jiang Qing as the ringleader behind the folly of the Cultural Revolution but Terrill made a very comprehensive account considering facts from both sides. I would say that this account is rather accurate relegating the facts from fiction...

Along with Jian Chen 1994 book on what drew Communist China into the Korean conflict, Prof. Zhang's book provides valuable insights on how Mao and the PLA "volunteer" army conducts its warfare against the much better equipped U.S. military. Red China paid a very high price to defend the North Koreans, and Prof. Chen explores the root motivation for this "sacrifice." Prof. Zhang's book focuses on the how of the war, from the Chinese view point. Working with previously classified Chinese documents, the book details how Mao and his military commanders (led by Peng Te-huai, who was purged three years after the Armstice) differed on the strategies and tactics, with Mao coming across as an incompetent bureaucrat who placed zero value on the lives of his soldiers. While there are many mistakes in this book concerning the movements of the U.S. forces (likely because Prof. Zhang is quoting from Chinese military memos -- but it would have been nice if he caught them and corrected them), this book is a must-read for every American who has not forgotten the Forgotten War and the hundreds of thousands of U.S. casualties.

Shu Guang Zhang provides an in depth perspective to the Chinese motivation for intervention in the Korean War, and a critical analysis of the strategy employed. Much can be learned of the battlefield strategy and political machinations of this most formitable foe, including the tactics of both the battlefield and the negotiation table.

Lee Feigon's new book mostly eschews an in-depth analysis of the underlying Chinese and western political philosophies that influenced Mao, choosing to focus on the narrower questions -- Was Mao China's Stalin, and his opponents relatively benevolent liberalizers? Was the Cultural Revolution a purely selfish power grab on Mao's part?

From 1966-76, it was trendy to uncritically praise Mao; since the mid-1980s, the trendy view flip-flopped. Mao went from being an emancipator who created a society where everyone selflessly struggled for the common good and avoided the usual social blights, to a selfish Stalinist monster who pushed more righteous leaders like Liu Shaoqi out of the way in the process of destroying China. While Lee Feigon is not the first China scholar to call into question this total demonization view, his book will likely be the most prominent attempt.

Half of this book is a biography of Mao and a history of the Chinese revolution. It seems directed at those with only a moderate degree of knowledge about 20th century China, and will be repetitive for the well-read; but these pre-PRC chapters are worth reading nonetheless, because a handful of surprising revelations and debunking of myths are scattered throughout.

The rest of the book is on the 1956-76 period. Feigon correctly notes that Mao was behind the 1956-57 "Hundred Flowers" campaign (though he ignores Zhou Enlai's role). The Hundred Flowers, a limited revival of the May 4th New Culture values, was China's first post-1949 democracy movement. Mao pushed the Hundred Flowers over the ardent opposition of his own Communist Party, who were comfortable in their positions, insulated from the public. Later, the party pressured Mao to let them silence those daring to criticize the infallible Leninist party. To his immense discredit (and to Zhou's chagrin), Mao grudgingly caved and endorsed the "anti-rightist" witch hunts of 1957-58, led with great relish by Deng Xiaoping, future darling of western journalists.

Another point Feigon discusses, and could have elaborated on further, was Mao's support for workers against the tyrannical Soviet model of industrial organization. Mao enthusiastically supported the workers' right to strike and right to participate in management. The party, on the other hand, detested both ideas, preferring "stability" and top-down organization. Mao put the right to strike in the PRC constitution, Deng took it out in 1982. Is it any wonder why, as Feigon notes, workers carry Mao's portrait in strikes against managerial corruption today?

Feigon shows that the Great Leap Forward should be thought of as a break with the centralized Soviet economic model, making the traditional rural market towns ("communes") outside-the-plan epicenters of economic development, a move with long range benefits. In the short term though, the GLF led to a devastating famine, because of the deadly intersection of utopian exuberance and totalitarian control of information which had been reinstated over Zhou's objection and with the approval of Mao and the Leninist-Stalinist wing after 1957.

In the Cultural Revolution chapter, Feigon describes how Mao, realizing how entrenched and elitist the party's bureaucracy had become, came to believe only a mass revolt against the party could establish a more populist anti-Stalinist political arrangement. Though the CR, in large part, failed to create a democratic political culture (Maurice Meisner, in "Mao's China and After" 1999 edition, shows how Mao proved hypocritical in calling for Paris Commune type organizations then double crossing the first one formed), Feigon notes two positive political legacies of the CR- 1) a weakened bureaucracy 2) permanent infusion into the political culture the idea that the people have a right to criticize or rebel against autocratic officials.

Feigon discusses how CR violence has been misrepresented as purely orchestrated by Mao, ignoring the complexities of the "royalist" vs. "radical" factional wars among red guards, rebels, and the army (the biggest perpetrator of atrocities).

Feigon also corrects the myth that the Chinese economy experienced "10 lost years" from 1966-76. As Chris Bramall, Carl Riskin, the World Bank, and others have shown before, the evidence indicates quite the opposite. It is understandable why the party pretends nothing was accomplished economically before 1979, it's less clear why western journalists are so uncritical of this propaganda.

So is Mao China's Stalin? In some ways -- there's the personality cult, the deep politicization of everyday life, and the shared contempt for basic civil liberties. But there are also clear doctrinal differences. Maurice Meisner's essay in the book "Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong's Thought" (1997) addressed this issue before. Stalin believed in a materially privileged bureaucratic ruling class absolutely immune from popular input and criticism. Mao, both Meisner and now Feigon have shown, believed exactly the opposite.

Stalinist violence? Feigon mentions that Mao didn't directly orchestrate state violence the way Stalin did, and was often conciliatory towards his enemies, albeit while doing little to reverse the culture of political violence. Feigon missteps with some figures though, alleging 2-5 million landlords were executed anyway. This would mean 3-7 landlords per village. Village studies and other documentary evidence clearly repudiate this range. He also repeats the usual inaccuracy about 900,000 Korean War KIAs (the UN figure he cites refers to killed and wounded, and is too high at that), and that "at least" 30 million "starved" after the GLF (an average of the mainstream demographic studies is 23 million above the normal deaths, in reference to the low 1957 death rate; and disease, not outright starvation, accounted for most deaths, as in most other famines).

Mao: A Reinterpretation is a new political biography of Mao which provides a different view of the leader as a committed revolutionary who contributed to China's history and culture. The real Mao wasn't a genius, nor the evil leader later biographies have portrayed. This reinterpretation examines both his life and the lasting effects of his ideals.

I read this autobiography during a month's stay in Hong Kong. I was hooked after the first chapter. Dr. Li's account of his life and work with Mao Zedong is at times moving and shocking. He seemed to spare us no details of Mao as a person, or as a patient. At times, I could have done without some of his detailed accounts, yet if I were reading this for a college report,this book would be my cliff notes(a huge one) savior.

I do wish that Dr. Li had shared more of his life with his wife and his feelings on his children, especially post-Mao and at times I felt he whinned more than need be,in other words he thought of himself a victim. Yet, Mao may have been anyone's worst nightmare for a boss, Dr. Li had a life of privy compared to those he encounted in his re-education days.

Yet, I feel blessed in a certain way to have read this book consisdering what kind of person Mao was. I was highly recommed this book to anyone wanting a very very personal look at Mao and Chinese politics during that reign.

Dr. Li's account of his years in the service of Chairman Mao is one of the most revealing biographies ever written of any major 20th century leader. It is a fascinating look at a man who held more absolute power over more people than anyone else in human history. Like all powerful leaders, Mao is a complex and enigmatic figure, a mass of contradictions that ultimately we can only try to understand by examining his words and deeds. This book amply provides us with those, while refraining from excessive speculation. It is also a lucid explanation of the byzantine alliances and rivalries of that period's Communist government. Finally, it provides us with Dr. Li's own poignant life story, as he witnessed the leader he once revered nearly destroy his beloved country. As he states at the end of this work, he paid for this book with his life, and indeed died soon after its publication. This book is highly recommended for those interested not just in modern Chinese history, but 20th century history as well.

As an aside, I was shocked to read some of the reviews castigating this book and defending Mao, which seem to parrot some of the criticisms of this book issued by Maoists in other parts of the world. Make no mistake: Mao was a great revolutionary leader (his "On Guerrilla Warfare" is a military classic) but a terrible ruler who ranks up there with Hitler, Stalin, and Hirohito. His disastrous policies resulted in at least 30 million deaths from the worst famine in recorded history, caused horrible suffering for hundreds of millions of others, plunged his country into chaos and set it back decades. To attempt to apologize for his atrocities is simply reprehensible. As one reads this book, one constantly wonders how so many could have been so intellectually and morally deficient as to consistently support his reign even as evidence of his venality and incompetence became increasingly obvious. Regrettably, it seems that such people are not all that difficult to find.

Dr. Li's book is no less than a miracle. Imagine the personal doctor of Stalin, Lenin or Hitler writing a detailed, meticulous biography of the doctor's patient. No academic or historian, Marxist theorists, or chain-smoking, cafe-intellectual could tell it like it is. This is Mao personal Doctor for 22 years. The world has to thank Dr. Li and required reading for historians of China.

1. The facts are from the "horses mouth". Mao has the most disgusting hygiene known to man. Did not know what toothpaste was. Eating habits of a pig. Read book for full details.

2. Mao has voracious sex appetite. No need for Penthouse or Playboy magazines. Fornicating with Red Guards, catching diseases and making moves on teenage girls. Details are in book.

3. Mao was ignorant, uneducated peasant who never went beyond primary school. Knew nothing about science, economics or nation building. Disasters all from 1949 - 1976. Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolutions. Disasters that caused upwards to 30-50 million death. Details are in book.

4. Disaster and catastrophe for China that depended on one man for guidance, depends on a ignorant dictator. No laws, no constitution, no orderly transfer of power. After reading Dr. Li Book, make me thankful for U.S. Constitution and the 43 Presidents U.S. has had. The U.S. system of government is a Miracle when compared to one of China and Soviet Union. Book shows how when a nation is run by an ignorant ruthless dictator, what are the consequences to lives and development of nation.

All the left-wing America haters out there should read this book. Blind reliance on a dictator or so called "leader" lead to death.

Some apologists for the dictator of death will say China is "different" and Western "standards" should not apply. Morons. Does starving millions need a "different standard" Do people in China have 3,4,5,6 eyeballs. They are part of humanity. Death and misery pains us all. All Americans, all peoples of the world should read this book to find out what happens when blind obedience is given to a ignorant dictator.

The world should thank Dr. Li for his courage and humanity. The world's school children should read this book so as to values the rule of law and democracy. The book is now banned in China, but future generations will read this book.

Mao portrait still hangs in Beijing. His body is on display at the Mausoleum. Dr. Li books is just the beginning of the study of the Mao period. 1949-1976 and the Communist period 1949-2000. Final judgment on Mao and his reign has not been concluded yet.

However, Dr. Li first hand account is the starting point for a reevaluation of Mao and disasters and nightmare of his reign

Books like this are important since they set the standards for others to follow. No one - to my knowledge - has seriously tried to quantify the extent of the suffering brought on by the famine that began in the late 1950s. In Hungry Ghosts, author Japser Becker might not get his numbers absolutely right, but this is a highly engaging look at the downside of thuggish megalomania. I don't think I've ever read anything so morbid, yet so utterly fascinating.

The basic thrust is that China's communists repeated the mindless agricultural policies designed by their Soviet counterparts in the 1920s. Russia's communists destroyed learning, promoted ignorance and brought famine to the Ukraine. China, following in their footsteps, made exactly the same mistakes. Strangely enough, the result was exactly the same. Famine and over 30 million deaths.

What follows is the story of a country in the grip of mass delusion as moronic agricultural policies caused a collapse in crop production and an authoritarian government demanded ever higher taxes in the form of grain. Of course, communities attempted to please Mao by lying about the true level of grain production. Since they exaggerated, their grain tax quota was higher. When they couldn't pay their taxes, their food stocks were confiscated. Villagers then died, en masse. Anyone found with food was assumed to be counter-revolutionary and was either starved to death or executed in gruesome circumstances. The madness only ended when Mao's own family intervened. But only after tens of millions had perished.

Some reviewers - expecially those who grew up in a stable and judicial country like Hong Kong - seem to think that the murderous circus just north of the Shenzhen river is something to be applauded and anyone who thinks differently is out to get at China. How sad can you get? Four Stars.

It has often been said that, to understand China, you must know of its past. Here is a compelling treatment of a chapter in China's history that is almost a black comedy. Mao's Great Leap Forward is predicated upon such preposterous silliness that we chuckle at its absurdities (eg, the crops will improve with "deep planting" at up to 12 feet; steel can be made by all in back yard smelters, etc...). Yet...the consequences are so awful, that any thought of smiles is quickly erased.

Historians differ, but here was want and famine on a scale unprecedented in the 20th century. Perhaps as many as 30,000,000 died. Another reviewer scoffs at this number and says that it was "only" 10,000,000. Whatever the number, this is still an unthinkable tragedy, and one that happened in our lifetime. Like the Taiping Revolution that claimed as many as 22,000,000 lives (read "God's Chinese Son"), it left an indelible, but largely unknown mark on China - one that shapes the country today as it emerges as the only "other" super power.

Well written and fascinating.

This book tells the fascinating and horrifying story of a Chinese famine caused by the communists. Basically, the communists had "experts" (really party hacks) who thought they knew everything about agricultural such as burying seeds several feet into the ground to produce good growth and planting crops close to each other so they could help each other grow. These techniques failed miserably but no one would admit the failures in the communist chain of command. Glowing reports of record crops were passed along to the point that Mao was wondering what to do with the surplus. Before it was over, millions had died and countless others were reduced to cannibalism.

If anyone ever thought that George Orwell didn't know about Communists and that way of thinking, he/she should read this book. Everything about it rings like an unpublished Orwell novel, but it was all too true for the millions who died. This work should definately be required reading for high school students.