Alfred Thayer Mahan is one of those oft-referred-to but little read historical figures whose staggering written output has been reduced by name-droppers to a single catch phrase: Naval Consortium. However, like Clausewitz, the man cannot so neatly be summed up without misinterpretation or drastic loss of understanding. Sumida's "reconsidering" of the seminal Navy man attempts to put things right, and mostly succeeds. In Inventing Grand Strategy, Sumida has written a wondrously clear and concise executive summary of Mahan's work, with a focus on the psychologically crushing moral aspects of leadership decision-making during wartime. To this end, there is plenty of talk regarding all the determination, courage, fear, boldness, danger, will, spirit, and indecision inherent in a situation where organized groups of strangers try to kill one another. This nonphysical component of war is often pushed to the wayside, but Sumida chooses to zero in on the men rather than the machines, to startling visceral effect. At the aesthetic level, the words in Inventing Grand Strategy are not beautiful, but they don't need to be. Instead, there is a refreshing directness and force to them, complemented by a palpable feeling of full disclosure. The only really troubling thing concerning the book is the undertone of shining righteousness; Sumida's nearly religious sense of faith that he's on to something big, and if you can't see it, there's a problem on your end. This subtle but steady aggression is extraordinary, and makes Sumida sort of the MC5 of military historians. On a different note, as good and interesting and insightful as the body of the book is, the real prize is the introduction. Here, Sumida manages to harmoniously and elegantly correlate musical improvisation to military improvisation, with a touch of Zen thrown in. A sight to behold.

In this book, U.S. Navy Captain Alfred T. Mahan presents what he considers the six key elements of sea power and shows the impact their application or misapplication has had on history. Citing numerous historical examples, he shows how nations have prospered or suffered through use or misuse of their naval assets. His book is rightfully considered essential reading for any historian of naval warfare. However, its impact does not stop there.

Mahan shows how nations thrived or declined during the 17th and 18th centuries through prudent or imprudent application of naval power. He contends France, Holland, Spain, et al. prospered until they allowed their naval power to dissipate. Meanwhile, Britain became mistress of the seas. British colonies provided raw materials for her industries, while her armed fleet insured uninterrupted commerce. He equates Britain's loss of her American colonies with inappropriate deployment of her fleet, contrasted with France's skilled strategic use of her own. This section will interest readers of American history schooled only on Washington's land campaign at Yorktown.

Mahan's book has had a tremendous impact on history. It unquestionably shaped the imperialistic policies of pre-World War I and pre-World War II Germany and Japan respectively. Students trying to ascertain why leaders of those nations acted as they did should read this work.

The elements of sea power are the same today as in 1900 when this book was first published. With a world economy as interdependent as today's, Mahan's principles are as valid as they were in the 1600's and 1700's, perhaps even more so. German war philosopher, Carl von Clausewitz's classic treatise, "On War," is considered a must read for every Army officer. Mahan's work is to the sea-battle as von Clausewitz's is to the land. Historians, military strategists, and architects of America's foreign, economic and national security policies should read this important work to gain insights on the necessity of protecting vital and vulnerable sea lines of communications worldwide.

Mahan uses how the British Empire fought with its navy and withs its econmic navy how it rose to become the empire that is was in the 18th-19th century. He uses various battles how the british defeated thier enemies afloat and how that often affected the battles ashore in Europe. A recommended read on how the British rose to power. Also on why we need to maintain a large navy. Only one down side, a hard and long read. Not a weekend or month book more like a 2-3 month book

Mahan uses some detail and technical language to demonstrate particular naval engagements from 1660-1783, but apart from being just a lecturer on naval warfare and an analyst on tactics, he demonstrates how the use of the general navies, or the strategy of using a strong navy to protect the fleet of an aggressive merchant marine, is the single most important root cause of advancing economic and therefore military prosperity in any nation. Using Great Britain as his main example, he also details the Dutch fleets to demonstrate their reason for becoming a European superpower in their own right. Later he identifies the presence of the French navy, apart from any material success in its engagements, as one of the determining reasons why America had a chance to win its independence. Finally, as he hints of the supreme commercial and military importance of the proposed (Panama) canal, against the declining state of the American navy and the paltry condition of its merchant fleet, he urges that America's prosperity if not survival depends on the powerful revival of its sea power.

An excellent read, a great general history book, and very lucid explanations, easy for the layman. If you enjoy history you'll enjoy this.