Mao Zedong had shaped China's political system so that it would be responsive to him. Even though the Cultural Revolution actually pitted portions of the populace against his own bureaucracy, he was always in control of this deliberate class struggle and believed the new culture that would emerge from this struggle would still be under his control. Mao's politics during the Cultural Revolution left China in shambles, later referred to "the ten lost years" in Chinese history. By 1976, it faced lagging agricultural production, an inefficient industrial system, high unemployment, sub par standards of living, widespread apathy and cynicism, backwards technology, and a high rate of population increase.

In the late 1970s, China launched a wave of economic reforms to liberalize China's economy and improve the quality of life in China. Such reforms induced an unprecedented wave of economic boom which has extended to today. However, such reforms have also come at the cost of a weakening central government, increasing inequalities, and fragmenting society. In The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms, the essays of various China specialists analyze the impact of China's economic reforms have had on its political system and social structure. The most important point that these specialists jointly raise is that Deng originally conceived his economic reform as a means to enhance the authority of the party-state. However, given the changing dynamics between the state and society, such reforms have ironically undermined the government's authority. Even though the party-state could still repress political dissidents which threatened the party or its leaders, it is increasingly unable to handle other pressing problems such as corruption, the increasing social and geographical disparities, agricultural stagnation, increasing lawlessness, and worsening environmental pollution. The party-state lacks the political institutions and infrastructure to regulate China's accelerating informal federalism, and as current problems grow to be more acute, the party-state will potentially face even greater disorder.

Please note that this book deals only with the internal politics of China. Foreign policy, etc. receive no mention. For example, the Korean War is mentioned, in passing, in one sentence. Taiwan receives perhaps a few paragraphs. The same for India and the USSR. If you are looking to read about China's role in the Cold War world (as I was), you will be disappointed... this is not the book.

Marfarquahr's edited book, The Politics of China, is an expectional one in all aspects. Not only is it informative and descriptive to a full extent, but it shows clear insight of interpretations with a good analysis of China's late era's, especially the Cultural Revolution and the First Five Year Plan.

Anyone hoping to gain an objective insight into the complex tragedy of the GLF should avoid this book at all costs. Despite the author's reputation as a noted scholar in the field, he makes sweeping, generalized claims that are simply not documented. In discussing the negative aspects of the GLF, for example, all efforts are made to present Mao as not responsible--somehow separated from the policy-making process and therefore not responsible for the terrible consequences. The millions of deaths that resulted are acknowledged, but the author quickly points out that Mao did inspire millions of workers in China to work for the common good, as if this somehow compensated for the maniacal toll on the country. I don't know why Mr. Macfarquhar is such an apologist for Mao, but it clearly interferes with the balance of his analysis and would outrage any sensible student of Chinese history.

I find this book as well as most of MacFarquhar's books (I have read several) to be fairly biased, though well-written. Here is MacFarquhar's strength and weakness. He is a good story-teller yet I find the work, from an academic standpoint, to be shoddy. He makes claims that are unsubstantiated as to what political elites in China were thinking. Basing his research on accounts written by others in a political system that is notorious for back-biting leaves me a bit concerned as to the veracity of his conclusions sine they are founded on perhaps erroneous information.

I would have liked to have seen him conduct more interviews with the actual people he is writing on -- the ones that are still alive at least -- or with relatives of the people he is writing on. Then, he could triangulate these interviews with is sources to determine as close to the truth as possible. Unfortunatley, his work is way too dependent on one or two sources.

Alas, MacFarquhar's books are the best on elite Chinese politics of the 60s and 70s -- only because no one else has really written on it. I would read the book for some fo the info but I would be wary of the conclusions and veracity of some ofthe arguments.

Professor MacFarquhar presents an extremely thorough and readable account of elite politics in China from 1958-1960. While writing this book nearly two decades ago, he had access to hitherto unavailable memoirs and other personal accounts of the events surrounding the Great Leap Forward. He gives the reader a very balanced picture of Chairman Mao - an extremely complex leader who (I disagree with the previous reviewer on this) cannot be called "evil." Mao was no Stalin. Mao was no Hitler. The book reveals that the decision to launch the Great Leap Forward, while ultimately Mao's responsibility, was pushed along by external events and ambitious cadres. My only criticism of the book is that it focuses too much on elite politics. I would love to know more about what was going on in the countryside. All in all, however, THE ORIGINS OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, VOL.2 is an excellent read. I would recommend it to anyone who is interested in modern Chinese politics.