MacDonald's text is the original non-scholarly texts written on this battle, he does however reference many Allied and German war records and unit histories as well as personal accounts of troops who were present. His credentials as a military historian are also well established adding significant value to this work.
This text is very well written and is the origin for many of the theories that are often repeated with regards to this battle - specifically that it was a useless use of manpower and that it never had the proper goals or objectives (the Roer River Dams specifically). Indeed, MacDonald quotes German commanders puzzlement about why the Americans were making such strong attacks into the forest.
Hindsight makes us wonder why the attack into the forest was pressed Division by Division with the loss of armored, artillery and air support and indeed the forest and the Germans extracted a heavy toll. Indeed one wonders why an airborne attack at the Roer River Dams coupled with a an armored push north (the Aachen Gap) and South (to the Roer) was not used to isolate the forest defenders, especially when one considers what was accomplished in the Falaise and Roer Pockets by the Allies or in the numerous encirclements achieved by the Wehrmacht on the Ostfront. Instead it appears that Eisenhower's broad front strategy condemned many soldiers to slugging it out yard by yard in the forest.
Regardless of the opinions or analysis aided by nearly 60 years of time - this is an excellent text and well worth reading as an insight into some of the hardest combat the allies saw in the ETO.

Charles MacDonald covers a lot of the same ground in "Siegfried Line" and "Three Battles", and those books have nicer maps. This book has the advantage of focusing on the Forest only (up to the Battle of the Bulge), and is fair and readable in the typical MacDonald style. For what the book is meant to be (i.e. popular history), it's superb. Other sources will have more detailed descriptions of certain battles and better maps.

The late Charles B MacDonald served as an officer of infantry in World War II and later became a civilian historian in the U.S. Army's historical division. His memoir, _Company Commander_ has enjoyed classic status. He also contributed three volumes to the Official History of the U.S. Army in World War II, commonly known as the "Green Books." This work, first published in 1963, still holds a valued place in World War II historiography.Although such recent authors as Gerald Astor (The Bloody Forest, 2000), Edward G. Miller (A Dark and Bloody Ground, 1995) and Robert Sterling Rush (Hell in Hurtgen Forest, 2001) have contributed new studies that take advantage of the latest sources, they all owe a debt of gratitude to MacDonald. MacDonald was the first to argue that the American planners failed to appreciate the importance of the Roer River dams as a primary objective of the Huertgen Forest campaign. He was also the first to state the Huertgen Forest was a wasteful squander of American lives and should have been avoided. Again, he was the first to criticize the American leadership for not fully comprehending the detrimental affects of the rugged terrain, the staunch German defence, and the harsh weather conditions that was indicative of the slaughter in the Huertgen Forest. These three basic themes would provide a basis for Astor, Miller, Rush, and others attempting to provide any future analysis of the campaign. MacDonald places the initial probes into the forest in September, 1944; the failure of the 9th Division in October; the decimation of the 28th Division in early November; and the final breakout in late November in overall perspective. MacDonald also provides a summation of Eisenhower's "broad-front strategy", a wide sweeping advance into the enemy's heartland, coupled with a strategy of annihilation, that of destroying the enemy and his ability to wage war. With this overall strategy in mind, what then was to be done with the Huertgen Forest? How were the Roer River dams to be captured when the heavily fortified town of Schmidt, and the better roads it provided for German armor and infantry, was continually denied to one American division after another? MacDonald does not tell us, nor, for that matter, does Astor, Miller, or Rush. The mistakes of generals are oftentimes evident; alternative solutions come harder.Yet, as a comprehensive narrative of the Huertgen Forest campaign, MacDonalds book was, and still is a solid foundation from which to build insight into what is perhaps the most difficult and bloody campaign in American Military history. A must for anyone interested in this terrible fight.

Col MacDonald's memoir as a rifle company commander on the line in the ETO is a straightforward, honest account of leadership in combat. His clear and extremely detailed accounts of the day to day life of an infantryman and the bluntness of his comments (his description of the execution of EPWs is no more detailed or explained than his recounting of his first breakfast while at the front) are the elements that make this book valuable and worthwhile reading to those who have both a professional and historical interest in combat leadership. Additionally, the author's development as a leader to include his lack of initial self confidence and fears make this book human, relatable and trustworthy.
If you are searching for a tactical primer for company grade officers than I suggest Erwin Rommel's Attacks and if you are looking for a more well written piece with a broader scope and commentary than of course I suggest any of Stephen Ambrose's works (particularly Pegasus Bridge or Citizen Soldiers). However, Col MacDonald's book is a vivid account, obviously written with a fresh memory and meticulous notes. Company Commander will not disappoint those who are interested in a memoir whose primary purpose is to relate to readers the conditions and nature of life as a rifle company commander.

This book is a must read for anyone seeking insite into the values a true leader must develope to succesfully lead troops into combat. Furthermore, it gives wonderful insight into the hardships endured by our soldiers to win the freedom American's enjoy. This book does not spend time discussing tactics, policies, or major operations. It simply gives a first person account of what it is like to lead a company of infantry soldiers into combat.

Captain Charles B. MacDonald first commanded I Company, 3-23rd IN, 2nd ID from October 1944 to January 1945 and later G Company, 2-23rd IN from March to May 1945. This memoir was written a few years after the war when recollections were still sharp and resulted in a very detailed account of what it was like to take command of a line infantry company and lead it into battle. This book is a must-read for all army officers who seek to command at company-level and it is also informative for military historians as well.

In comparison to the more recent Band of Brothers, ostensibly a company-level account of E Company, 506th PIR's actions during the same period, Charles MacDonald's book is clearly superior. In fact, Company Commander is everything Band of Brothers is not: accurate, objective and informative. Unlike BOB, MacDonald does not claim that the companies he commanded were anything special or that he demonstrated heroic leadership (he did win the silver star in the Battle of the Bulge). Instead, the author is very honest, admitting his apprehension and anxiety about commanding infantry on the front line. Although there is some tension with battalion and regimental headquarters, mostly about ill-considered orders and creature comforts, there is not the character assassination that is so prevalent in BOB; Macdonald was career army and he wasn't going to make points by ridiculing superiors.

MacDonald arrived as a replacement and took command of I Company just as the unit was conducting a relief-in-place of another US unit in some captured positions in the Siegfried Line in the Ardennes. While civilian readers may find the first 100 pages devoted to this "quiet time" to be dull, military readers will not. MacDonald does a superb job describing the nuts-and-bolts of a relief-in-place in a difficult position that is under enemy observation and then the daily grind to improve the position. Readers who believe that US units in the Ardennes in the fall of 1944 had it easy should reconsider. MacDonald's unit was under constant mortar and sniper fire, poor weather caused much sickness among the troops and supplies were limited. On 17 December 1944, MacDonald's battalion was hastily shifted to blunt the massive German Ardennes offensive but the 12th SS Panzer Division overran his company. Fortunately, losses in MacDonald's company were relatively light and when the unit was reformed it helped to stop the northern German pincer on the Elsenborn Ridge. In January 1945, the author was wounded while participating in the counterattack to retake St. Vith and spent two months recovering.

Returning to the 23rd Infantry in March 1945, MacDonald was given G Company and he led this unit in the final dash across Germany to Leipzig. MacDonald ended the war in Czechoslovakia. The final three weeks of the war seem a bit blurry here, compared to the earlier slow pace in the defense, and this is the only aspect of the author's narrative which is a bit choppy. There is a tremendous amount of combat wisdom in this account, although the author admits mistakes. During the first day of the Bulge, MacDonald's unit - which had very little ammunition, limited fire support and no information on the friendly or enemy situation - was ordered to launch a hasty attack to relieve a trapped US unit. MacDonald's account of his briefing to his lieutenants in the dark with a wet map is striking: "I wondered if I could have drawn any worse conditions under which to issue my first attack order." The attack was cancelled, but then MacDonald's company was ordered to hold off the advance guard of the 12th SS Panzer with only 3 bazooka rounds and no mines. The result was inevitable.

This account offers some tactical points about US ground operations in 1944-5 of interest to historians. First, US units often seemed to move to contact the enemy with minimal regard for reconnaissance and US commanders seemed to prefer hasty over deliberate assaults. Many US losses seemed directly attributable to this tendency to launch hasty, poorly coordinated attacks with inadequate forces. Second, US units often did not make good use of terrain. In the defense, MacDonald's company often had to occupy non-key terrain that lacked cover and concealment. Occupying such exposed positions merely to maintain contact with the enemy resulted in unnecessary casualties. US units would have been better off to occupy key terrain further back from the line of contact and leave only small covering units in direct contact. Interestingly, MacDonald's unit did not use LP/OPs at night. Finally, the decimation of US infantry units in the Second World War as portrayed by modern author's such as Stephen Ambrose is demonstrably false. Although MacDonald's company suffered many wounded and sick during the fall of 1944, he did not have one soldier killed in action in his first two months on the front line. Even in the Battle of the Bulge, the number of infantrymen actually killed in combat was relatively small. Soldiers were far more likely to be wounded or evacuated for pneumonia than to be killed outright, and those men usually returned in weeks or months. American infantry units were never "bled white" by combat losses as some accounts imply by exaggerating the body count. Overall, Company Commander is a class of its own as a memoir, since a capable historian who actually experienced the events described wrote it.

While MacDonald is no Ambrose when it comes to personal stories and oral histories of the individuals who fought in the great battle, he nevertheless lends organization to explaining what happened during the chaos of the Battle of the Bulge. He divides the German offensive into three geographical areas and discusses in great detail the chronology of events in each sector. This book uses many maps depicting local areas under discussion. While the descriptions are well worthwhile and do not bog down, MacDonald tends to emphasize the REMF's decisions and commands rather than those in the foxhole. As a company commander during the bulge himself, Mac still is able to lend acute authenticity to this retelling of the Bulge, sprinkled somewhat with Ambrose-esque vignettes of local action. One should read this book first, and THEN go on to read "A Blood Dimmed Tide" as this book gives an excellent overview of the entire event.

I think "A time For trumpets" is the most accurate and complete history of the Battle of The bulge that has been written. Charles B. Mcdonald was a great Historian. He was the youngest Captain of Infantry. a company commander at the age of 22. His account of the Battle of the bulge for television was a masterpiece, as was his book. Charles is dead now and the United States has lost a great soldier and a wonderful Historian.

The Battle of the Bulge provides the basis for a lot of the controversy surrounding the effectiveness of American soldiers in combat, specifically in the Second World War. Champions and detractors have expended a lot of ink in the debate over whether American reactions were slow, if Allied countermoves were appropriate, and so on. MacDonald starts from the premise that this was a great American victory, so you know exactly where his bias is. His research is so thorough and his first-hand accounts of the battle are so compelling however, that by the end of the book you're a believer as well. MacDonald also has a talent for writing from the infantryman's point of view, rather than from the cammander's (his first book "Company Commander", a memoir of his experiences in northern France and the Bulge is superb). In style, scope and depth, this book compares favorably with "Six Armies in Normandy" by John Keegan or "Decision in Normandy" by Carlo D'Este. It's also a good companion volume to "Ordeal and Triumph", Ladislas Farrago's bio of Patton and "The Bitter Woods" by John D. Eisenhower (sic?). The readability of this book is unsurpassed. It is a monumental work (over 800 pages), but I guarantee it's a quick read. Some great moments: descriptions of the defense of the "fortified hedghogs" around St. Vith, Houffalize and Bastogne, depictions of the retreat (from both British and American sources), and some of the high level dialogue between Monty, Patton, Hodges, Bradley and Eisenhower.