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The Union attempted to take Richmond by the shortest and most direct route; but this way was blocked with natural obstacles. If the Confederates fell back they would be closer to their reserves, supplies, and reinforcements. These facts favored the entrenched defenders.
The western campaign ended in the capture of Vicksburg and control of the Mississippi from St. Louis to New Orleans. Liddell Hart contrasts the maneuvers here to the stalemate back east. But the conditions, or politics, did not allow a wide flanking invasion through West Virginia or North Carolina. The threat to Richmond kept Confederate troops there. Longstreet proposed an invasion of Kentucky, a far flanking attack, but was turned down by Lee.
It explains how Sherman out-maneuvered Johnston from Chattanooga to Atlanta. By threatening to outflank Johnston, the Confederates fell back. His replacement by Hood did not prevent the capture of Atlanta. This revived the hope of victory for the North, and helped to re-elect Lincoln.
Sherman then abandoned his supply and communication lines (vulnerable to attack) and marched on to Savannah and the ocean. His army lived off the land. This enabled his army to be resupplied by the Navy. He then marched north, seeming to attack other cities, but passed between and continued to destroy railroads and bridges.
The end came soon after this, as other armies invaded the South. Sherman designed an armistice and amnesty where the Confederates would be disbanded, and their arms turned over to the states. The latter would allow repression of bandits and guerillas. He was criticized for this.
Sherman was a man of modest habits. When admirers raised [money]to buy him a house, he refused to accept unless he received bonds that would pay the taxes! He lived within his means. The resisting power of a state depends more on the strength of popular will than on the strength of its armies, and this depends on economic and social security (p.429).
Liddell Hart gave preference to contemporaneous correspondence rather than Official Reports (which are written for history to justify a policy). Some of the ideas in this 72-year old book may not coincide with more recent history.