It is hard to believe that the reviewer for KIRKUS read the same novel I did. I found GOING UNDER to be powerful, moving, frequently funny, and ultimately positive. Luvass portrays the members of a dysfunctional family with compassion and insight. Each character is fully drawn and entirely credible. Terrible as their problems are, they ultimately manage to regain control of their lives. Those who admired Wally Lamb's best-selling novel SHE'S COME UNDONE will find GOING UNDER to be a richer, deeper, and more insightful study of the psycholigal problems that can damage essentially good people.

It is hard to believe that the reviewer for KIRKUS read the same novel I did. I found GOING UNDER to be powerful, moving, frequently funny, and ultimately positive. Luvaas portrays the members of a dysfunctional family with compassion and insight. Their problems are terrible, but Luvaas makes us care about them. In the end he demonstrates the human capacity to regain control of our lives. Those who admired Wally Lamb's best-selling SHE'S COME UNDONE will find GOING UNDER to be richer, deeper, and more insightful study of the psychological problems that can damage essentially good people.

I will start by saying Liddel Hart is my favorite military historian/author and I own half a dozen books by him, and regard them as gospel. However I felt that Liddel Hart was not as well versed in this area as he is in European History. He lets his ingrained contrariness run away with him. He wants to create a "great captain" where there is none. He also, I believe, wants to convince the reader of the genius of the "inderect approach" which he expounds in his excellent book "Strategy". However I think considering Sherman's campaign as indirect is like calling D-Day indirect because the allies invaded Normandy as opposed to Calais. ( I must admit that I am biased because I am a Lee fan) Like every other book by Liddel hart though, it is a very quick and pleasant read. I would recommend his book on Scipio as a great intro to his work.

Sherman was both the most original genius of the Civil War, and "the typical American". His career provides lessons to the modern world and to modern warfare. It was his conscious exploitation of the economic and psychological factors of war in his "March through Georgia" which helped to end the Civil War. The long and expensive battles in Northern Virginia were replayed on the battlefields of France in the Great War.

The Union attempted to take Richmond by the shortest and most direct route; but this way was blocked with natural obstacles. If the Confederates fell back they would be closer to their reserves, supplies, and reinforcements. These facts favored the entrenched defenders.

The western campaign ended in the capture of Vicksburg and control of the Mississippi from St. Louis to New Orleans. Liddell Hart contrasts the maneuvers here to the stalemate back east. But the conditions, or politics, did not allow a wide flanking invasion through West Virginia or North Carolina. The threat to Richmond kept Confederate troops there. Longstreet proposed an invasion of Kentucky, a far flanking attack, but was turned down by Lee.

It explains how Sherman out-maneuvered Johnston from Chattanooga to Atlanta. By threatening to outflank Johnston, the Confederates fell back. His replacement by Hood did not prevent the capture of Atlanta. This revived the hope of victory for the North, and helped to re-elect Lincoln.

Sherman then abandoned his supply and communication lines (vulnerable to attack) and marched on to Savannah and the ocean. His army lived off the land. This enabled his army to be resupplied by the Navy. He then marched north, seeming to attack other cities, but passed between and continued to destroy railroads and bridges.

The end came soon after this, as other armies invaded the South. Sherman designed an armistice and amnesty where the Confederates would be disbanded, and their arms turned over to the states. The latter would allow repression of bandits and guerillas. He was criticized for this.

Sherman was a man of modest habits. When admirers raised [money]to buy him a house, he refused to accept unless he received bonds that would pay the taxes! He lived within his means. The resisting power of a state depends more on the strength of popular will than on the strength of its armies, and this depends on economic and social security (p.429).

Liddell Hart gave preference to contemporaneous correspondence rather than Official Reports (which are written for history to justify a policy). Some of the ideas in this 72-year old book may not coincide with more recent history.

Dispite reading most of major accounts of the American Civil War, I had not fully understood the central role played by Sherman until reading Hart's book. Hart makes it clear that Sherman's appreciation of the futility of attacking entrenched positions and his consequently developed strategy and tactics turned the tide for the North, saved the 1864 election for Lincoln, and saved perhaps tens of thousands of Union and Rebel lives. He also points out that the same insight accounts for most of Lee's success, i.e., Lee won battles in which he entised the North to attack entrenched positions (e.g. Fredricksburg) and lost when he attacked entrenched positions himself (e.g. Gettysburg). Hart fully disposes of the long held prejudice that Sherman's approach to war was more inhumane than the alternative of massive blood letting being practiced by virtually every other Civil War general. It is rare to find a historical account containing so much insight.