Professor Lucas has written a well researched analysis of the burning of Columbia, South
Carolina by the Federal army. There were strategic military reasons for Sherman's march
through central South Carolina. Columbia "was an important war manufacturing
center--one of the few still in Confederate hands--providing munitions, equipment, and
uniforms....central South Carolina contained the last Confederate sources of food
untouched by war." Governor Magrath pointed out to Jefferson Davis that the borders of
South Carolina were Richmond's second line of defense which was confirmed when
Richmond fell less than two months after Columbia surrendered.

The author outlines the wartime conditions in Columbia noting that both the civilian and
military authorities were tardy in realizing the obvious danger to the city and even slower
to act. Finally the author writes "The missing ingredient with the Confederate camp....was
a belief in the possibility of success. The defeatism of Beauregard's leadership was
abundantly clear...."

Chapter 2 gives a succinct account of the evacuation of Columbia noting that inspite of
the desperate condition of the Confederate armies, the large arsenals and war supplies in
Columbia were not evacuated. The cotton in storage was moved into the streets with
orders for it to be burned which contributed to the later fires. Columbia Mayor Goodwyn
surrendered the city while scores of bewildered Columbians, in an ill-conceived attempt to
placate a dreaded conqueror, began distributing alcoholic beverages to the soldiers. This
precipitated an insurmountable problem.

A balanced account of the burning of Columbia is given. The most damaging fire began
about eight p.m.on February 17th, was of inexplicable origin and was not extinguished for
six or seven hours when the wind abated. With drunken men roaming the streets, rioting
and acts of personal violence were bound to occur. Confusion reigned and most control
over the city was lost . The extent of the damage following the fire is reviewed. About
one-third of Columbia was destroyed with the business community virtually wiped out and
265 residences burned.

Regarding who burned Columbia, the conclusions were (and still are) along partisan lines.
South Carolinians charged Sherman as "morally responsible for the burning of Columbia".
Union officers and troops felt that while the events in Columbia were regrettable they
were the results of acts of war. Sherman entered South Carolina to disrupt the state's
transportation system and bring an end to the war by destroying Southern morale.
However, Professor Lucas notes "The failure of Sherman's psychological warfare, a new
kind of war which Southern civilians did not understand, was that the hatred generated
during the invasion did not terminate with the war's end."

The post war criticisms of and charges against Sherman and the Union army are reviewed.
The author notes that the Confederates as they evacuated the city began the looting and
plundering then the entering Federal troops seized what was left. The unanswered
question of incendiarism, the most disputed issue, is complicated by a lack of reliable
eyewitness accounts.
In summary, Sherman failed to take timely and sufficient action to control both the fires
and the riots. However, the author notes that the failure of Confederate leadership in the
defense of South Carolina and the evacuation of the city played a major role in creating a
situation which resulted in the destruction of the city. In addition no preparations were
made by Beauregard, Hampton or the city fathers for the official surrender of the city
when a formal declaration of Columbia as an open city may have produced positive
results.

In conclusion, Professor Lucas writes that the burning of Columbia was a great tragedy
for South Carolina and the Union stating "....when the Union Army left Columbia on
February 20, 1865, it left behind bitter hatred. Many citizens had lost everything they
possessed, while others had gone through the catastrophe relatively unscathed. All,
however, suffered psychologically. They had promised to give their "all" in defense of
South Carolina and the Confederacy; it was painfully apparent that few had done so. Long
before Columbia was captured, Columbians had given up."