a fascinating behind-the-scenes look at New York City during the l960s when rioting in the streets of most of our major cities brought our country to the brink of a second revolution. reads like fiction. Unlike Spin City, this one tells it like it was. a very good read.

I remember his running for New York City Major. I read this book in college. He know he was not going to be elected. But Buckley put The Conservative Party on the map in that campaign. And in 1968 his brother, James Buckly, was elected to the office of US Senator from New York State-- on the conservative party line. James Buckley was a very significant Senator.

When it became clear that Lindsay would be the nominee of both the Republican and Liberal Parties,
and furthermore, thanks to incumbent Robert Wagner's scandal ridden term, that Lindsay would likely
win, Buckley began to write pieces asserting that it was important that someone who actually
represented Republican views enter the race, simply to guarantee that there would be an honest debate
on the issues. When leaders of the recently formed Conservative Party approached Buckley and asked
him to take on the race, he agreed, on the understanding that he would not campaign full time and
would continue to fulfill his obligations to the several jobs he held. He made his reasons for running
clear in his announcement speech:

The two-party system presupposes an adversary relationship between the two parties. That there is
no such relationship in New York Mr. Lindsay makes especially clear when he proposes as running
mates members of the Liberal and Democratic Parties. Mr. Lindsay's Republican Party is a sort of
personal accessory, unbound to the national party's candidates, unconcerned with the views of the
Republican leadership in Congress, indifferent to the historic role of the Republican Party as
standing in opposition to those trends of our time that are championed by the collectivist elements
of the Democratic Party. Mr. Lindsay, described by The New York Times as being "as liberal as a
man can be," qualifies for the support of the Liberal Party and the Republican Party only if one
supposes that there are no substantial differences between the Republican Party and the Liberal
Party. That there should be is my contention.

It was clearly understood by all concerned that he would basically play the role of a gadfly in the
race. Indeed, any doubts that he reckoned how little chance he had of being elected were cleared up at
his first press conference, when to the consternation of staff and Party officials he gave the following
answers to questions:

Q: Do you think you have any chance of winning?

WFB: No

Q: How many votes do you expect to get, conservatively speaking?

WFB: Conservatively speaking, one.

In the campaign that followed, Buckley, freed from the restraints that bind a politician who thinks he
may win, proceeded to run one of the most ideological, honest and entertaining campaigns that anyone
had ever seen. He quickly became a media phenomenon, although they were almost uniformly hostile
to him and his views, they loved covering him. And when the cities newspapers went on strike the
race came to center around television and Buckley was able to totally outclass his opponents, Lindsay
and Abe Beam.

Besides his natural facility with the fairly new medium, Buckley's political platform turned out to be
more popular than anyone expected. Indeed, his proposals were twenty or thirty years ahead of their
time, including Education reform, Welfare reform, beefed up law enforcement, tax cuts, balanced
budgets, an end to school bussing, abolition of rent control, and so on. as a result, when the first polls
came out, not only was Beame beating Lindsay, Buckley was polling over 20% and doing particularly
well with Blue Collar Democrats. Suddenly everyone, including he, had to take his candidacy
seriously.

From that point on Lindsay and Beame and their cohorts trotted out all the trusty anti-conservative
canards--tarring him as a racist, an anti-Semite, anti-Protestant and, somehow, even an anti-Catholic.
Buckley ended up spending so much time defending himself that he lost the momentum he had gained
by being a purveyor of brash new ideas. He acknowledges that his political inexperience was a major
handicap as he allowed himself to drift off message and into a defensive posture.

When the votes were finally counted, Lindsay won, but with just 45%, Beame tallied 41% and
Buckley polled an impressive 13%. In the process, he had carved up Lindsay to the point where no
one seriously considered him to have a future in Republican politics and indeed Lindsay eventually left
the party for his natural home with the Democrats. But more importantly, Buckley demonstrated that
there was a significant segment of the democratic Party that was just waiting to be wooed by a
conservative Republican message. These folks--largely middle or working class, White, ethnic and
Catholic--would later form the backbone of Nixon's "Silent Majority" and would come to be called
Reagan Democrats, but it was the 1965 New York mayoral race that really showed that conservatism
had an inherent appeal to this population. For this, as for so much else, the Republican Party is
indebted to William F. Buckley.

This book, his account of these events, is one of the funniest political stories ever written. He looks
back not in anger but in bewilderment at the neophyte mistakes he made, at the shoddy media coverage
he received, at the character assassination he was subjected to and at the entire chaotic process of
running for office, especially in New York City. It's a real shame that the book is out of print (though
easy to find used, see the link above); it is almost frightening how much of the story remains topical
and pertinent today. In particular, and somewhat ironically, I couldn't help thinking how badly the
Democratic Party today needs someone like Bill Buckley--someone with wit, grace, style, and actual
core convictions who will remind them that they are supposed to represent something more than
conservatism with an Oprahesque tone. As Buckley said in his announcement, the American system
presupposes two adversary parties. Men like Goldwater and Buckley made sure that the republican
Party offered "a choice, not an echo"; where is the Democrat who will do the same for his party, who
will undertake a similarly quixotic quest, though it prove his own unmaking? We're waiting.

GRADE: A+

This true story is written from a somewhat sardonic viewpoint, given the fact that its author, conservative journalist William F. Buckley, had no intention of winning, or even actively campaigning in, the race he had entered. The year of this tale is 1965, with the election in November. However, the real story begins in the 1933 New York City Mayoral election.

Republicans in New York had been dormant ever since Al Smith's glory days of the 1920's, and they were unsure of how to operate. In 1933, however, the party's nominee won a commanding victory in the general election, definitely something curious for a city where, amongst registered voters, Democrats outnumber Republicans nearly 3-to-1. Buckley explains that a certain political faction backed the 1933 GOP nominee, Fiorello LaGuardia, and these were not your usual Republicans. Rather, a centrist coalition of good-government seekers (or "goo-goos") choose to stand by LaGuardia rather than his Democratic opponent, a top lieutenant of the notorious incumbent Jimmy Walker.

After Walker's resignation in 1932, the normally victorious Democratic Party had a tarnished image and a corrupt machine, and subsequently the GOP was almost guaranteed the Mayor's Office if it choose the right man. By the end of LaGuardia's reign, the Democrats were ready to take over once more. Thus, Buckley asserts, the only way for the Republican Party to win a city-wide office in the Big Apple was by nominating a non-traditional Republican at a time when the Democratic Party was under intense scrutiny.

Such was the case again in 1965, when this story takes place. Mayor Robert Wagner had chosen not to run for re-election, and voters were extremely flabbergasted at the ethical shortcomings of his tenure at City Hall. Thus, voters were carefully watching the Democratic Primary to see if the victor was a crony of Wagner or a political independent.

Republicans had already nominated U.S. Representative John V. Lindsay as their mayoral candidate, much to the chagrin of conservative Republicans. In1964, Lindsay publicly denounced Republican Presidential nominee Barry Goldwater, a staunch conservative. Additionally, he had accumulated the notorious distinction of being the most liberal Republican, voting with President Lyndon Johnson's position over 80% of the time. Thus, he was seen as a Republican in name only by conservatives, but he was perfectly suited for the Mayoral "nomination" of the goo-goo crowd.

Subsequently, many prominent Democrats supported Lindsay. Though a few die-hards waited for the Democratic Primary, it was clear that a bipartisan coalition of left-of-center politicians had practically elected Lindsay long before the election. Furthermore, the New York State Liberal Party gave Lindsay its nomination, and this was the culmination of conservative unrest and disdain towards Republican politics in New York.

In 1962, Kieran O'Doherty and Dan Mahoney, two young lawyers disgusted with Governor Nelson Rockefeller's nominal Republicanism, founded the New York State Conservative Party in order to elect conservatives to the many local, state, and national offices that were of concern. By fall of 1964, they had no formal Conservative candidate for Mayor, and so begins this story.

William F. Buckley, Jr. was editor of National Review, an accomplished writer, a weekly columnist, and a staunch conservative when he decided to run for mayor. He was concerned that the Republican party was swinging away from its classic platform, and therefore decided to run for Mayor to carry the Conservative backing and its ideological accruements.

So in April of 1965 he began his campaign, with his brother and future Senator James Buckley serving as campaign manager and confidant Neal Freeman acting as press secretary. Buckley immediately deemed that it was impossible to win the November 1965 election, and so he decided against having many rallies or appearances. Thus, his campaign was half Quixotic, half symbolic.

After his declaration, the press was indifferent, but many associated his candidacy with the far right wing John Birch Society. The growing sentiment in the New York circles was that Buckley was a rightist henchman trying to kill the "moderate" influence that Gov. Rockefeller, Rep. Lindsay, and Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY) had on the party. Of course, Buckley pointed out, his goal was not to destroy moderation but to make sure that the left wing of the GOP did not destroy the party.

The Democrats nominated Comptroller Abraham Beame for Mayor, and many were disappointed. Beame was part of the Wagner regime, and his two "running mates," the candidates for Comptroller and City Council President were Wagner associates. Though Beame stressed his independence, the opinion polls indicated that Lindsay was still running ahead.

Immediately, the campaign turned nastily racial. Buckley, a Catholic, made an off-hand remark about Lindsay's Protestantism, and wildfire began. Beame, a Jewish man, tried to take the high ground, but his numbers did not change. From this point, it was clear that Buckley's vote would make the difference in the campaign.

Since Buckley hurt Lindsay more than Beame, he received a worse assault from the pro-Lindsay camp. He was derided as racist, elite, anti-progress, anti-Protestant, anti-Semitic, etc. Beame finally assailed Buckley, but it seemed that his campaign was not improving. It was, however, apparent to both Beame and Lindsay that the more they criticized Buckley the more votes would be returned to their campaigns.

Beame, a moderate-liberal with a low-key personality and generally boring speeches, had an ineffective campaign from the start. On the other hand, though he was oratorically mundane, John Lindsay had a Kennedyesque charm that led many journalists to speculation on his Presidential aspirations. Buckley was perhaps the most interesting of the three, because he was unfettered in rhetoric because he had no intention of winning. He had colorful speeches and fresh ideas, but the press treated him as if he was Adolf Hitler.

Eventually, the assault on Buckley, his campaign workers, and his speeches diminished his support. On Election Day, Lindsay won the race with 45.3% of the vote. Beame came in behind with only 41.3%. William F. Buckley ended up with 13.4% of the vote, which was significantly lower than projected.

Though it seems as though Lindsay's victory was Buckley's loss of purpose, it must be noted that Buckley's candidacy did more to help the fledgling Conservative Party. The total percent of votes cast for the Conservative ticket, 13.4%, was much higher than the 11.1% cast for Lindsay as a Liberal. Thus, for the first time, the three-year-old Conservative Party outpolled the older Liberal Party in a major election.

This was a great book, because it was written from a dynamic first-person point of view. Buckley more than adequately gave the reader background on New York Mayoral politics, and he then went on to analyze the events leading up to the 1965 race. He described the three candidates, including himself, very much in detail and he never lost sight of his subject matter. Additionally, in the end of the story he compiled many excerpts from various news articles pertaining to his campaign, giving the reader an impartial collection that shows one the hostility most reporters showed towards Buckley's candidacy.

This book was written not for the mere entertainment value that such a firsthand account of politics espouses, but for the cause of conservatism. Buckly is trying to show us that the Republican Party is still not the vehicle for true conservativity, and that third parties can literally grow overnight. His point may be that conservatives ought to form a viable third party. Hopefully, though, the Republican Party will not be detained from pure conservatism for much longer.

My parents left the East New York section of Brooklyn in the mid 1960's. They moved to Long Island were I grew up. They always cursed John Lindsay. After reading this book I now know why. Vincent Cannato shows in brilliant fashion how Lindsay was in the wrong place at the wrong time. While Cannato does use the term WASP too many times to describe Lindsay, his WASP heritage (actually Scottish-Dutch, not English) was not his reasoning for not understanding NYC. Maybe it did not matter who was mayor of NYC from 1965-73. Lindsay was the in the wrong place at the wrong time. Whites were leaving the city for the suburbs. They were replaced with poor, low educated Blacks and Puerto Ricans. The demographics were changing. Lindsay did inherit a mess with NYC's grossly overpaid (even today) Civil Service workers asking for super pay raises. Lindsay handcuffed the police too much. Lindsay allowed black militants to run buskshot over the city schools which went downhill. Crime went out of control. Welfare dependency skyrocketed. Lindsay only cared for Manhattan and militant minorities. It was changing racial/ethnic demographics that made life for Lindsay tough, but he made the situation worse with his big government, appeasment of criminals attitude. What NYC needed in the 1960's was a Rudy Guiliani. Rudy came 30 years later to clean up the mess left by Wagner, Lindsay, and Dinkins. Lindsay may have been a good man, but he should have been mayor of Salt Lake City instead.

Dr. Cannato has done every student of urban history a favor with this eminently readable book that is not just the story of a promising politician who failed but of promising policies--and an era--which failed as well. They failed their promises and their constituencies and the story is well told, unlike too much history which is dry or not made relevant to current events, trends, and understandings of social policy. Mayor Lindsay was a "phenom," but so too were his failures in the most recognizeable city in the world during the most tumultuous times of the last century in America.

While a reader may not agree with all of Cannato's conclusions, s/he cannot help but understand the diagnoses in this thoroughly researched book about more than a man, more than a city--but urban policy in general.

The city and urban policy have gained more and more interest from social scientists for a generation now and this book explains that interest in that it explains the crucible of a time and of a person--all well-intended.

Race, religion, partisan intrigue and ambition--it's all here and generations from now when city politics and New York City are studied, I'd predict "Cannato" will be mandatory reading just as other great historians' books are known by the hisotrian's name; "Cannato" will be a standard and Cannato's future career as a social historian is well set from this, his maiden voyage.

I loved this book about a topic I only knew little about--before I read it.

When John Lindsay was elected mayor in 1965, his supporters already perceived that New York was in decline. Lindsay's appeal was as a disinterested outsider, a liberal Republican brought in to reform a city run by a corrupt Democratic machine.

Lindsay was challenged from literally the first day he took office, when the transportation unions went on strike. Cannato examines the Lindsay administration as it lurched from crisis to crisis. Mostly Lindsay was grappling with larger historic forces unleashed by the civil rights and anti-war movements, as well as the changing demographics of a city which, like many others of the time, was losing population both to its own suburbs and the sunbelt.

But Cannato makes it clear that Lindsay's ignorance of the nitty gritty of New York politics left him vulnerable and unprepared for much of the wheeling and dealing of city government. A denizen of the affluent Upper East Side of Manhattan, he was successful in reaching out to African-Americans. He was much less successful in his relations with the white ethnics of the outer boroughs, who also filled the ranks of the police and fire departments.

When New York went bankrupt two years after Lindsay left office, it was climax of a narrative that had been developing over the course of thirty years. But Lindsay's years in office are perhaps the most significant in the telling of that story. One can more sympathetic to Lindsay's liberal instincts than the author and still appreciate the work Cannato has done to present a definitive history of the era.