I almost felt that most of the book was about Lithuania. Maybe that is because Lithuania, unlike its northern neighbors, was able to resist teutonic conquest and allied itself with Poland. Lieven gives the reader history and more, because the actions the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians took in becoming independant are rooted in history. For example, the 2nd Republic had to decide what constitution or laws were used. Most opted for the interwar laws and constitutions. But this conflicted with the European or EU view. So, the Balts were considered to be insensitive to the colonizers, in their midst. The Balts looked toward Europe, but their view of Europe was stuck in the interwar period. That was their only view, during the Soviet occupation. As the author states in arguments with "the extreme Right-wing parties about some of their ideas, and my knock-out blow (wrapped in less direct language) has always been: 'what you are saying is not European; it will separate you from the modern West'" page 71. This idea is sort of a mantra for the author. That the Balts do not know what it is to be European.
The book has notes, but no biliography. I found that to be unacceptable. The book is organized thus: 1 The Shape of the Land; 2 Surviving the Centuries; 3 Independence Won and Lost, 1918-40; 4 The Troglodyte International: The Soviet Impact on the Baltic; 5 Imagined Nations: Cycles of Cultural Rebirth; 6 Lost Atlantises: The Half-Forgotten Nationalities of the Baltic; 7 The Baltic Russians; 8 The Independence Movements and their Successors, 1987-92; 9 Building on Ruins: The Recreation of the New States; Conclusion: The West and the Baltic States.
This was an interesting book. I would be interested in reading what has happened during the 10 years, since the writing of this book. I think the author took pride in declaring to the Balts that they were not "modern" Europeans.
Lieven's cautioning againt the dangers of nationalism masquerading as "postcolonial" democracy is as relevant to Ukraine as it is to Kazakhstan or, say, Zimbabwe. The book makes a strong case against continuing attempts of some western geopoliticians, unreconstructed cold warriors and eternally anti-Russian hawks of the Ukrainian dispora in the west to drive a wedge between the two countries that even now are much closer to each other than, for example, Canada and the USA. The book essentially argues that, to facilitate both countries' liberal-democratic development, the West must help their strategic partnership, not obstruct it. This is a refreshing view, made all the more relevant by post-September 11 developments.