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Our favorite was the Hotel Waldrand Pochtenalp, a place so far from the beaten path that we never would have found it without the help of this excellent guide!
The book assumes some knowledge of neural anatomy, and serious scholars are encouraged to make use of the bibliography. But I think that Lieberman's work exemplifies the neuroscientific approach to understanding human behavior, and I recommend this book for anyone with an intellectual stake in the nature of language and the brain.
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For example, there is no reason why humans could not develop speech and language with a higher seated larynx. Indeed, a human can be understood while using just ONE vowel in running speech (this is in iximpil iv whit i min). And a language could be constructed around one vowel by simply making longer words. Also, humans who are adept at buccal speech (where the vocal tract is basically the oral cavity) can be readily understood.
It is true that a lowered larynx indeed allows more vowels to be produced and makes speech more efficient, but that does not prove that this was why the larynx descended. The larynx may have descended in order for humans to bellow out deeper nonspeech warning cries to predators. And, further, a higher larynx is not the reason chimps do not talk. That is to say, there is no reason to suspect that had their larynges moved South, nonhuman apes would begin conversing in human-like fashion. Lieberman points out that the chimp lacks higher cortical centers for speech and language, but he eschews a Chomsky-type innate language acquisition device. His arguments against this are interesting, if not compelling.
Certainly, articulators such as the tongue,velum, and lips, and the way they are articulated are far more critical to the production of speech than is the position of the larynx. Yet, the perception of speech takes place despite fairly sloppy articulation.
In Lieberman discussion of vocal tract normalization, he suggests Terrance Nearey (1978) first described this phenomenon, when, indeed, this concept was written up very nicely by Tim Rand in a Haskins Lab Research paper in 1970.
As Lieberman writes in the Coda of this book, "Evolution in itself has no direction." Despite his research and views, I believed the larynx gradually lowered in humans, but did not HAVE to. It just evolved that way and consequently made speech more efficient. Lips could have protruded more to lengthen the vocal tract (and thus allow more vowels), but, if anything, human lips, in general, have receded over time, not protruded. Yes, a lowered larynx increases the risk of choking to death, but does this really prove that the reward of more efficient speech is the underlying cause for this? Who knows?
What came first, the lowered larynx or language? I say, language, however "primitive" it may have been. What did Eve say to Adam? Obviously, she spoke the equivalent to "Yes" or we would not be here now. Lieberman is correct in saying there may have been many Adams and Eves over the past five million years. He exhibits his humane side when he adds "We are not the lords of creation, made in God's image because we talk, masters of the birds and beasts, which cannot speak. The purpose of human life is surely that we must use the gift of speech, language and thought to act to enhance life and love, to vanquish needless suffering and murderous violence - to achieve a yet higher morality." He may be stretching it a bit here, but it would be nice to think he is right.
In short: decent writing, useful material, terrible organization. Definitely a library read.
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Briefly, Lieberman argues first that language and speech must have co-evolved (as opposed to the capacity for language coming first, perhaps being used in gestural modalities before the capacity for speech came about). The reasons for this are complex, but the gist of it is that a supra-laryngeal vocal tract that permits formation of the sounds of human speech is such a non-survival characteristic (adult humans are the only mammals incapable of breathing and drinking simultaneously (thus also rendering infants subject to SIDS in the period when the larynx drops), small mouth and small teeth make us work harder to ingest food, etc.) that it would never have evolved at all if the capacity to use language had co-evolved with some other adequate modality of language use. In addition, general principles of natural selection tell us that the cognitive capacity for language (probably) did not evolve independent of an ability to use language.
Next, Lieberman argues that the cognitive capacities that make language possible are the very same ones that make possible all of the cognitive "feats" that we consider to be particular to humankind: creativity and innovative thought, as well as our highly-developed hand-eye coordination and digital manipulation abilities.
In my view -- but not Lieberman's -- the third part of his argument is something of an afterthought, not a necessary part of his theory and more speculative than data-driven. However, it remains an extremely important and interesting speculative exercise, namely: what is the origin of "true" altruism (by which I mean something more than "kinship" or other, lesser forms of altruism)? Lieberman implies that the same brain areas that evolved to make efficient, linguistic, syntax-governed communication possible are the same ones responsible for true altruism, a trait found only in human beings (if even there!).
To summarize, this is Lieberman's most readable book, intended for a broad, lay audience, and functions as a terrific counterpoint both to hardline, evidence-be-damned non-Darwinian language theorists such as Chomsky and Pinker and to sloppy evolutionary psychology which fails to distinguish the (admittedly few) qualitative differences between human and nonhuman mammalian decision-making.