Yet again Liddel shows quality. Liddel has taken the data from his postwar interviews with german generals, and produced this little gem. - Why did the germans not push earlier and harder towards Dunkirk ? How serious were the plans of an invasion of England ? Spain ? Why the conquest of Norway ? Jugoslavia ? Greece ? The difficulties of raising a discussion on strategy with Der Führer. Mainly comments on all the major strategic desicions, and the generals view on them.

Excellent book, partly due to the rare and precious opportunity the anthor had obtained to interview those German generals/prisoners. If you are BH Liddell Hart's fan, "the other side of the hill" seems to be one of his favortie phrase. He used this very phrase as the title of this book, reflecting his fondness of the topic. I just want to point out there is a book titled "German Generals Talk", which is recently published. This book, I suspect, is indeed the famous book "The other side of the hill".

I have recently inherited some family papers that include records of two relatives that died in the First World War. In an effort to discover more I have been researching their regimental histories and other sources of official records. Having found out the details of the actions in which they died, I wanted to read a general history of the war to get a better sense of perspective. Liddell Harts’ book was recommended to me by my Father. I was expecting a dry military history. What I found was a vibrant, in some cases, damning history of what must be one of the most horrific wars of all time. Liddell Harts style is grand and literary. His portraits of the key characters are rich and balanced. His deep knowledge of military strategy and first hand experience of the war makes his account credible. Add to this his impartial professional military eye and his compelling style and you have the best book of military history I have read. His willingness to point the finger of blame was startling and really drove home the horror of the war. His claim that the British command in charge or the second battle of Ypres should stand charges before the national for manslaughter was shocking both in the abstract and personally. For it was in this unsustainable defense of a weak position that one of my relatives died at Hill 60.

A must read for both the people and the leaders of ALL the dictatorial regimes around the world (democracies would also surely benefit) . A book for all times to come. His understanding and explanation of where the real power lies is outstanding. What s breathtaking is how relevent his arguments are today and how strinkingly similar the working of all governments turn out to be (as generalized by Hart). He deals with issues such as "patterns and psychology of dictatorship", "power politics in a democracy" and lastly the the "desire for power" and "War".

Even those with little knowledge of the Second World War know the names "Dessert Fox" and Rommel. For those more familiar with WWII history and the great generals, they know a lot of what is general knowledge is hype more than fact. For example, while Field Marshall Erwin Rommel was certainly a brilliant tactician and strategist, he was not - contrary to popular belief - the originator of the Blitz style of armored warfare. Certainly he was one of its most successful practitioners, but not the originator. That credit belongs to English military minds and was put into practice by General Heinz Gurderian (see Panzer Leader by Gurderian). Rommel was a brilliant self-promoter - with humility though. And he was a favored son of Hitler in the beginning, although the "father" forced him to commit suicide in the end. Rommel did have some amazing victories and equally appalling defeats. All are chronicled in this stirring, well-written pseudo-autobiography. The Rommel Papers was written from Rommels own personal diaries made during his numerous campaigns. He was a voracious writer who sat down on a near daily to preserve the events of the day. Thus we are treated to a wonderful story of the Blitz through western Europe in 1939-40, the swift victories in northern Africa and slow arduous defeats that followed, and finally to Rommel's attempts to stem the Allied tide that was threatening to rush the Western shores of France in 1944. This is a fun and insightful read for anyone who wants to see war from the perspective of the German public's most favored Marshall. Certainly worth the time spent reading it! Highly recommended.

This book takes you through the events of World War II using the unedited writing of General Rommel. Hart does a great job of insuring the thoughts of Rommel are preserved. The hard bound version of this book, has chalk drawing of Rommels battle plans.

This book is an excellent account of Rommel, his leadership and his tactics.

Rarely do you get the ability to go into the mind of a commander at war. Usually those writings that come out are clouded by the overall victory or defeat. Rommel's early death prevented that. His notes allow you get into what he was thinking, often on the days of the battles. What impact does the 'fog of war' have on troops and units when the shooting starts? How do you get the enemy to react to you? This book is a treasure indeed.

The lessons he learned apply today as well. I found his reviews of the battles; actually explained much of what occurred in the Persian Gulf War. The Allies may have read this book; I feel the Iraqi's may not have. Those who fight in next war in the desert will face similar constraints.

Students of maneuver warfare, armor officers or anyone who may have to do battle in the desert will get much from this book.

Some books you read and discard. This is a keeper in my library.

From the outset a presumably simple question needs to be posed and answered, due to the attributed authoritativeness of author Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart. Does this history of the Second World War give an exact account of the global war between the Axis Powers and The Allies from 1939 to 1945?

The answer is emphatically yes, but a distinction must be made. This book took me two months to read, taking into account its length this was not especially poor for a general history reader. But I believe the reason behind the prolongued read is precisely because it is not an account for general readership but for the reader of military history - it is in short, a military and strategist's view of the Second World War. An important categorization that I hope is understood.

This does not mean however that its worth is negated for the general reader. Liddell Hart's history is as thorough and epic in scale as the war itself, authored by an experienced military strategist who bore witness to its prosecution, it holds unique and valuable insight. Of particular value is the inclusion of German accounts of the war from interrogations and interviews made by the author.

Great eruditeness is also shown in describing the varying campaigns, invasions, battlefields, and military plans of all sides. The sheer detail he offers is immense and because of this nothing is gleaned over, of considerable use in gathering a full account of actual fighting. In addition, something of the art if essentially chaotic nature of the war and indeed warfare as a whole is infused into the reader's mind.

Yet, all this could have been achieved with much greater effect and with less long-winded and relentless detail if it had contained more frequent accounts from the protagonists involved. Indeed if the participants in the theatre of operations were taken account of at all, this history would have added a worthwhile human dimension above the confusing tactical and strategic aspects which tended to dominate the retelling.

If it had, this account would surely have become an unsurpassable tome leaving fellow historians of WWII to fight it out for the scraps of academic esoteric obscurity that is Hitler's dietary needs and "confused sexuality".

Yet despite my craving for some sort of personal narrative, which is probably unfair in view of Liddell Hart's obvious interest and authority on strategic and military matters, this book did provide me with the knowledge of the Second World War that I had sought from the outset. It is so thoroughly detailed that it covered all of the theatres of war with particular emphasis on the campaigns in North Africa, Italy and the Battle of Britain/Atlantic.

Readers from the United States may be disappointed however at the focus of the war upon British and Soviet battles in contrast to their own vital contribution to the Allied victory, namely in the Pacific Ocean, which I might point out in mitigation was one of the strongest sections imparted. But I consider that Liddell Hart has emphasized overall fairness, the Allies together defeated the Axis powers, it was not one partner exclusively, although the Soviet Union's all-important recoiling of Hitler's invasion has been given deserved focus in the book.

I would also put forward certain caution if any readers approached this conflict without any prior knowledge of its main events, you will undoubtedly lose track of any timeline, as I occasionally did. The narrative swerves from North Africa to the Russian Steppes and the Burma jungle, with no clear indication of its importance in relation to other theatres of the war.

My judgement upon this book ultimately has to be that of conflicting middle ground however. As an account of any war it has to be regarded as a classic. As a military history of the Second World War I doubt whether the understanding of Liddell Hart or his analytical brilliance shall be surpassed, and as an historian of the Twentieth Century he is rightly regarded as amongst its most esteemed.

This book however does not fully meet the requirements of modern readers to understand the Second World War beyond the concept of armies, war production figures and "losses". It rarely goes beyond a history of the conflict that is simply one of strategic/military problem and solution. Indeed, it neglects to emphasize at all that the war involved massive human taking up of arms with the resultant consequences. A history of war without human context bears no resemblance to the actual war itself and thus I believe this book is not as authoritative as it once seemed.

History has always fascinated me and in modern times, the Second World War (along with the Civil Rights movement) intrigue me most as a history major - both are periods of great social change (although thankfully one occured with much less bloodshed).

This book analyzes the numerous campaigns of the Second World War covering them very completely. If you want a detailed overview of the war this is it - it covers every level of the war - from the steppes of Russia to Pearl Harbor, from the air war to the Battle of the North Atlantic. There were a number of maps, some of which were quite helpful in following the course of battles.

I only have a few complaints with the book. The first is that Hart goes to great lengths to explain why what he would have done in certain historical situations would be better. I disliked this because hind sight is 20/20 and it seemed that Hart almost was claiming he could have ended the war quicker. While pointing out what makes a campaign (ex. Barbarossa) unsuccessful is great, injecting what you would have done is not.

The only other aspects I didn't like was the emphasis on Britain (I would have liked seeing a bit more U.S. battles in the Far East) and his writing about the Atomic Bomb - because as an earlier reviewer stated, it is entirely editorialized and doesn't attempt to look at the social mood in the Western world at the time.

Overall though a great overview, with many details that you begin to appreciate in the reading.

(by E.M. Singer, author of "Mother Flies Hurricanes") Liddell Hart was a noted tank expert and advised British military leaders during the war, so his perspective is not only of "looking back" (which any historical treatise does) but also "in the thick of things." So you get that sense of being there when you read his book. His chapter on the Battle of Britain is the best short account (about 26 pages) of this pivotal episode. Even if you read only that, it's worth the price of the book. Still, it would be hard not to read the rest of Liddell-Hart's book after reading that chapter (or to refrain from reading anything else about the Battle of Britain-go on, I dare you!). Liddell Hart is provocative and opinionated; even if you don't agree with everything he says, History of the Second World War is still a cracking great read! I consider this the second-best book about WWII; for the best book (in my humble opinion), check out the "Best Books about WWII" section of the motherflieshurricanes.con webite.

I want to start by saying that I recommend this book to people that like to read about military history and strategy; however, I am not that high on this book as other reviewers.

"Strategy" was written with the purpose to prove one thing: battles and wars are normally won by unbalancing the enemy at all the levels, a strategy the author coins as the "Indirect Approach", not by attacking him directly. The book has two sections, one which narrates the history of warfare from the Persian Wars all the way to the Arab-Israeli War of 1948. The second section postulates the principles of Indirect Approach and "revisions" on Von Clausewitz's postulates.

That said, unlike other reviewers, I believe that there are two landmark books on War better than this one, Sun Tzu's "The Art of War" and Von Clausewitz's "On War". While Liddell Hart had the benefit of living on the time when Von Clausewitz's war "premises" were revised after the massacres of WWI, and Liddell Hart is one of the grandfathers of modern tank warfare, I think his concept of "Indirect Approach" is a modernization of Sun Tzu's principles on deception in warfare. That is why I think this book does not have the theoretical value other reviewers want to give.

As for his historical evidence about the application of the "Indirect Approach", I think many accounts are based on biased reports that don't truly tell us the complete picture (for more on this, I recommend Hans Delbruck's History of Warfare series, which is the best I've read). If this is correct it would undermine the supposedly "overwhelming" evidence of his theory. I would add, however, that his description of WWII is extraordinary and I consider it the best analysis on the overall conflict I've ever read.

Overall, I think two thing makes the book worthy. First, the Indirect Approach has the spirit of Sun Tzu in it. The way this concept clarify's some of the old precepts on the chinese manual about war is extraordinary. Besides, it completely modernizes the spirit of the "Art of War" and proves there are many ways to outclass an enemy and force him to make a mistake in modern times. It also presents a great principle on winning the Grand Strategy, in the realm of politics, before even considering victory at the Strategic and Tactical levels. I would recommend the book because of this and because of the great description on WWII.

Here Liddell Hart sums up his principles of strategy, illustrating his ideas with examples throughout history. Critics have claimed, with some justice, that he got too wrapped up in his major idea, the "indirect approach," and oversimplified the campaigns he reviewed here to bolster his point. What a reader must realize, however, is that by the time this book was written, much of Liddell Hart's approach had been battle-tested, with spectacular results: among those who credited him were Guderian, Rommel, and Montgomery. If his "indirect approach" is not universally effective, especially against opponents who have also read the book, it is still brilliant and valuable.
Liddell Hart seems to have fallen into disfavor in U.S. military circles, to a degree that cannot be explained simply by his disagreement with Clausewitz about the necessity of destroying the main force of the enemy. While not crediting him, the U.S. applied an indirect approach, emphasizing rapid maneuver, with great success in the Gulf War. Perhaps the explanation lies in a careful reading of the last chapter, added in the 1967 edition, in which he suggests that counter-guerilla warfare must aim to disrupt the guerillas' sources of supply and liaison with allied regular forces nearby -- in short, to win, the U.S. needed to isolate the battlefield. Maybe the U.S. thinkers didn't want to hear this -- and it hasn't helped that, once again, he was absolutely right.
So, by all means, read this book carefully. But then also read
his critics. Nobody, even Liddell Hart (or Clausewitz, or Sun Tzu) had all the answers, and the art of applying past principles to future conflicts keeps changing.

B. H. Lidell Hart has written a masterpiece in "Strategy". His survey of history and it's successful generals all point to one, irrepressible conclusion; that to win, you must do the unexpected. Hart's main contention is that from acient to modern times, the generals who win, and win consistently, do so not by beating their heads against impregnable positions or trying to bring the enemy's main body to battle by direct action. Instead, he argues that in war, the object is to achieve victory at the least cost--in other words, use economy of force. The "indirect method" which he speaks of has been tested over time, and has proven itself repeatedly. Of the truly decisive campaigns from all of history, 90% of them were won, not by direct assault, but by maneuver, cunning, and by forcing an enemy army to prepare for multiple contingencies. In short, this book is not a handguide to winning a war, and does not present itself as such. What Hart does is show what history's successful captains have done, and leaves the reader to draw his own conclusions, and apply the facts that Hart presents. Overall, a well-written survery of military history that tests many of our preconcieved notions military success.

I will start by saying Liddel Hart is my favorite military historian/author and I own half a dozen books by him, and regard them as gospel. However I felt that Liddel Hart was not as well versed in this area as he is in European History. He lets his ingrained contrariness run away with him. He wants to create a "great captain" where there is none. He also, I believe, wants to convince the reader of the genius of the "inderect approach" which he expounds in his excellent book "Strategy". However I think considering Sherman's campaign as indirect is like calling D-Day indirect because the allies invaded Normandy as opposed to Calais. ( I must admit that I am biased because I am a Lee fan) Like every other book by Liddel hart though, it is a very quick and pleasant read. I would recommend his book on Scipio as a great intro to his work.

Sherman was both the most original genius of the Civil War, and "the typical American". His career provides lessons to the modern world and to modern warfare. It was his conscious exploitation of the economic and psychological factors of war in his "March through Georgia" which helped to end the Civil War. The long and expensive battles in Northern Virginia were replayed on the battlefields of France in the Great War.

The Union attempted to take Richmond by the shortest and most direct route; but this way was blocked with natural obstacles. If the Confederates fell back they would be closer to their reserves, supplies, and reinforcements. These facts favored the entrenched defenders.

The western campaign ended in the capture of Vicksburg and control of the Mississippi from St. Louis to New Orleans. Liddell Hart contrasts the maneuvers here to the stalemate back east. But the conditions, or politics, did not allow a wide flanking invasion through West Virginia or North Carolina. The threat to Richmond kept Confederate troops there. Longstreet proposed an invasion of Kentucky, a far flanking attack, but was turned down by Lee.

It explains how Sherman out-maneuvered Johnston from Chattanooga to Atlanta. By threatening to outflank Johnston, the Confederates fell back. His replacement by Hood did not prevent the capture of Atlanta. This revived the hope of victory for the North, and helped to re-elect Lincoln.

Sherman then abandoned his supply and communication lines (vulnerable to attack) and marched on to Savannah and the ocean. His army lived off the land. This enabled his army to be resupplied by the Navy. He then marched north, seeming to attack other cities, but passed between and continued to destroy railroads and bridges.

The end came soon after this, as other armies invaded the South. Sherman designed an armistice and amnesty where the Confederates would be disbanded, and their arms turned over to the states. The latter would allow repression of bandits and guerillas. He was criticized for this.

Sherman was a man of modest habits. When admirers raised [money]to buy him a house, he refused to accept unless he received bonds that would pay the taxes! He lived within his means. The resisting power of a state depends more on the strength of popular will than on the strength of its armies, and this depends on economic and social security (p.429).

Liddell Hart gave preference to contemporaneous correspondence rather than Official Reports (which are written for history to justify a policy). Some of the ideas in this 72-year old book may not coincide with more recent history.

Dispite reading most of major accounts of the American Civil War, I had not fully understood the central role played by Sherman until reading Hart's book. Hart makes it clear that Sherman's appreciation of the futility of attacking entrenched positions and his consequently developed strategy and tactics turned the tide for the North, saved the 1864 election for Lincoln, and saved perhaps tens of thousands of Union and Rebel lives. He also points out that the same insight accounts for most of Lee's success, i.e., Lee won battles in which he entised the North to attack entrenched positions (e.g. Fredricksburg) and lost when he attacked entrenched positions himself (e.g. Gettysburg). Hart fully disposes of the long held prejudice that Sherman's approach to war was more inhumane than the alternative of massive blood letting being practiced by virtually every other Civil War general. It is rare to find a historical account containing so much insight.

The book is divided into two parts. the first covers Liddell Hart and his thoughts on armoured warfare between WWI and WWII. Gat thoroughly discusses the subject and successfully shows that much of the critisism vented on Liddell Hart is incorrect. This part of the book is very good. Gat makes use of sources overlooked by e.g. Mearsheimer and can present a picture of Liddell Hart that is quite diffeent from the one dominant the last decade or so.
In the second part of his book, Gat argues that Britsh theorists, notably Fuller and Liddell hart, had a decisive influence on the creation of teh German Panzer forces. Here Gat not only goes further than his sources permit, he also uses them very selectively to suit his thesis. For example he states (p. 48) that the German periodical Militärwochenblatt is an important source to the development of German armoured forces. This is probably true, but he only mentions those articles iin the perdiodical that discussed events and developments in Britain, when in fact the Germans, judging from the content between 1921-1936 which I have studied, seemed to study virtually all countries.
One of the most recurrent subjects in Militärwochenblatt was developments in the Soviet Union. However, when Gat (p. 86f) discusses other influences than British theorists, he completely ignores the Soviet connection. This is all the more surprisisng, given the formerly secret cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union that today is well known.

Quite illogically Gat fails to compare British influences with the german own thinking. he seems to take for granted that the Germans were influenced by other countries and the issue is to find which.
Also his argument is marred by some basic errors of fact. For example, he states that the Germans mixed light and medium tanks in their tank battalions until the end of the war, thus following their supposed british masters. This is completely wrong. For example, of the 19 tank battalions in German panzer divisions fighting in Normandy 1944, 16 had only one type of tank. Of the remaining three, two had medium tanks and medium assault guns, while the last one was partially equipped with captured tanks.
To sum up, the first part of the book seems fine, but the latter part gives an impression of an author who looks for evidence supporting his thesis rather than contradicting it.

I am not familiar with Nikias Zetterling's studies, but I hope they are not as strangely flawed and misleading as his reading. He alleges that my book fails to mention German studies of countries other than Britain. However, I repeatedly emphasize that all other countries were extensively covered by the Germans (pp. 50, 53, 55-7, 61-2, 71-2, 86-7, 94), while I elaborately explain why it was the British armour model that influenced them so decisively from early on. Zetterling specifically claims that I 'completely ignore' the Soviet connection, citing pages in my book (86f) to demonstrate his point. He obviously looked at the wrong pages, for I present the exact nature of this connection on pp. 74-76. In recent years, with the revival of interest in the Soviet 'Deep Battle', some writers have speculated that there was a significant Soviet influence on the evolution of the Panzer arm, supporting their claim (like Zetterling) by vague circumstantial allusions. Analyzing the actual evidence, I show why Soviet developments were well known to but barely influential on the Germans. Indeed, documentary evidence is a crucial subject here, and again the reviewer is skating on very thin ice. He cites only the material in the highly important German military periodical Militärwochenblatt, apparently because this is the only source with which he is familiar. He fails to mention that my book relies not only on additional German open publications and much other miscellaneous evidence, but indeed, most notably, also on the interwar, mostly unpublished documents of German Intelligence, Operations, and Command of the Armoured Troops. Curiously enough, these documents were not studied in the many popular treatments written on the rise of the Panzer arm. Some of these documents, particularly the reports of the German military attaché in London Geyer von Schweppenburg on the British armour manoeuvres and on Liddell Hart's lessons from them, which were eagerly awaited in Berlin, are truly amazing (pp. 63-66). Indeed, as I demonstrate, the German Panzer divisions, created in 1935, were closely modeled on the pioneering British experimental Mobile Division of 1934. Inter alia this included the mixing of light and medium tank companies in the tank battalions. Zetterling reveals to us, in line with rather than in contrast to my own reference (p. 87), that the German abandoned this practice in the last stage of WWII. It apparently does not occur to him that the issue in question is how the Germans came to adopt this particular practice in the first place, before the war and during their initial campaigns. Indeed, pace the reviewer, while tracing the internal sources and development of German doctrine (pp. 49-50, 68-74, 92-3), the book explains how the German lack of both armoured vehicles and armoured troops until 1934 made the German army so heavily dependent on foreign models which it avidly studied, particularly the leading British one.

This book tackles the issue of the development of doctrine and theory of armored warfare in Europe between the wars. Gat opens with the controversy surrounding the famous figure of Basil Liddell Hart. The famous theorist was much acclaimed until research by John Mearsheimer in 1988 (see "Liddell Hart and the Weight of History" by that author) largely discredited him. Azar Gat, has done some careful research that goes quite a way to restore the reputation of Liddell Hart. Gat investigates the various roles played by the theorists J.F.C. Fuller and Liddell Hart in fashioning armored fighting doctrines in Europe between the wars. The theory itself is described and analyzed in detail. There is also an extensive historical review of developments, with emphasis placed on the events in Germany. The analyses and discussion are intricate indeed, and this book is not intended to be light reading. The work is purely academic, and ranges from interesting to tedious. It is suited to academics of this field, officers and others occupying this niche. Anyone in need of research material must get his/her hands on this book. I rated it as deserving five stars, as it is indeed of high quality, although a star-rating is perhaps not appropriate for books of this level and category.

Liddell Hart's "Foch, the Man of Orleans" is a study of the style of military leadership of Marshall Foch, the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the WWI. Foch, a former professor and a chief of the French Staff College was foremost proponent of preponderance of moral factors and of a French offence a outrance style of war. It is not at all clear that this style of warfare is criticized by Liddell Hart in view of its ultimate redemption by virtue of French Victory. It is clear, however, that the author heart lies with Petain (and his defense oriented resource consuming style). Foch is given his due primarily for personal courage and strength of convictions, iron nerves and clarity of vision.

One of the illuminating points in this book was an introduction to the politics of coordination of war among the Allies, colorful sketch of personalities involved. Foch is given his due by his periodic sacrifices of ambition towards the common goal.

Style of the book is a bit dry at times; but this is well compensated by the presence of a lot of good maps and the occasional diversion toward description of mood, landscape and philosophical interludes.

Topic: Single volume overview of W.W.I.

Main thesis: Mistakes. Hart's thesis puts me in mind of the wag's observations on chess: whomever makes the second to the last mistake wins the game.

Style: Hart writes with sardonic wit. Initially, I found it fun to read, but by book's end, p.476, it became a bit of a drag.

Bias: I believe Hart's book is fairly even-handed towards both the Allies and the Central Powers, although Hart frequently waxes in romanticisms, such as, moral and gallant.

But at times, Hart will suddenly and, in my opinion, wrongfully, blame the British citizenry. He seems more critical of the English populace than the enemy forces who killed, wounded and maimed millions of their sons, fathers and brothers.

For example: [on the heavy British losses at Ypres 1917] "And for this lack of moral strength the public must share the blame, for they had already shown themselves too easily swayed by clamor against political interference with the generals, and too prone to believe that the politician is invariably wrong on such occasions. The civilian public,indeed, is apt to trust soldiers too little in peace, and sometimes too much in war." [p 367]

Another example: [on four years of trench warfare] "Thus the ultimate responsibility falls on the British people. Even the military conservatism which obstructed improvements and reorganization during the war may be charged to lack of public concern with the training and selection of officers in peace. In the light of 1914-18 the whole people bear the stigma of infanticide." [p 129] WOW!

These bits of sophistry hold no water. The generals and their staffs are, supposedly, the experts at war, not the public. In a democracy, the politicians and the generals bear the burden of the public trust. In peacetime, the public relies on the politicians and weapons manufacturers, and in war, the generals. Yet, in both examples, the public is responsible what's best for the British military, not their professional military overseers. It seems that Captain Hart preferred to blame the people instead of his own comrades-in-arms. This is a case of the proverbial tail wagging the dog.

Recommendation: Hart's Real War is a good place to start only for a basic overview of the First World War. But the book is seventy years old and Hart's lambasting the British people is questionable at best.

B. Liddell Hart is one of the history (not only military) thinkers whose fertile works will be fully appreciated only when time has passed on. As usually, human being reckon others merits too much time later. The whole Liddell Hart work it's an example. Had military staffs read him carefully before WWII, perhaps the output would has been otherwise, or at least different. So may be said about the further wars. "The Real War 1914-1918" is a veritable good analysis of the entanglement that led to war. But not only on military factors, as often happens. He included political, economical and even psycological considerations. Instead of a narrative reconstruction, his abarcative and reflexive study is a pretty good proof about what a writer can do if he possess knowledge, patience, and vocation to teach. As reader can verify by himself with "Real War" on his hands ("Strategy", "Germans Generals Talk" or the others Liddell Hart's books as well), with a such kind of master, every book becomes sadly too much short. Thus, among the books I have had opportunity to read about WWI, I deem "The Real War 1914-1918" simply the best one. You won't be disappointed by your choice.

I picked this book up somewhat on a whim. I was looking for a book that would give me good overview of WWI, filling in the details left out in the brief mentions found in our high school history books. And this after reading an abridged version of Winston Churchill's "The Great War". Captain Hart's account is not for someone looking for an "easy read". I don't know of any substaintial account of this war that could be written as an "easy read". Of course Captian Hart is writing with 20-20 hindsight, so he is able to see and give account of the miscalculations and errors. Would we have done any better then Foch and the other allied Generals under the times and circumstances? I have my doubts, but we are in the "now" and can learn from the tragic mistakes of the past. If ever war was "hell", it was so in the trenches of France. Somewhere in France near the Argonne Forest rests the mortal remains of Pvt. George Britton, my great-uncle, killed exactly 4 weeks before the Armistice. In Hart's account, I at least find some facts to help me understand what happened there, and come to grips somewhat with why my Uncle died at a young age, far from home and family. RIP