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This was an amazing war between Puritans, who were would poorly equipped in nearly every way, against Indians who would were born and raised in warfare. For many months the Whites lost virtually all the battles. King Philips' war was one of desperate sieges of tiny garrisons and ambushes of those Whites trying to rescue those besieged.
Just when you think the Whites are about to get the upper hand, the Indians attack new targets and the Whites are losing again. The most amazing thing is that the colonists had not one English soldier or ship to help them. They raised and equipped their own little militia companies. Unlike some other Indian wars that only had a few battles, this little war had dozens if not hundreds of little battles.
The Indian was as well armed with flintlocks, as was the White. In this war, the Indian was far superior in tactics and he was never beaten when he could fight his guerrilla style warfare. This was the Indians' last chance to push the White man into the sea. Providence (Rhode Island) was nearly destroyed and the Indian raided the towns adjacent to Boston. Town after town was destroyed.
I think this book is a little superior to Schultz's "King Philip's War," which is a little bit too PC. But both are well worth reading.
I part with the other reviewers in the analysis of Leach's objectivity. Most of the KPW authors of the last forty years appear to hate the Puritans as much as the KPW authors of the 1920s and earlier hated the First Nations.
Leach's work, I think, holds a good balance. He clearly acknowledges English arrogance, stupidity, all-out barbarism, and total failure in the area of evangelism, without making ridiculous leaps about English psychology.
It's an outstanding work.
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By 1763, it is easy to see a deeply ingrained resentment between redcoats and colonists. While this certainly contributed to the eventual declaration of independence and the British response, this would still seem to be a secondary influence compared to matters of natural rights, taxation fairness, and larger political/economic factors. The disdain expressed by professional British soldiers and sailors for their disorganized, unpolished, amateur American counterparts may well have led them to underestimate the fighting prowess of the Americans; militiamen, for their part, had to be encouraged by the fact that their wilderness fighting skills gave them a distinct advantage over the redcoats' European formation style of fighting. More importantly, a shared and pervasive resentment of British regulars was an important unifying factor among all of the colonies by the eve of the revolution. Given the history of joint cooperation and continual conflict between the British and Americans, it is a wonder that British colonial control lasted as long as it did and that English control of the colonies was never lost to the French. While Leach may overestimate the importance of this matter of military relations in explaining the origins of the Revolutionary War, the relatively unknown history revealed in these pages is both fascinating and disturbing.