This is an excellent book on Kant's metaphysics (in the CPR). It is tightly argued and rigorous. The key to understanding Langton's discussion is in the subtitle: "Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves," which gives us a pretty clear indication that the traditional (Strawsonian) epistemological focus won't be explored in detail here.

I recommend reading Langton's article "Intrinsic Properties" (co-authored with David Lewis) prior to delving into this book.

Langton's thesis is that (a) 'humility' follows from (b) 'receptivity,' which is quite novel and refreshing. A similar point is made by John McDowell in Mind and World (and Sellars in S and M). If (a) follows from (b) then, as Langton argues, we can ignore K's args. on space, time, and the categories. Actually, it seems to me that a deduction of concepts would be on a parallel course with 'receptivity' talk in terms of transcendental presupposition.

The most interesting chapters are: Ch 2 [part 6 (humility), part 7 (receptivity)]; Ch 3: Substance and Phenomenal Substance; Ch 5: Kant's Rejection of Reducibility; Ch 8: Kant's 'Primary' Qualities; and most especially, Ch 9: The Observable and the Supersensible.

Langton (e.g., as Allison does) defends Kant's Transcendental Idealism on the grounds that the intrinsic properties of things are indeed unknown. Her arguments are persuasive and convincing. This book would be a good read along with Allison's K's TI (Yale UP), and the standard figures who tend to focus on epistemological concerns (Strawson, Bennett, Guyer, etc).

I also recommend the vast literature on Transcendental Arguments, esp. Stroud (1968) and (1999) in his Understanding Human Knowledge (Oxford UP); A. Brueckner on TA's (in Nous); see also R. Stern's two books on TA's (Oxford UP).

Klar und deutlich. Outstanding and illuminating book. However, the reviewer from Princeton is right - not enough attention paid to the epistemological motivations for the unknowability of things in themselves in the mature works, which isn't to say that the metaphysical motivations stressed by Langton are in any way incorrect or unwelcome - quite the opposite.

If you want have a go at Kant, you could hardly do better than read this exemplary book. You cannot fail to get a lot out of it.

First, and not particularly important, Rae Langton is a woman. Second, and far more important, this is a beautifully clear, original interpretation of Kant's transcendental idealism, a resource of accurate and insightful criticism of other interpretations, and a joy to read. The interpretation is exciting, but, I think basically implausible. It gives far too little weight to Kant's doctrine of synthetic a priori knowledge, and to his specific claims about space and time. For Langton, transcendental idealism is supposed to follow just from his general epistemology of receptive sensibility. I don't think that it does; but I learned an enormous amount about Kant and about metaphysics from this book. It should be reprinted in a paperback edition people can afford!