These people are ahead of their time - if you had a chance to catch the Guggenheim retrospective of the same name, you know what I am talking about. In 50 years, more people will know about Arakawa and Gins than right now, but why wait? We need to change the direction of humanity NOW!

This book goes though the vast output of Arakawa and Madeline Gins, from Arakawa's thought-provoking conceptual paintings from the 60's, to their more current philosophies about the body and architectural surround.

The pictures are colorful and vivid, every page is different and exciting. Their newer computer renderings of beautiful organic housing projects will blow you away. When you open a book like this in a room full of people, everyone will gather around you to get a look! When something is different than the norm but still maintains logic and beauty, it naturally attracts people.

Get this book before it becomes a collector's item.

I had hoped to get a book that fit its subtitle, "What Categories Reveal about the Mind." What I found was a diatribe against a naive form of objectivism. Certainly, naive objectivism does not work, however it does not take hundreds of pages to point this out.

But I could have put up with that if he had succeeded in other ways. The typical reason he fails is particularly clear when he discusses mathematics. Only one unschooled in mathematical foudations would believe, as Lakoff does, that mathematicians think they can prove which mathematical propositions are absolutely true. That went out not long after Kant proclaimed Euclidean geometry to be the only such truth, an idea trampled by non-Euclidean geometry.

Of course, what mathematicians do is show that if you assume certain axioms then you can show that certain theorems follow. If the axioms are true, then the theorems are true, but mathematics says nothing about the truth of the axioms and thus nothing about absolute truth at all, and Lakoff's arguments fall apart.

Much of the rest of the book also consists of setting up straw men and knocking them down, Unlike the problem with the mathematical example, there is not room in this review to give details, but the careful reader will be often be able to think of counterexamples to Lakoff's numerous supporting instances if he or she can avoid being carried away by the rhetoric.

The book considers only the environmental influences on the creation of categories and misses the role of evolutioand biological influences. This is, a characteristic weakness of taking a mainly psychological view of the subject.

The strongest part of the book is the linguistics, but it fails to hold up the rest to the point where the book is worth owning.

Definitively in my top 5 (High Fidelity?) books to bring on a desert island. Lakoff manage to be brilliant and sometimes funny while debunking one of the oldest theory in the world (the Aristotelician view on the nature of categories). Who said formal logic, linguistic and cognitive psychology are boring?

George Lakoff, the premier cognitve scientist, overwhelms the reader with evidence that there is no disntiction between the body and the mind. All humans think in terms of the relationships it has with the body. The categories whether it is a radial or idealized cognitive model, show this relationship between the body and the mind, not separated from it. Moreso, the metaphors humans use have a connection with the body and mind relationship as well. Unlike the previous philosophers and linguists, these metaphors are intelligable if they are investigated with the proper methods as Lakoff shows. This leads to conclude that their is no such thing as an objective reality, and that due to putting all these bits of information into 5 to 7 main categories, humans overlook and categorize things in terms of characteristics that they look for to put it into categories. A truly objective reality is a chaotic reality. This book, when applied to the different cultures, does put a more relativistic approach as to how one should study a culture. Without a deep investigation into the language, there is no possible way to understand how one thinks. Categories are hidden in the language not just in the grammar, phonolgy or morphology, but in metaphors as well. Lakoff gives excellent methods to do this, and therefore, a much better way to understand human thought.

Metaphor is usually seen as an aspect of words, a linguistic trick we use to increase the effect of our words. Lakoff sets out to show that metaphors are a fundamental part of our thought processes whenever we try to think abstractly. His book does not provide a rigorous scientific proof, but it does present a lot of evidence in favor of the thesis. However, a full treatment of the issue would take a much thicker and less readable book than this one.

Lakoff gives examples from life for various metaphors, for example, TIME IS MONEY (or TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY), and shows how we use these metaphors in our everyday thoughts and actions ("Spending time", "wasting time", "saving time", etc). He shows how many different ideas can be expressed with simlar metaphors, ie HAPPINESS IS UP / SADNESS IS DOWN, HEALTH IS UP / SICKNESS IS DOWN, and so on.

Lakoff sets forth his case clearly and coherently, and with some of his examples, quite entertainingly. If you want some insight into how we think, buy this book.

If we talk about relationships we might say: "She was in the driver's seat" but we "reached a fork in the road" and now we're "on the rocks" and we may "go our separate ways." Lakoff and Johnson point out that each of these expression uses some version of a metaphor that "Love is a Journey" -- where the journey may be by boat, by car, or walking. Metaphors like these are not special poetic creations, but are part of the day to day way we talk and think about relationships. In the same way, prices "go up", people "get close", the future is "down the road" and cognitive scientists "defend" their "positions." Metaphors like these are not simply a playful use of words. They are part of the way that we think.

This is some of Lakoff and Johnson's fascinating description of the pervasive role of metaphor in human cognition. To this reader, it has all the hallmarks of a great scientific discovery: it is original, profound, simple, and obviously true. For this reason alone, the book deserves five stars.

However, the book fails to give it's marvelous subject the treatment it deserves. The writing, while clear and full of common sense, is often uneven. The organization is lopsided -- much of the book is devoted to attacking straw men and and hand waving attempts to expand their discovery into some kind of murky philosphical revolution. This is confusing, easy to criticize, and a waste of time. Worst of all, they blunt the greatest weapon of any truly great idea: its simplicity.

If Lakoff and Johnson really want to start a revolution they should take a lesson from the master: Darwin. His Origin of Species presented only the things he could prove: his evidence and his discovery. Lakoff and Johnson would have included a critique of the Bible.

If we talk about relationships we might say: "She was in the driver's seat" but we "reached a fork in the road" and now we're "on the rocks" and we may "go our separate ways." Lakoff and Johnson point out that each of these expression uses some version of a metaphor that "Love is a Journey" -- where the journey may be by boat, by car, or walking. Metaphors like these are not special poetic creations, but are part of the day to day way we talk and think about relationships. In the same way, prices "go up", people "get close", the future is "down the road" and cognitive scientists "defend" their "positions." Metaphors like these are not simply a playful use of words. They are part of the way that we think.

This is some of Lakoff and Johnson's fascinating description of the pervasive role of metaphor in human cognition. To this reader, it has all the hallmarks of a great scientific discovery: it is original, profound, simple, and obviously true. For this reason alone, the book deserves five stars.

However, the book fails to give it's marvelous subject the treatment it deserves. The writing, while clear and full of common sense, is often uneven. The organization is lopsided -- much of the book is devoted to attacking straw men and and hand waving attempts to expand their discovery into some kind of murky philosphical revolution. This is confusing, easy to criticize, and a waste of time. Worst of all, they blunt the greatest weapon of any truly great idea: its simplicity. If Lakoff and Johnson really want to start a revolution they should take a lesson from the master: Darwin. His Origin of Species presented only the things he could prove: his evidence and his discovery. Lakoff and Johnson would have included a critique of the Bible.

This is a book that is well worth reading, but one that, for me, is depressing. The book depresses me because I think Lakoff's description of American politics is correct.

It took me a while to figure it out, but each of Lakoff's two metaphors --'strict father morality' for American conservatives and 'nurturant parent morality' for American liberals-- describes government as a parent and citizens as its children. Government, in other words, is always paternal in mainstream American politics. Only the _type_ of paternalism differs between conservatives and liberals. In neither political scheme is there room for adult citizens who are free to make their own choices, to make choices that may be unpopular with the majority. This is very sad, but I think it is an accurate description of American politics.

Lakoff doesn't feel this way, because he is --by his own admission-- an American liberal and feels that it is proper that government treat its citizens like children. Classic liberals condemned this same style of government that American liberals praise.

The classic liberalism of Adam Smith, John Locke and John Stuart Mill has died in the USA, a nation that owes its birth to a liberal revolution. To understand the depth of this loss, I urge readers of MORAL POLITICS to read also the first of Locke's TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1690) as well as Hayek's modern essay "Why I am not a Conservative".

In this book George Lakoff applies insights from contemporary cognitive science and the study of metaphor in an effort to explain why conservatives and liberals think as they do, why their positions on certain issues seem inconsistent with their positions on other issues, and why debates between the two always seem to generate more heat than light. According to Lakoff, liberalism and conservatism presuppose incompatible worldviews proceeding from conflicting moral premises about the family and childrearing--transferred to the political realm via a metaphor which leads advocates of each to see the nation as akin to a family and its government as akin to a parent.

The conservative worldview proceeds from a Strict Father conception of the family, one with the father at the head of the household, the mother subservient in a hierarchy, and the children expected to obey authority without question. The liberal worldview presupposes a Nurturing Parent model which sees parents as equals and their role as nurturers instead of taskmasters. Competing moral beliefs dictate the language of each. Thus the role in conservative writings of terms like independence, personal responsibility, self-reliance, tough love, strength, discipline, and so on; and the role in liberal writings of other terms: compassion, social responsibility, care, helping, sensitivity, social forces, and so on. This further explains conservative and liberal demons, why conservatives despise feminists and homosexuals whose very existence seems to subvert their conception of a morally correct family structure; and why liberals despise Newt Gingrich and Rush Limbaugh as persons who confound their view of nurturer as a proper function of government in a humane society.

Lakoff reaches some provocative conclusions as he applies this conceptual machinery to various issues: abortion, gun-control, capital punishment, affirmative action and the culture wars, and so on. He explains why conservatives oppose abortion but favor capital punishment even though each (on their terms) takes a human life, and why they oppose government spending on welfare but support it for the military. His argument would also account for why liberals favor government intervention to help the poor and minorities but see it as having no right to interfere with a woman's right to choose. He suggests explanations for the many variants on conservative and liberal themes, some of the former focusing on the religion and others mostly ignoring it, with some of the latter focusing on, e.g., women's issues and others focusing elsewhere. (Libertarians, according to Lakoff, are much closer to mainstream conservatives than they think; their moral focus is on keeping government small, but within a Strict Father conception of society.) Lakoff even finds contrasting Strict Father versus Nurturing Parent views of God, leading to interpretations of Christianity other than those of conservative groups such as the Christian Coalition. He observes that Jesus himself did not ignore the poor and destitute. In the end it is wrong and simplistic, however, to dismiss conservatives merely as heartless, self-interested apologists for the rich, and it is equally wrong to dismiss liberals as whining promoters of bureaucracy and large, intrusive government.

Examining the dispute between the two in light of the findings of behavioral science on childrearing and of cognitive science on how the mind operates, Lakoff concludes that current scientific research favors the Nurturing Parent model. Thus he is a committed and unapologetic liberal. He does not, however, claim to have the final word on the subject. His book issues an implicit challenge to conservatives to back up their views on the family and by extension, on society, by producing quality research of their own. Right now, he contends, advocates of Strict Father morality are allowing Christian fundamentalists to set their agenda for the family and for communities. (Libertarians, I had noticed before encountering this book, have little to say about family systems at all.)

I confess to being one of those people who has, until recently at least, operated from a Strict Father perspective of the (more or less) libertarian variety. As such, Lakoff has given me a great deal to think about, and I will never again look at conservatism, liberalism or libertarianism in the same way. Lakoff is thoughtful, intellectually honest about where he stands, and never becomes shrill or strident. When he states an opinion he always has a reason. He even has an explanation for why liberal politics has retreated somewhat in the 1990s, at least at the state and local levels. This is implied in the book's subtitle. Conservatives, Lakoff believes, have greater intuitive insight into the moral structure of their position and how to use it to maximum effect in communities than do liberals. Thus conservatives' highly successful appeals to "family values" which have won them so many state and local elections. Lakoff urges that we create a "metalanguage" for the discussion of political issues which takes into account how conservatives and liberals operate from different moral premises, but sees today's political discourse as so impoverished that he is pessimistic about this happening, at least right now.

I offer only these reservations. The psychologist Abraham Maslow observed that "if your only tool is a hammar, you tend to treat everything as if it were a nail." Reductive approaches which use vast, expansive categories as their primary means of explanation are always vulnerable to this sort of danger. Lakoff's tools are cognitive science and his Strict Father / Nurturing Parent dichotomy. This does not really permit him to ask, on their own terms, questions like, Do conservatives (or libertarians) have, at some level, a fundamentally better grasp of economics than liberals? Do they have a better grasp of the conditions under which societies develop, flourish, and then prosper well enough to nurture all their members? After all, the natural order in which the human race invariably finds itself does not nurture us in ways which do not strain the metaphor. We have to nurture ourselves and each other, and even when this is necessary, the indifference of the universe suggests limits to the nurturing model. Finally, can any policies which achieve their goals through coercion succeed? Policies Lakoff would describe as rooted in the Nurturing Parent model have hardly abjured an authoritarianism more easily associated with Strict Father morality, after all, when their advocates could not achieve what they wanted through voluntary means. This might be all the more reason, however, why this model cannot be easily dispensed with.

Be all this as it may, Lakoff has definitely added something interesting and important to the conservative-liberal debate. Liberals will find a new and original source of support for their views in this book. Conservatives and libertarians, on the other hand, will find many of Lakoff's observations acutely uncomfortable. In this writer's view, the latter owe it to themselves to swallow their discomfort, read what Lakoff has to say, and then take up his implicit challenge!

"Those liberals!" "Those conservatives!" How many opportunities for community-building have been hijacked by political debates? And yet, itÕs fascinating how rarely the assumptions underlying political differences come to the surface. Cognitive scientist George Lakoff has built this political book around a reinforcing process: Attitudes about child-raising lead to attitudes about government, which lead to attitudes about child-raising again. Conservatives see morality as a matter of strength and discipline (Lakoff calls it "strict father morality"). Liberals see it as a matter of empathy and protection (Lakoff calls it "nurturant parent morality"). Both groups believe that the other groupÕs attitudes lead to danger, and both believe that a government should be to its people as a parent is to their children. Both groups, in the end, know a piece of truth about the world that the other groups lack. (Lakoff makes this clear although he, himself, falls on the side of the nurturant parents, and argues for liberalism on those grounds.) If you are trying to pull together (or simply to understand) a community full of both "strict fathers" and "nurturant parents," especially in the United States, then you need this book... Ð

Whenever a person finds out that I'm a math enthusiast, 9 times out of 10 I get an uncomfortable reaction along the lines of "Oh, I HATE math!" In my experience, the mathphobe's biggest gripe is that math is a completely abstract concept, all based on memorization of some strange language, with so much of it having absolutely no comparison to the physical world.

This book strives to show that mathematics, from basic arithmetic to more advanced branches, can in fact all be reduced down to mental metaphors of physical concepts. Early in the book, the authors present the sound scientific evidence that humans have an innate understanding of the concept of quantity, and some degree of manipluation with quantity. This ultimately leads to an understanding of addition, and then subtraction. Those concepts, combined with the understanding of how to group objects in like sets, leads to an understanding of multiplication (add like sets) and division (subtract like sets). The book then introduces a few more fundamental ideas that the human brain can use to make analogies with (motion along a path, rotation, etc.), and recreates more common mathematical concepts in increasing complexity: geometry, trigonometry, logic, set theory, etc. At the end the book the authors even successfullly tackles Euler's equation (e^i*pi = -1), a classic example of something in mathematics that doesn't make any logical sense at first glance.

The book is extremely thorough in the way it presents all this. Most chapters start off by introducing a new cognative metaphor, then including a table showing the mathematical concepts to be presented and to which cognative metaphor each one relates. For a book on mathematics, this is actually a rather long read. It's thorough because it has to be, given the subject and the authors' claims. But the book might seem to drag around the middle, with a lot of repitition in each chapter as the strategy in breaking down the mathematics is constantly applied.

Still, I found this to be an overall very interesting read. I think the authors succeed in showing how all sorts of math concepts break down to the simplest fundamentals, which in turn can be mentally assocated with concepts we can understand in the real world.

As a physicist and recreational mathematician, I found this book stimulating and reassuring. The connection of mathematics to human realities in our embodied world gives a new way to understand the conceptual and practical power of mathematics, as well as approach its limitations. I also found it helps to explain my preference for "seat of the pants" approach to some subjects, as contrasted to the proof-driven esthetic of many professional mathematicians. I think this book may encourage new ideas in mathematics education as well. If you're a Platonist, you'll find a lot to scream about, but its a great read for any math nut.

While I agree with the previous reviewer that the authors may at times suggest a little too much credit for a work that does have its predecessors, I still consider this a great book.

By attacking the transcendental nature of mathematics, and elaborating the grounding of mathematical thought in the metaphorical mapping of the mind, many important implications arise ranging from the meaning of mathematics, the way mathematics is practiced and proofs are formulated, to the way mathematics should be taught. The authors formulate their intention to link the fields of mathematical thought and cognitive sciences to generate the field of mathematical idea analysis. They stress the point that their work should be considered as an initial step and in no way as the final word. In the analysis of the thought process a number important aspects of mathematical thought get visited. Having recently read Aczel's book about Cantor and Infinity- I now feel I over-rated it at 2 stars- Lakoff and Nunez give a treatment of the concept of infinity based on the basic metaphor of infinity (BMI) that simply ridicules Aczel's. Masterful.

Is this book perfect? It's excellent, but could (and will) be improved.

Little attention is paid to the idea of linearization that is such a central concept in much of mathematics. In attempt to save the best for last, the authors conclude with a detailed analysis of the ideas behind Euler's famous formula: e^ip = -1. They claim that such a treatment would be very helpful to develop a better understanding of the formula, than a more standard approach. It may be that my former Dutch high school education, blessed with a great math teacher, deviates from the current US standard. Yet, I must say that the analysis of Lakoff and Nunez is simply not as clear and thorough as the one I received in my teens. Not only did my high school analysis include all the metaphors but a much clearer link between the e^ip and the sin(t) + i sin(t) functions based on the Taylor expansions. It is especially in this last section that the authors undermine their cause, by making statements that an expression e^p would be devoid of implicit meaning.

While I agree with the author's central dogma of mathematics as one of the human mind's most beautiful and enduring products they sometimes take their argument just a little too far. By a careful analysis and conceptualization of simple ideas mathematics has generated formalized concepts that allowed extrapolation into conclusions that initially appeared non- or even counter-intuitive. I think, that this process has been so crucial in establishing the magic or romance of mathematics.

No matter what the authors may say, wherever in the Universe any group of beings draw the line connecting the series of points that share the same distance, r, to this center, the resulting circle will always have a 2pr circumference. They may conceptualize it completely differently, but will come to the same conclusion.

This IS an important contribution to literary theory. The points that Lakoff and Turner make are very good, very logical, and will make you go "Of course! Why didn't I think of that?" It will not only change the way you read poetry, but will impact the way you watch t.v., listen to people speak, read the newspaper - any endeavor involving language. Why the low rating, then? Lakoff and Turner are structuralists, and they repeat everything over and over again, breaking things down to their minute building blocks. They made a very convincing argument in the first chapter, I thought, and didn't need to keep going the way they did. The third chapter, in which they apply their theory to a William Carlos Williams poem is also very good. Those two chapters would have sufficed. Again, an important book, but rather boring at times.

The important claim this book makes is that literary language does not differ from common everyday language. Poets make use of the same linguistic resources and cognitive mechanisms we all use in everyday situations. They just do it better, in innovative ways. The discussion of poems the authors provide to support their argument should perhaps be more articulate and systematic in order to be truly persuasive. At times one gets the impression that this book was conceived as a kind of divertissement in wait of future, more carefully planned incursions on the subject.
However, this does not diminish the importance of a book which urges literary critics and all those who like books to consider the cognitive basis of both everyday and literary communication. Also, More than Cool Reason can be read as an accessible introduction to Lakoff and Turner (and Johnson)'s theory of conceptual metaphor. For a much more articulate discussion, I would recommend Lakoff and Johnson's "Philosophy in the Flesh", but then you will have to draw the implications of their theories for literature by yourself.

I may just be an armchair philosopher, but I don't think this book's challenge is nearly as radical as it's rhetoric would suggest. Surely, the authors are part of a wonderful project, and one with very important consequences; it seems they know this and with this book aim to convince a wider audience of this fact. It's a noble endeavor; the inclusion of the findings of cognitive science are impressive enough to warrant a reading by anyone who wants to broaden their base of informed philosophical opinion. Nevertheless, the authors' attempts to make this text more accessible tends to oversimplify their critique of philosophy and effectively weakens their overall argument. Many crucial movements - post-structuralism, for example - are merely paid lip service here, and the more comprehensive commentaries seem to be conveniently selected. It's not difficult to finish this book with the impression that these authors are better linguists than they are philosophers.

For over two millenia, nearly all worldly knowledge was regarded as falling under the general heading of philosophy. Physics, psychology, politics, and even economics were all regarded as various branches of study growing out of a single, philosophical trunk. Aristotle, the most systematic of the ancient philosophers, even dabbled in biology. But as human knowledge advanced, these various branches of study broke off from the philosophic stem and established themselves as independent sciences in their own right. Philosophy soon found itself reduced to metaphysics, morals, aesthetics, and epistemology. But now even epistemology is trying to break away. "Philosophy in the Flesh" documents the attempt of "cognitive science" to make epistemology an empirical science separate from philosophy. Its authors, Lakoff and Johnson, seek to challenge the largely introspective and "a priori" speculations of philosophical epistemology, which they regard as discreditable.

"Philosophy in the Flesh" commences by laying down three major findings of cognitive science: (1) that the mind is inherently embodied; (2) that thought is mostly unconscious; and (3) that abstract concepts are largely metaphorical. Assuming that these three findings are true (and, according to Lakoff & Johnson, they are empirically validated beyond any question), then it follows that many of the central tenets of the major philosophic traditions must be dismissed as hopelessly inadequate. "Once we understand the importance of the cognitive unconscious, the embodiment of mind, and metaphorical thought," our intrepid authors advice us, "we can never go back to a priori philosophizing about mind and language or to philosophical ideas of what a person is that are inconsistent with what we are learning about the mind."

All this is very important. If true, it constitutes one of the great revolutions in philosophy and science. But are Lakoff & Johnson the men to carry it out? No, I do not think so. They may be competent scholars and solid citizens within the academic fold, but their philosophical interpretation of the empirical data of cognitive science definitely leaves something to be desired. While I whole-heartedly agree with their contention that philosophy needs to become more empirically responsible, empiricism, though vital and necessary, is not enough. The empirical facts must by synthesized into a grand interpretive vision, and this can only be done by a philosopher of genius. And indeed, in some respects, it already has been done. Most of the valid points in Lakoff's & Johnson's book have been made by philosophers working within the critical realist tradition, especially the philosopher George Santayana. Lakoff and Johnson operate under the illusion that the findings of cognitive science are radically new, but they are not: they simply are new to those whose philosophical knowledge doesn't extend beyond the major traditions taught within academia. Yet well before second generation cognitive science, Santayana had been arguing that the mind has a natural locus within the body, that it contains a large "vegatative" (i.e., unconscious) component, and that concepts (and, indeed, all knowledge) are essentially metaphorical. Cognitive science, in discovering and validating these great truths, merely affirms what Santayana contended throughout his long philosophic career. If we could but merge the findings of cognitive science on the one hand with Santayana's philosophic vision of man and his spirit, we might at last have the honest, empirically responsible philosophy which Lakoff & Johnson are so eager to provide for us and which, thanks to analytic and rationalist philosophy, we have so desparately lacked.

Having followed the authors' work for over ten years, I was pleased to see Lakoff and Johnson come around once again to tackle the philosophical implications their research entails. As expansive as Women..., but explicated in a clear and precise manner, Philosophy in the Flesh presents the bulk of experiments and observations detailing the embodied roles language and imagination play in our lives. That concepts have a basic logic which is neither a representation of mind-independent categories in the world nor a product of individual minds only, they have offered the philosophical community a middle path between Objectivism and Solipsism. Their own work, supported by people such as Antonio Damasio, Mark Turner, and Ronald Langaker, has reached a maturity most philosophers only dream of. Unfortunately, rather than being seriously attacked by mainstream philosophy or cognitive science, they have been largely ignored. Not entirely unlike their colleagues in vision, people such as Evan Thompson and Francisco Varela, they have been marginalized by the very figures they critique. Happily, however, there is a growing core of linguists and philosophers who have grown up wary of the traditional camps, and who have added to the core belief that the function of our perceptual and motor system creates the very particular cognitive system we have in place. If there is a complaint about this book, it is in the challenge that they fail to give to the bulk of philosophical work being done today. Work that would greatly benefit from their insights.

This book exemplifies what can happen to the scholarship level of an academic area of study when there is no significant internal pier-review or criticism. The author makes unsupported assertion after assertion, creates straw men, makes silly characterizations of the positions of those he disagrees with, makes faulty inferences and draws faulty implications throughout the book. The author claims to have carefully kept his political leanings out of the book. In fact, the entire book is an exercise in moral sophistry through redescription, and one more failed attempt at building a moral metaphysical system. Lakoff's underlying theory (assertion) that our metaphors control our mental conceptualization of the world is finally being critically examined and reviewed.(For a devastating critique, read "Concepts as Metaphors" by Matthew S. McGlone in "Understanding Figurative Language" edited by Sam Gluckberg).

Political positions are usually cast as being either "liberal" or "conservative." But what is the basis of liberalism or conservatism? How is it that conservatives, disapproving of big government, can support rolling up large deficits or extending "welfare" to corporations. Where is the logic? According to the author, the explanation lies in morality. What best explains the politics of conservatives and liberals is their fundamentally different moral worldviews. Those views are grounded in models of family morality.

The "Strict Father" model of family morality that conservatives subscribe to is based on the hierarchical authority of the father who sets and enforces rules of behavior. Children are expected to learn self-discipline, self-reliance, and respect for legitimate authority. Obedience is emphasized; questioning of authority is little tolerated. Governmental social programs are seen by conservatives as rewarding a lack of self-discipline, of failing to becoming self-reliant. However, spending for the preservation of the moral order, for protection of the "nation as family," whether it is for defense or for building more prisons, is morally required.

Liberals, on the other hand, subscribe to a "Nurturant Parent" model. Children become responsible, self-disciplined, and self-reliant through being cared for, respected, and, in turn, caring for others. Open communications is emphasized; even the questioning of authority by children is seen as positive. Desired behavior is not obtained through punishment. Empathy and a regard for fair treatment are priorities in this model. Social programs are seen by liberals as helping both individuals and the greater society. The maintenance of fairness is a priority for government.

Particularly instructive is the role that competition plays in these models. For conservatives, competition is essential to determine who is moral, that is, who is sufficiently self-disciplined to be successful. Understandably the prototypical conservatives are businessmen who have succeeded in the competitive marketplace. They are at the head of a hierarchical moral order, of a "meritocracy of the self-disciplined." Interestingly, governmental largesse for economic elites is viewed as deserved, unlike assistance for the poor.

But liberals view fierce competition as bringing out aggressive behavior that is hardly consistent with a desirable nurturant personality. Liberals would also contend that there are class and social forces that are essentially inescapable by those on the lowest rungs of society. The ubiquity of the conservative "Ladder of Opportunity" is largely a convenient myth.

The author explains the liberal and conservative position on any number of contemporary issues, from taxation and gun control to the environment and abortion. Invariably, conservatives take a Strict Father moral position and liberals use the morality of the Nurturant Parent.

The book lacks any real historical or geographical perspective on these two models. Although the Strict Father model may seem close to traditional morality, the author does not identify at what point in our history these models clearly emerged, or why. Or have there been changes in these moral models over time, either in basic tenets or in who subscribes to them? Furthermore, what are their connections with such 19th century political philosophies as republicanism or producerism, or for that matter, democracy? Are these models unique to the United States? Why is social democracy so prevalent in Western Europe? Is there little Strict Father morality there? In slightly hedging his message, the author does note that individuals can use different moral systems in different spheres of life, in addition to acting pragmatically within a moral model.

The author complains that the "issue" orientation of news organizations, as well as claims to "objectivity," can be misleading because of unconscious moral system slant. But beyond that point, the author has nothing to say about the influence of the vast oligopolistic media empire. He does note the rise of conservative think tanks and their ability to influence public debate. Have these developments impacted adherence to the Strict Father moral model?

It should be said that the author is not neutral concerning the soundness of these two moral models. He cites considerable evidence that Strict Father childrearing has unintended consequences. Moral strength is often not the outcome and violent behavior seems to be reproduced. In addition, Strict Father morality countenances little in the way of subtle interpretations of morality, which the author points out is not particularly consistent with the way we actually think.

The book is rather lengthy with considerable redundancy in describing these two moral models. The author should have provided historical and philosophical context. His models do seem to comport with political behavior despite the fact that much of that influence may act unconsciously. I think the book would be interesting for those trying to understand political behavior.