In The Juggler, Warren Kimball attempts to paint a new picture of FDR's foreign policy. Warren Kimball's thesis is that FDR had a vision for his foreign policy and did not merely react to events but attempted to craft a post-World War II world. From Lend-Lease to World War II, Kimball argues that FDR was consistent in his beliefs and desires. As a politician, FDR (unlike President Wilson) was willing to compromise to ensure his dream would come to pass.

The tragedy was the FDR's vision was beyond humanity. Like Communism, he thought that the utopian ideal would allow humanity to transcend our weaknesses. War would no longer be profitable so nobody would want to wage it. This vision went beyond his grasp to attain. He did succeed (whether it was he doing or merely the geopolitical realities of the Russian threat) in ensuring that the UN would be founded and that the US would continue its presence in world affairs.

Warren Kimball wrote an important book to dispel the preconceptions of FDR's foreign policy. Despite contradictions and vague notions, FDR did have a larger vision and didn't spent his Presidency merely reacting to foreign events.

An outstanding contribution to World War Two diplomatic history, Warren Kimball lays to rest one of the old chestnuts common to most people - that Franklin D. Roosevelt, the domestic reformer, had no consistent foreign policy, merely reacting to events. Weaving humour, deft insight, an unparalleled knowledge of the sources (Mr. Kimball is the editor of the FDR-Churchill correspondence) and diplomatic history together wonderfully, the Juggler is one of the central texts for anyone looking at the wartime Grand Alliance.

In "Forged In War," Warren Kimball seeks to shed light on the relationship between Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill that was, well, forged in World War II. For those who are interested in what happens away from the battlefield, this book provides an intriguing behind-the-scenes look at cooperation between two Great Powers. After a brief discussion of the two major players and their characters, the book plunges into the meat of its subject, namely the political and military cooperation between America and Great Britain during and after the war. Essentially, the narrative is divided into three (somewhat overlapping) parts. The first segment covers the events leading up to the war and FDR's decision to enter it; the second, the struggles to defeat Germany and Japan; the third, the diplomatic maneuvering over postwar arrangements once the defeat of Germany had been assured. It's the third part that's most prominent, and also most interesting, as Kimball delves into a discussion of how the prosecution of the war effected, and was effected by, competing visions of the postwar world. The upheavals caused by wars tend to have a dramatic impact on the way the world looks after they're over, and "Forged In War" is a comprehensive examination of how Roosevelt and Churchill (and Stalin for that matter) attempted to exert their control over these upheavals. Although Kimball obviously has a certain level of admiration for Churchill and Roosevelt, he makes it clear that for both men practicality overrode principal; as Roosevelt said, he was not a Wilsonian idealist, and the same held true for Churchill. At the same time that the two Western leaders were finishing off Germany militarily, they were also positioning themselves to prevent Soviet domination of Europe at war's end. A central focus of the book is the massive series of formal and informal discussions that eventually culminated in the acceptance of Stalin's axiom: whoever liberated a conquered country got to impose on it their own political system. In this sense, probably the most impressive aspect of the book is the extent to which Kimball captures the intermingling of political and military considerations that can occur during wartime. Kimball has a straightforward and sometimes entertaining writing style that prevents his narrative from getting too bogged down in detail, so most should find reading this book pretty easy. For history buffs, "Forged In War" gets a high recommendation.

Forged in War is a well researched although often quirky history of Churchill and Roosevelt during World War II. As diplomatic history, this book is a good review of the key events during the war years, including the many conferences and meetings between Churchill, Roosevelt, and sometimes Stalin. Kimball reminds the reader that during the war Britain and the United States were allies with the Soviet Union. He correctly discourages the reader from using the Cold War as a prism for viewing the decisions of high strategy made during the war, while at the same time he reviews those key wartime decisions that were so important in shaping the postwar world.

Kimball uses various unnamed sources throughout his otherwise meticulously researched book. For example on page 10 at the end of a paragraph about how postwar leaders "exploited the Churchill legend" Kimball states: "Even one of those convicted in the Watergate affair during the Nixon years adopted as his public motto a Churchill admonition not to give way "in things great or small, large or petty." On the next page he refers to: "One student of international affairs, who by 1990 had become a regular contributor to the op-ed page of the New York Times . . . ." Such references to unnamed sources leaves the reader wondering why Kimball uses such sources at all, if he can't or won't name his source.

Kimball is a talented writer although he too often inserts comments that remind the reader when he is writing-in the 1990s-and by doing so he cheapens his narrative. One example is in reference to the Yalta Conference and its influence on postwar popular culture. "Fifty years after the Big Three met in the Crimea, a supermodel, appearing in a motion picture depicting her vacuous, if remunerative, occupation, specified the place of the conference in historical memory. Searching for a stark contrast between what she did and what was truly important, she quipped: 'I mean, the worst thing that can happen to me is I break a heel and fall down. This is not Yalta, right?'" (pp. 310-311) He then refers to this broken heel later in his text. The name of the supermodel is supplied in an endnote, however the reference is a strain on the narrative. Kimball would have done much better not to include such references at all, however they are laced throughout the book.

Despite such quirks in his narrative, Kimball still manages to deliver a good review of the leaders and their strategies for winning World War II. Churchill is depicted as loveable, immature, brilliant, drunk, determined, and loyal to his country and empire. Roosevelt is shown to be shrewd, duplicitous, patrician, informal, irreverent, and equally committed to his nation's interests. FDR constantly urges Churchill to abandon his colonies in favor of self-determination for those under British rule. Churchill is adamant in his desire to maintain the empire. Kimball completed a three-volume study titled Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence. He draws heavily on this research and includes choice quotes from the correspondence between the two wartime leaders. Kimball looks far beyond the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence however, and gives the reader a comprehensive summary of both the Churchill-Roosevelt relationship and their independent actions as they led the world to victory over the Nazis. The book focuses on the war in Europe with fewer references to the war in Asia. Stalin is also prominent in this narrative as befits the leader of the nation who took the brunt of what Hitler's armies had to offer.

Kimball reviews all of the summit meetings of the war from the Atlantic Conference through Yalta. Churchill met with Roosevelt eleven times, with Stalin twice, and all three met on two occasions. The travel logistics and risks were enormous in these meetings, especially for the handicapped Roosevelt. Churchill too was not a young and strong man. Included among Churchill's many serious health problems is the story of when he nearly died of pneumonia after the Tehran Conference.

Kimball argues against putting excessive blame to "losing eastern Europe" at Yalta, reminding the reader that most of the postwar agreements, including the fate of eastern Europe, were already agreed to prior to Yalta. Those agreements were made with the Soviet Union when they were a desperately needed ally in the fight against Hitler. Churchill was especially worried about Stalin negotiating a separate peace with Hitler.

Even with his quirky writing style, Kimball managed to write an excellent history of Churchill, Roosevelt, and their wartime leadership that led to the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany and set the foundation for the postwar world.

Warren Kimball once again, with an adeptness uncommon among documentary-based historical narratives, weaves his way through the complexities of the Roosevelt-Churchill wartime partnership. As suggested by the title, Kimball frames for the reader a political and personal relationship that, although rife with an undercurrent of conflict, ultimately is hammered into the finest weapon of war. A picture immerges of two leaders, who despite the immense internal political and external military pressures of the war, never lost their edge in dealing with one another, let alone their common foes. Many internal skirmishes over the conduct of war policy are revealed in the author's apt analysis of the documents. The correspondence reveals that the duo often disagreed quite intensly about the conduct of the war and the way to win the peace at war's end. The careful reader will appreciate the pains professor Kimball undertook to reveal the many shades of the relationsip. The two statesmen did not always see eye to eye and frequently utilized subtle, to not-so-subtle methods of deception in order to force the other's hand or coax the other slowly but surely to eventually concurr. However, a final balance in the narrative is achieved by a paralleling focus on Roosevelt's and Churchill's shared mutual objectives. In the end it was Roosevelt's and Churchill's compatible visions of future that transended their differences in style, personal judgement and even national self-interest.