This is an excellent overview of the British, French, German and Norwegian war campaigns in Norway in the spring of 1940. This remarkable campaign began with the British and French trying to cut off Axis iron ore supplies, which in winter came from Sweden through Norway to Germany, and ended with a decisive German victory. It is an amazing study of military incompetence on the part of Norway, Britain and France, and substantial competence on the part of the Germans.

The initial planning for the campaign by the British was astonishingly amateurish. The political leadership both micromanaged and failed to make major decisions simultaneously. Adding to the tension and complications were the French, desperate for the effort to take place because it would largely be the responsibility of the British.

With our perspective dominated by the stunning German defeat of France in May of 1940, it is hard for us to remember the earlier contemplations that year by the Allied military of campaigns in Sweden, Rumania and the Soviet Caucuses. There were serious advocates in France for attacking the Soviet Union to cut off German supplies. There seems to have been a blind faith at that time that the Allies would hold in Northeastern France and could focus on strangling the Germans.

This was a campaign in which the British resolutely refused to trust or listen to the Norwegians. Their generals operated with tourist maps, and the communications were so bad that the unified commander was actually in London because no place in Norway could reliably communicate with any place else.

This is also a campaign in which the British Army commander was working under instructions that were directly opposite those given to the British naval commander. It is a great study in the need for unified command and a joint doctrine.

As a study in the follies of democracies in peacetime, the Norwegian failure to have any reliable defenses is a classic. The Germans were effective and professional but they were helped a lot by three allies who were amateurish, incompetent, and with deeply divided (and normally dishonest to one another) councils of war.

Among the forgotten ordeals of WWII for many is the Scandanavian theatre of 1940, an area that was blistered by war following the post-poland "Sitzkrieg" but that briefly preceded the Blitz of the west. At the top of the list of narratives involving this theatre lies Kersaudy's book, a marvelous overview of the Norway campaign from conception to conclusion, with emphasis placed on the staggering of the allies who are shown to have acted in alarming incompetence throughout the campaign. Observing their inaptitude for defending Norway and the disorganized and ineffective strategies that changed day by day with contrasting orders being given to different commanders, one cannot help but develop a sympathy for the overwhelmed and disrespected Norwegians. Also interesting is the discussion of the planning for the operation inside Hitler's high command, a portion of the book that provides a uique glimpse into the heart of the third reich at the height of its power. I can certifiably recommend this book strongly to anyone with a fascination in WWII, military or European history, and I'm certain after reading it that you will not be disappointed (in the book itself, for with the allies I am sure you will be disgusted)

On April 9, 1940, the Germans attacked Norway - two months later, the war in Norway was over. As Kersaudy points out (p.227) "the only substantial - and even decisive - advantage that Great Britain was to draw from [the] ill-fated undertaking was the replacement of Neville Chamberlain by Winston Churchill. Indeed, nothing other than the dismal story of setbacks suffered in Norway could have led to the resignation of Chamberlain before 10 May 1940". Zeroing in on a very small, but strategically important theater of World War II, Kersaudy paints a tragic-comic picture of the conflict in excruciating detail. The valiant Norwegian military forces under General Ruge were hamstrung by their own incompetent politicians, and "allies" (?) who were worse than useless. The British squabbled with the French, and then the British generals and politicians quarreled with each other. New plans were substituted for old plans while the old plans were in the midst of execution. Polish 'mountain troops' who had never seen a mountain were sent to the Narvik theater, as well as French Chasseurs Alpins who were short of skis and snowshoes. Ships were loaded with the wrong supplies, in illogical sequences, and diverted to locations where their contents were not needed. --- None of this should have been too surprising. In the introduction to "Norway 1940", Kersaudy states: "The French... could find in their "Dictionnaire des arts et métiers" a rather peculiar map of Scandinavia: Sweden remained nameless, but Norway was called... Sweden! The Germans did little better, since the capital of Norway was nowhere to be seen on their maps... In 1940 the [British] Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, glancing at a map of Scandinavia, was still mistaking the Norwegian border for a railway line." ---- This book is history at its best: detailed, incisive, with context as well as personalities. At times detailing the action on an hour-by-hour basis, it could easily be the basis of a fantastic movie script - for much of the action seems cinematic. "Norway 1940" contains a wealth of very comprehensive campaign maps and well-selected photographs, of military action as well as portraits of 'the players'. (One of the most fascinating candid photos is Norwegian King Haakon and his son Price Olav running through a snowy field for cover during a German air attack on April 11th!) Take time to read this book - it is well worth it! (P.S. Have a pad and pen close by; keeping track of the players and the action requires more memory than most will be able to muster).