Walter Kerr's The Silent Clowns is a must. Tons of great pictures and details on Buster, Chaplin, Harold Lloyd, Laurel & Hardy- but also on lesser known "clowns". It is obvious how much Mr. Kerr loved his work. At one point he talks about how he enjoyed going to Buster Keaton movies as a youth. This book lives up to the hype as the greatest book ever on silent comedy. You can read this book 50 times and still enjoy it.

*Get the HARDCOVER version. The paperback version does not do this book justice.

This book is not only the single best volume ever written about silent film comedy, but the best about silent film, period. Only Kevin Brownlow's The Parade's Gone By even comes close. There are chapters on the mechanics and aesthetics of silent film that should be read by everyone with an interest in the form. In addition, his chains of reasoning and perceptions are put forth with an aptness and lucidity that conceals the depth of the intellectual analysis. The elegantly straightforward prose makes this book a joy to read from start to finish. Further, in addition to covering the film work of the "big four" (Chaplin, Keaton, Lloyd, and Langdon) Kerr also sheds welcome light on lesser-known and even forgotten figures, such as the "unexpected" Raymond Giffith. Finally, this is a book that was well-produced on every level, right down to the layout, chapter headings, and fonts. Numerous film stills of every size (inluding some generous two-page spreads) make it a feast for the eyes as well as the mind, cogently and often playfully setting off the text. The original hardback edition published by Knopf was meant as a sort of intelligent coffee-table book (most assuredly NOT an oxymoron in this case), and the present oversized-paperback edition provided by the good folks at Da Capo should be seen in the same light. Both a celebration of silent comedy and a superb investigation of the form. Also a book that you can dip into again and again over the years with undiminished pleasure and come away with reinvigorated enthusiasm for the subject. If you don't have it, get it.

What Kerr has essentially revealed in this book is the very pulse by which the silent comedic form remaines timeless. He manages to write his book with such a love, yet such an intellectual understanding, that much like the art form he analyzes, it is a book devoid of snootiness or cynicsm. The book has many stengths, but carries such weight because it isn't only pre-occupied with Keaton and Chaplin. The chapters on Harold Lloyd -- who remains understudied -- are very insightful, yet objective. And while other silent comedians aren't given quite space that the major four American comedians are (Chaplin, Keaton, Lloyd, Langdon), a respectable analysis of Arbuckle, Sennett, Linder, Laurel and Hardy, and many more are presented. Valuable perspectives on "non-comedic" actors like Fairbanks, Pickford, and Gish are also hearty reading.

Kerr also give great insight into aesthetic issues, such as music composition and presentation, varying artists' cutting techniques, the roles of women in selected films, the alternate use of frame rates, and much, much, more. What makes the book so refreshing to read is how very much Kerr loves his subject, not necassarilly his subjects. Most books about the silent comedians -- Keaton and Chaplin in particular -- cannot help but devote numerous pages and even chapters to the filmmaker's vices (i.e. Chaplin's womanizing, Keaton's alcoholism). Kerr mentions such subjects when pertinent, but they do not become the book's thrust, nor are such issues presented to undercut the artist or his work in any way. Flawed men these clowns were, but their work remains relatively perfect.

I love the book but hate the font and layout.
I had a previous edition which got lost, but for all that this is a must read for students of theatre and people who are intersted in the construction of plays.

Walter Kerr looks at some of the most popular plays of our time and proceeds to then do what theatre critics do best.

He delves into structure, text, plot and the whole idea of realism in theatre. Walter Kerr urges writers to get off their high horses, stop trying to write social change and just go back to the basics of telling a really good story.

Are we listening yet??

This book was originally written in the mid-50s as an attack on the, even then, stale conventions of realism and the well-made play. It remains an indispensible guide for the playwright who is searching to create their own style, especially if that style has nothing to do with sofas and kitchen sinks. Kerr, the renowned NY Times Theater critic, uses this book to beg, implore, and prod playwrights into accepting, exploring and exulting in all that is theatrical and dramatic. If your idea of great theater involves the unities of time and place, and a penchant for realistic sets, then please do yourself and theater lovers the courtesy of purchasing SCREENPLAY by Syd Field. On the other hand, if you strive to create great theater, then HOW NOT TO WRITE A PLAY is for you.

Walter Kerr offers this exhaustive study into the nature of comedy for us to explore. He started out, by his own admission, trying to write a book about the nature of comedy only and not involving tragedy. As he went along, he realized that he could not do so for the very root of comedy is tragedy. Comedy is born through proper, high tragic elements and lets the viewer see the "behind the scenes" or the "truth" of an event. A tragic moment is a man stepping up to the microphone and letting you know that the president has been shot. The "truthful" or "comic" moment is the exact same scene, but you see the man stub his toe on the platform and whisper an expletive right when he gets into microphone range. It is a fantastic book and puts Walter Kerr up there with the top critics of modern times.

I have actually read the earlier edition of this work and therefore am not certain exactly what was added for the 1983 re-issue, but unless Kerr did a wholesale rewrite incorporating much of the extensive (mostly German) scholarship on the war in the Eastern Front, this book really has little to offer. The book addresses the Battle of Stalingrad not so much from the significance it had for the German war effort, than for the battle's importance in the disintigrating relationship between Stalin and his western allies. The book nevertheeless primarily discusses the course of events prior to the surrender of the German 6th Army on February 2, 1943, and only the occssional reference is made to the suppossed central topic of the book. But one can not be too harsh in criticizing the author since it is quite clear that the sources available to him are quite limited and either biased and/or falsified to some degree. The author was himself, as a journalist for a New York newspaper, in the Soviet Union at the time and does record some of his own impressions and encounters with some of the key figures in the battle. So even though the book is really of limited value, it is still one that someone interested in the topic should still consider reading.

This is an in depth description of the battle of Stalingrad during WWII. Not for the faint of heart.

In the Preface, the opening paragraph summarizes the book stating "This is about Stalingrad and how it was fought and why at the turning point in the struggle on the eastern front the United States and Great Britain invaded North Africa instead of the coast of France as almost everyone in those days expected." The text notes that during WWII Moscow "was a secretive city in a secretive state waging a secretive war." Even, the front line was unclear in the public's mind and few knew the names of Russian field commanders. Interestingly, an accurate/extensive civilian "grapevine" was developed which kept the public informed.

This book reviews the military and diplomatic events preceding the Battle of Stalingrad. The German High Command had misgivings about the eastern front in 1942, but Hitler assured them all was well as he planned to attack the Caucasus for their oil and food. Accurate intelligence was lacking for both combatants with the Germans tending to overrate their own forces while underestimating the enemy. Stalin, however, was better informed and did an excellent job of concealing his large number of reserves units. The text notes that even after the war that the Russians continued to conceal the role of these reserve units for reasons of military security or political necessity.

The diplomatic card game played by Stalin was intriguing. Stalin played his cards close to the chest, revealing nothing. Britain and the United States, however, failed to ask the right questions (in many cases asked no questions at all) that would have revealed the true military situation on the eastern front. Answers were needed before a second front could be opened. Stalin simply told his coalition partners nothing making effective coalition warfare impossible as mutual confidence was lacking. Stalin wanted a second front in Europe in 1943 and purposely led Roosevelt and Churchill to believe that Russia was in extremis. However, Churchill convinced Roosevelt to move to North Africa in 1942, and George Marshall thought this 1942 move would make it impossible to invade France in 1943. Thus a common integrated allied strategy was not developed.

The author narrates the tactics and moves of the German 6th Army as it thrust to the Volga River and the capture of Stalingrad. An angry Stalin annoyed that there would be no second front in Europe in 1942 and suspicious of his army's will to defend Stalingrad to death, issued on July 28 the terrifying directive to not yield any ground in Stalingrad.

The closer the Germans got to Stalingrad, the less room they had to maneuver and the farther they were from their base of supplies so that the Russian Army was able to initiate a counteroffensive to encircle and cutoff the German 6th Army. Stalin issued orders on September 12, 1942 to develop a powerful counteroffensive. The significance of 12 September passed unnoticed in Washington and London. Stalin's deception of his allies continued as the author notes on page 227 "On October 3, when Stalingrad was just about won, Stalin told Roosevelt and Churchill the military situation was getting 'worse." Hitler refused to allow General Paulus and the 6th Army to leave the Stalingrad pocket and on November 19th the Russian counterstroke in the Stalingrad direction began. By February 2, 1943 the German 6th Army ceased to exist and the Battle of Stalingrad ended. "The obliteration of the 6th Army, is a story of incomprehensive suffering that is made all the more appalling by the stunning fact it will never be known how many men died in the course of it."

The author notes "After Stalingrad the uneasy relationship between East and West took a sharp turn for the worse from which it never fully recovered." The continued mistrust prevented the development of a common strategy for the defeat of Nazi Germany. The author questions whether it was even clear to Roosevelt and Churchill that Stalingrad marked a turning point in the war on the eastern front. Had there been mutual trust and openness from the beginning, perhaps the war would have been shorten using an integrated allied military strategy. However, this may never become known as the text notes that much information still lies unobtainable in Moscow, London and Washington archives so that the full extend of the deception by all parties perhaps will never be revealed.

With the great wartime secrecy in Russia during the war, it is amazing how the author, as a New York newspaper correspondent, was able to move about in Russia. While this book is several years old now, it is well worth reading. Historians, politicians and diplomats may well learn from it valuable lessons regarding the critical need for mutual confidence and trust if military or political coalitions are to succeed.

My chief criticism is the lack of a good map or maps of the immediate battle area around Stalingrad. Also, the author's writing style is somewhat difficult.