This book starts at the beginning with all aspects of financial planning. From basics like having a will to the details of different types of stocks and bonds, this book gives the novice exactly what he/she needs...even includes blank forms to fill out for your own financial planning. Absolutely invaluable for anyone serious about planning their financial future!

The frightening aspect of this work is that it is simply another glazing over of what Americans call the Vietnam War. The sources consulted do not constitute anything resembling a full scope of available scholarship. Americans do not understand the Indochina conflict because they are only allowed to see one side. This book is simply another work in a long line of American political lore which has created convenient rationalization for complex events in Southeast Asia. There are significant scholarly works available for the reader who desires true understanding. This work is certainly not to be held among them.

David Kaiser has accessed newly released documents to write an excellent book. He has chronologed the day by day decisions and opinions of the men at the upper levels of the government that led America into the Vietnam War. We see how Eisenhower's men wanted to commit troops to stop the expansion of communism in Southeast Asia, especially in Laos. Then we see how Kennedy's people continued these policies, while Kennedy reigned them in and wanted to move more carefully.
Kaiser shows us the different agendas. How Diem did not want to use his troops against the Viet Cong, but rather to keep him in power. Diem refused to give any of his military officers enough power to fight the Viet Cong for fear they would plot a coup. He only gave his officers enough force to show the governments strength, keeping Diem and his family in power.
After Kennedy was assassinated Lyndon Johnson inherited Kennedy's advisors, but did not keep a reign on them, so the government made commitments to send troops into Vietnam. Even after Diems death, the Vietnamese only wanted to continue their troops in their power plays instead of fighting the Viet Cong. McNamara and Rusk continued to lead us into war and Lyndon Johnson agreed with them. Ball continuously tried to slow the slide to commitment down, but Johnson and his advisors ignored him.
Kaiser argues that the opinions each man held depended on when he was born. He explains that some were born, and grew up during the 30s and 40s during what he calls the GI generation. Because of this they believed that the United States could achieve anything. Kaiser also points out that the arrival of World War 2 also affected their opinions. Rusk devoutly believed that we had to stop the communists in Vietnam, or there would be another World War. Johnson also held this all or nothing viewpoint. Kennedy on the other hand held a more sophisticated view, placing Vietnam behind other problems, unlike Johnson.
Kaiser shows how Johnson and his advisors refused to negotiate with North Vietnam unless North Vietnam gave us everything we asked for first. An unlikely event. Eventually Johnson and others lied about the problems to keep the commitments increasing. Johnson also tended to ignore other foreign policy problems.
Kaiser's writing usually moves easily so it is not as hard to read as it might have been, given the complexity and detail of the subject matter.

Professor David Kaiser of the Strategy and Policy Department of the Naval War College tells us the real story behind the bureaucrats who put us into Vietnam, and in doing so lives up to the highest traditions of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps which have generally been far ahead of the other services in their resistance to bureaucratic pressures from politicians. The CIA refused to provide Kaiser with anything but token documents, violating the Freedom of Information Act. Kaiser shows how politicians including Presidents Eisenhower and Lyndon Johnson grew up under the spell of Churchill's anti-appeasement speeches to believe that the USA had to become the World Policeman. When he became President, Eisenhower began U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia covertly and the Joint Chiefs of Staff except General Shoup of the Marines were badgered into accepting this. When John F. Kennedy became President, both his Senate and Navy service led him to oppose intervention for a long time, in agreement with the U.S. Senate Democrats (Mansfield, Humphrey, etc.) and isolationist Republicans (Dirksen, etc.). The State Department Bureaucrats (who controlled the CIA) and their allies in related departments and the Joint Chiefs so badgered and pressured Kennedy that he eventually collapsed under their bombardment and agreed to intervention in Laos. When Johnson came in as President, he made full scale intervention. Some readers may recall that I have reviewed biographies of Field Marshalls Montgomery and Slim of Great Britain and Marshall/General Zhukov of Russia but not Eisenhower. The Allies produced 4 creative geniuses in World WarII: Montgomery, Slim, Zhukov, and Admiral Nimitz. Eisenhower was not one of them. He was then and later more suited to bureaucratic Ingenious Follower status than to individual Creative Genius status, like Lyndon Johnson. Our British and French allies opposed the intervention (Churchill would probably have opposed it too) not because of De Gaulle's *intransigence* as the news media claimed, but because they are the two nations with the most creative geniuses (along with Italy) in world history. When all is said and done, World War II was needed to defend the USA, but most wars are not and were not (like World War I, which was a bureaucratic war and nothing more). I hope that we start thinking more about jobs and education and environment at home and less about creating overseas what we cannot do at home.

David Kaiser's excellent book recaptures the era of the late forties and early fifties, when the major leagues consisted of only 400 players on sixteen teams - most of whom were familiar to any serious young student of the game. His detailed descriptions of the teams, the players, and the season regenerate fond memories of afternoon games, All-Star game ballots cut from the newspaper, and hours of studying season statistics in the Sunday newspapers.

For those of you are old enough to remember the time, the book faithfully recalls the suspense of the season and the games that made it that way. To those who have known only pampered stars with million-dollar salaries, the book provides a window into a purer form of baseball.

The writing carries the reader through the season just as it happened, the suspense is allowed to build, and the foibles of the teams and players are described and analyzed. The research is excellent, and the organization crisp. The season's end leaves the reader satisfied that the winner rose to the occasion and the almosts gave a good accounting of themselves.

This reader can offer only one disappointment. The author obviously came to be very familiar with the players that made it all happen. Had he weaved into the text a more detailed set of profiles that captured more of the players' personal essence, the richness of the read would have been greater.

In summary, the book was well written, makes a serious contribution to the written history of baseball, and is highly recommended to anyone who enjoys the national pastime.

This analysis of the 1948 American League pennant race has several strengths. Author David Kaiser has gone to great lengths to gather all possible information about the events of the year, and left no stone unturned (statistical or historical) in finding ways to place the story of the season in context for us. This wealth of material requires a sure hand to organize and present in a coherent way, and Kaiser is equal to the task.

The writing, itself? It's not bad. It won't make anyone forget Thomas Boswell, but it is clear and orderly and doesn't get in the way of the story.

The book isn't a casual read. There is so much to tell about the '48 season that you actually have to pay attention to the abundance of detail in order to take in everything there is to take in.

In other words, it doesn't have that great a beat, but you can still dance to it... I give it a 68.

And if you're specifically interested in the Indians of that era, or the '48 race itself, then of course the book is completely indispensable.

THIS BOOK IS A GREAT READ. A DAY BY DAY ACCOUNT OF THE AMERICAN LEAGUE PENNANT RACE OF 1948. MR. KAISER HAS DONE HIS HOMEWORK ON THIS VERY FACT FILLED NOVEL. I FELT LIKE I WAS BACK IN 1948 ENJOYING THIS GREAT RACE. HE HAS MUCH DETAIL AND ANALYSIS FOR EACH TEAM IN THE RACE. IT IS THRILLING FOR AN INDIAN'S FAN, AND HEARTBREAKING FOR A REDSOX FAN. A GREAT WRITING ABOUT A GREAT SEASON IN AMERICAN LEAGUE HISTORY. HIGHLY RECOMMENDED.