Used price: $14.27
Collectible price: $19.04
Buy one from zShops for: $11.50
Used price: $1.95
Collectible price: $1.95
Used price: $5.84
However, this "accessibility" is in the midst of a studiedly experimental text. This is a corruscating satire in which Johnson targets one of the symbols of capitalism, the double entry system. The very basis of accountancy, and the manipulation of finance, Johnson turns this building block on its head as his central character, Christie Malry, a young man with a future, decides that he will live his life accoridng to the principles of double entry.
Johnson's novel has acute observations on a variety of issues in British life that still merit comment. How working class people come to vote conservative, the manner in which people's worth is measured financially; and all of this is in the midst of an angry satire where Malry wreaks vengeance on the system. It is a bitter cycnical novel, with a dark wit.
There is love, sex, and death; and an unusual use for shaving foam. And all of this is presented in a slightly distant way, where Johnson continually turns to the reader and winks, letting you know this is a novel. Characters are aware of their place in fiction, and Johnson deconstructs the novel to let you see how it works.
This description may be off putting, but this is classy fiction. It is funny, and angry. I enjoyed this work, but preferred Johnson's The Unfortunates; which I feel has more depth, and more humanity.
If you enjoyed this you may like Graham Greene's Dr Fischer of Geneva or The Bomb Party or Michael Dibdin's Dirty Tricks (a Thatcherite satire).
David Quantick, London March 6 1999
List price: $18.95 (that's 30% off!)
What makes this book better than most is that it does not get lost in the details of the military movements. It does a fine job of explaining the whys and the hows. Not an easy thing in the limited space avaliable. The most interesting part of the book focus on the German commanders, fresh from the Russian front, fighting the American military with the same Eastern font tactics. As explained, the American use of artilery and close air support made the tactics a disaster.
As in all the Osprey Campaign series, the volume starts with a section on the opposing strategic plans. In assessing Allied strategy, Zaloga conforms to conventional wisdom in suggesting that if only Patton's 3rd Army in Lorraine had been accorded logistical priority in September 1944, then perhaps the year might have ended very differently. This is actually the voice of Patton glorifiers/Montgomery bashers. This conveniently ignores the logistic bottlenecks back at the beaches: even if Eisenhower had given Patton the bulk of available supplies, the Redball Express could not have supplied Patton very much further east at that time. The Allied armies were consuming vast quantities of fuel in their pursuit across France and they needed a deep-water port like Antwerp in September 1944 far more than a tenuous foothold across the Rhine. Finally, does anyone seriously believe that Patton's 3rd Army - which only had 8-10 divisions at the time - could have mounted a serious invasion of Germany with minimal support from the other Allied armies? Zaloga ignores the vast manpower and material resources that were still available to Hitler in September 1944. Despite widespread condemnation by many armchair strategists, Eisenhower's "Broad Front" strategy was the best course of action under the circumstances.
The section on commanders is a bit odd because the majority of the space is devoted to well-known higher-level commanders, including Hitler, Model, Bradley and Patton. The corps and below leaders who actually fought the battle are barely mentioned - the two US corps commanders receive one sentence each. Major General Wood, commander of the exemplary US 4th Armored Division, is barely mentioned anywhere in the text. Given the local nature of the armored battles in Lorraine, it is probably inappropriate to describe this series of actions as "Patton versus Manteuffel". These were battalion and brigade-level fights.
As expected from a technical expert, the sections on the opposing armies are quite good. In particular, Zaloga makes very good points about the US edge in battlefield communications. However, one major item lacking here is a discussion of tactical organizations: what did German armor battalions look like in comparison to their US counterparts, particularly in terms of scouting assets, support weapons and maintenance capability? As a former armor officer, I can attest that maintenance capability is much more critical in sustaining armored combat than is often appreciated. Unfortunately, Zaloga leaves this vital area blank and instead tells us that the Germans committed about 616 tanks and assault guns against 1,280 US tanks and tank destroyers.
The sections covering the actual campaign are quite good, starting with the destruction of the 106th Panzer Brigade on 8 September 1944 and progressing up to the final battles around Arracourt on 25-29 September. While the 3-D maps are quite good, the standard 2-D maps leave much to be desired since key phases of the battle are not depicted. There is no map depicting the German offensive that led up to the Arracourt battles, so it is difficult to determine how the Germans coordinated all their units. This tends to make it look like the panzer brigades were committed with support from other units.
The section on wargaming the battle is ridiculous as it usually is in Osprey books. With the availability of superb computer simulations of the Arracourt battles such as Talonsoft's WEST FRONT and OPERATIONAL ART OF WAR (which are never mentioned in this section on war gaming), it is absolutely ludicrous to read a discussion of a "war game" where the players "wear personal stereos, playing deafening music to recreate the effect of motor noise within the crew compartment. Players could also wear cardboard spectacles, with narrow slits to simulate the view through a periscope or vision port..." and so on. Please stop. Given the existence of Avalon Hill's SQUAD LEADER series and the Talonsoft products, which adequately cover the Arracourt battles, this section is a gross insult to serious wargamers.
Nevertheless, Zaloga's book is a useful campaign summary to keep on the bookshelf. Certainly the organization of the material is more interesting than the actual subject, for this overly-covered campaign was certainly not one of the epic struggles of the Second World War. The US 3rd Army was winded after a long pursuit and at the absolute limit of their logistical chain. Although beaten in Normandy, the Germans were starting to regroup but the Lorraine campaign offers one of the very few times in the Second World War that they fought poorly on the offense. Most of all, the strategic stakes were low in Lorraine. If the Germans won, they might have hurt 3rd Army a bit but they would probably only have bought themselves a few weeks respite. On the other hand, the US achieved a tactical victory but so what - the campaign still ended in stalemate for logistic reasons and the weather. This is a key factor ignored by Zaloga and most other writers on the Lorraine campaign: yes, the 3rd Army defeated the German spoiling attacks but how did this translate into a strategic success? The fact is that the strategic circumstances of September 1944 prohibited 3rd Army from inflicting a decisive defeat on the Whermacht, no matter how much tactical skill they demonstrated on the battlefield.
Used price: $12.95
Used price: $14.00
Used price: $11.16
Used price: $18.99
Collectible price: $71.45
Buy one from zShops for: $21.46
Used price: $10.51
Buy one from zShops for: $13.50