This classic of social psychology is based on the idea that people in groups might think differently and by implication less well than they would have thought as individuals on the same issue at the same time. That is probably true for some groups at some times just as it is also probably true that some groups at some times might actually think better than any individual member of that group. In fact, most of the evidence cited in this book supports the idea that group thinking, like thinking in general, goes awry when there is a failure to evaluate all the available evidence for relevance and sufficiency in quality, quantity, and weight. When a group or an individual fails to evaluate the evidence, then the group or the individual reaches a decision not justified by the data and vice versa. Failure to perceive the reality, as demonstrated by evidence, has tremendous adverse consequences as is so well illustrated by Janis' detailed account of the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Correct evaluation of the data, as demonstrated by evidence, has tremendous beneficial consequences as is so well illustrated by Janis' detailed account of the Cuban Misssile crisis. In fact, the fascinating parts of this book relate to the detailed analysis of group decisions in history, a reason enough to buy and read this fine work despite the price. Incidentally, Gilbert Murray has sought to explain the group cohesiveness thing by another myth which he calls "the groping of a lonely-souled gregarious animal to find its herd or its herd-leader." But however we attempt to account for the craving for unity in some groups, it seems to be a deeply rooted human irrational demand. Like James' "sentiment of rationality," it is a sentiment and a need long before it is justified by any discoverable facts. Our duty is to be on guard against it. Groupthink, this classic book, should boost our defenses.

Janis defines groupthink as the "deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment" in the interest of group solidarity.
Pressure to conform. Formal and informal attempts are made to discourage discussion of divergent views. Groups exert great pressure on individual members to conform.
Opposing ideas dismissed. Any individual or outside group that criticizes or opposes a decision receives little or no attention from the group. Group members tend to show strong favoritism toward their own ideas in the manner by which information is processed and evaluated, thus guaranteeing that their ideas will win out.

Irving L. Janis culls together evidence regarding three fiascoes, the Bay of Pigs invasion, Pearl Harbor, and the United States' invasion into North Korea, and contrasts those with the Cuban Missile Crisis and Marshall Plan. The bottom line is that the first three incidents were examples of groupthink, the last two were able to avoid this problem.

Groupthink is the process described by Janis when a group follows a certain set of patterns that result in disastrous consequences. Clearly if the same group patterns were applied to the Cuban Missile Crises that were used in the Bay of Pigs, the world might well have been destroyed by nuclear war. The possible consequences for groups are enormous.

When a group, whether it is a business, church, school, little league, not for profit, or other organization, knows how to avoid groupthink, it can come to a much better decision for the group itself, as well as those the group represents. Janis provides the means to help groups accomplish this very important goal. This is material from which any group can benefit, if they chose to put it into practice.

I recommend this work very highly to anyone who works with groups of any kind.

This text covers the Bay of Pigs invasion as well as several other whitehouse decisions by cabinet and select committee members with all the right information, yet make the wrong decisions. The answer is based upon the dynamics of the group and the power it has in swaying opinions, even if the group member knows that it is wrong. As group members, each if in fear of group rejection or not going along with the flow. It demonstrates why some group member should always be devil's advocate if proper decisions are to be subjective. A super read for those interested in international politics and the U.S. Governments' ability to see or not see the obvious.