Immerman's "CIA in Guatemala" is a very-well researched book, evidencing a great breadth of scholarship and study, but is at times very turgid reading indeed. My greatest problem concerns the author's endless hammering at the idea that the Guatemalan intervention was much more than a protection of US economic interests; that, rather, the intervention was more importantly a result of the "cold war ethos" of the time that dominated US political thought. Immerman's chief illustrations of this concern a wealth of evidence displaying hysterical US officials' ranting about the "international communist conspiracy" in Guatemala. While these men would certainly have liked everyone to believe that this was more than just a protection of their country's economic hegemony in Latin America, I don't see how Immerman can take this idea seriously. He shows through his own research that the Soviet Union- which was the fundamental opposing partner of the "ethos"- had nothing to do with Guatemala's revolutionary government at any time outside of sympathy, and that the Soviet Union's foreign policy was always a very conservative one, and always very fearful of the United States. The book would have been shortened of at least a few needless pages and clarified extensively if Immerman would have (1) dropped the idea that men like Dulles and Eisenhower were stupid enough to believe the "anti-Communist" propoganda they spouted at this time, and (2) recognized that perhaps the cold war ethos he discusses was all about preserving US economic dominance and concerned the Soviet Union only as a propoganda element, at least in Guatemala. Besides what I saw as a somewhat unclear argument to bolster the main idea that the intervention was an essential event in Cold War history, the book is undeniably well-researched and presents the Guatemalan intervention in excellent detail. The author's final chapter is especially interesting in linking the broad problems of Latin American reformist leaders demonstrated by Guatemala to the Cuban revolution and its aspirations. Overall, for its subject the book is certainly a must.

This is a useful book. It is very well researched, extraordinarily documented and tells you essentially anything you need to know about the CIA's plot to overthrow the Arbenz government in Guatemala. Unfortunately, the writing is so turgid and dull it's difficult not to nod off in the middle of a particularly gritty section of history. I applaud Immerman's effort and the completeness of his overall work, but he really should have taken on a jounrnalist to help him get through the rough spots and make the book actually readable.

The CIA in Guatemala offers the reader a compeling and shocking truth regarding the involevement of the American government in third-world country. Immerman relates in detail how the CIA and United Fruit magnates paint the guatemalan flag red and declare the country communist because they misinterpreted Agrarian Reform as a direct threat to "National Security." Boldly told, the reader finds himself amist a sea of revelations and a little confusion as the story unfolds, but it is only natural for a book of this nature. Immeran has done a wonderful job explaining foreign and political intervention about the american titan otherwise know as the "Gobierno Gringo." A marvelous account of past events are exposed after years of being witheld by the CIA as classified documents. I invoke anybody with an interest in politics, governmet intervention or just to inderstand how foreign interests dictate a small nation by placing puppet presidents to do their bidding to read this book.

Bowie and Immerman posit that "credit for shaping ... strategy (of Cold War) belongs to President Dwight D. Eisenhower." By the end of the Truman Administration, the initial confrontational phase of the Cold War was reaching a steady-state. The Truman Administration set up the basic framework for the American side, but due to crises (foreign and domestic) had not had the time to set longer-term goals. Eisenhower, a man used to a more bureaucratic, organized approach, followed Truman and institutionalized much of what the Truman Administration had begun. Bowie and Immerman continually suggest how Eisenhower personally oversaw what (rhetorically) comes across as a kind of revolutionary retooling of America's Cold War response. But their own thorough use of documentation continually shows what took place under Ike was a bureaucratic evolution, one building upon the Truman Administration's somewhat sparse initial outline. The authors' penchant for "Ike cheerleading" (and to a lesser extent, "Truman diminishing")is a continuous distraction, and is a direct outgrowth of the overblown thesis (or maybe its the other way around.) It is unfortunate that Cold War historiography often gets caught up in this sort of "partisan" behavior, particularly concerning Eisenhower. Ike was unjustly considered to be mediocre for so many years that a large number of historians felt it necessary to resurrect his image. The resurrection has succeeded; Ike certainly had a very good grasp on foreign policy issues and deserves to be ranked among the more effective Presidents ever. But there simply isn't the discontinuity between the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations that is suggested here. An example: the authors go to great detail in showing how the Eisenhower Administration reexamined the goals of the Cold War struggle; they are impressed by the thoroughness and awareness of Ike and his people. What is the result? Containment, the same exact guideline devised under Truman and carried forward to the end of the struggle. NSC-68, which did temporarily occupy the Truman Administration, had mostly been abandoned by Truman by the end of his second term, as seen by the downward revisions of projected military budgets. (If Truman actually believed that 1954 would be the "time of maximum danger," would he have been more concerned with budgetary matters than defense?) The authors point out these things, and yet continue to claim extraordinary achievements under Eisenhower. Ike deserves his due as Cold Warrior (mainly for organizing the bureaucracy and pushing foreign aid), but he was not radically different than what came before him. The authors' research suggests this -- its unfortunate that they seemingly didn't realize what their own research suggested.

This book is a very entertaining read. I have done extensive research on the CIA, particularly regarding the Bay of Pigs, and this was one of the first books I read on the subject. HOWEVER, even though I assumed that what I had read in the book was highly accurate, as I read two and three other books on the same subjects I was looking for [The CIA's Secrete Operations, Spying For America, and others] I realized that the other books seemed to agree with each other, as well as with the official, recently declassified reports on the Bay of Pigs by Colonel Hawkins-who ran the Bay of Pigs operation- yet THIS BOOK CONSISTENTLY MISLEAD ITS READER, which confused the hell out of me, since this book had been the first one I had read on the subject. There remarks such as the following: "Some two thousand Cuban rebels land at the Bay of Pigs. They are hit immediatly by Castro's armed forces. A debacle is in the making." (pg.307, opening of chapter 22) this is just one example of misleading information. What actually happened was that the 1187 cuban-exiles that landed were actually split up into three separate groups miles away from each other, none of which where "hit" by Castro's forces for hours. They did encounter a roving militia of about 40 people who promply surrendured, and a CIA scuba team that was leaving beacons for the invasion boats to navigate to were forced to open fire on a small contingent of Cuban forces (the CIA forces eliminated them). This does not, however, suggest what is reported in the above quoted statement. Other examples proliferate across the book. just a warning that this book seems to want to tell a good story more than give an accurate account of what actually happened. If all you want is an entertaining read, then the book will probably still be fine, since the fact bending tended to be restricted to small, inconsequential details. I must say, however, that Ambrose sure does know how to write an entertaining book.

This book is very helpful in understanding the challenges of today's world. Intelligence is a vital requirement for three objectives: Knowing what your opponents are doing; deceiving your opponents about what you are doing; and using covert means to change or replace your opponents.

As Ambrose makes clear, Eisenhower was introduced to the world of intelligence by Winston Churchill and rapidly became fascinated with it. His chief intelligence officer Kenneth Strong, a British General, kept him remarkably informed throughout the Second World War. Ambrose argues, and he is almost certainly right, that only the combination of great intelligence about the Germans and the most successful deception plan in history made the invasion of France possible in 1944. He also notes that deception had also been brilliantly used in 1943 to convince the Germans that the allies were going to invade Sardinia or Greece rather than Sicily. The result was a reallocation of German forces to the wrong places, which weakened their forces in Sicily.

There are a lot of lessons in this book for our generation. Eisenhower valued technology and took risks to develop it. He knew how to undertake successful covert operations. For anyone who would understand the uses of intelligence in the modern world, this is a useful book.