Many historians of diplomacy refer to some inchoate set of common principles and ideas that seems to lie behind all the twists and turns of American 20th-century foreign policy; Hunt actually tries to determine what that shared ideology was. He describes three basic components of this shared ideology: 1) America's vision of national greatness, 2) the American propensity to view the world's population in a hierarchy of race (and later culture as its substitute), and 3) America's growing disappointment and horror at failed revolutions of the 19th and 20th centuries. He makes a sound, logical argument, and this book holds an importance place in its field. Certainly, Americans have always believed (and rightly so, in my opinion) that theirs is the greatest political system on earth. Indisputably, Americans have tended to assign characteristics to peoples on the basis of race (from blacks to eastern Europeans to Asians). I can't buy as strongly into the effects of failed revolutions--surely, the French Revolution shocked and displeased Americans who expected it to be a revolution in the American vein and just the first in a series of changes that would bring peace and freedom to all peoples. The Bolshevik Revolution also affected Americans' views of the world significantly, but I think Hunt overexaggerates the fears generated at home by Third World revolutions abroad. As Hunt would be the first to admit, ideology alone cannot explain foreign policy, and I find that his arguments do not explain to my satisfaction the disparity between Jeffersonian/Wilsonian and Federalist/FDR/LBJ thinkers. Overall, though, I found this book noble in its intentions and quite utilitarian in covering a neglected area in the field of foreign policy.

Then I read the last chapter. After putting forth his arguments, Hunt feels compelled to proscribe a new, more effective foreign policy for the United States. The fact that this exceeds the purview of an historian is beyond the point. His suggestions for changing the ideological notions of American diplomacy strike me as dangerously isolationist (despite his assertion to the contrary), exceedingly liberal, and naïve. He basically argues that America should get out of the business of imperialism, stop worrying about what other countries are doing, and devote itself to creating social and political equality at home. The Cold War had not ended when this book was written, but his suggestion was that we basically let Communism determine its own future while we implement socialism at home. Hunt must have been terribly disappointed to see Ronald Reagan win the Cold War so soon after this book's publication because that victory invalidates many of his recommendations. Hunt's main contention is that America cannot simultaneously maintain liberty at home while working to spread freedom abroad--while I think he is completely wrong about this, the subject is being hotly debated in the context of the war on terrorism and will surely be debated for all time.

I do recommend this book. I disagree with his conclusions, but his points are presented clearly, and his insights into history are invaluable. I should also mention that he ends the book with a chapter discussing relevant books in the field of ideology and foreign policy--although his references seem weighted toward revisionist/leftist scholars, it is a very useful introduction to further readings in the important and always hotly debated field of American diplomacy.

This is that rare combination of a serious intellectual effort for scholars and a highly-readable work that should satisfy a broader audience. Michael Hunt trained at Yale, and teaches at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. It's simply a remarkable book. I've used it teaching High School students, college and graduate school students, and adults wishing to broaden their understanding of the complex motivations that underpin foreign policy.

I have just finished my master's thesis on American foreign policy and Michael Hunt's book was one of the foundations of my study. It is a highly readable and fascinating study. I can recommend it for the general reader as well as the academic. It is one of the most insightful books I have ever read.

This book covers major events in US foreign policy, such as the World Wars, Vietnam and Korea, Cold War, and Iran. Each chapter provides a survey of the event, dates, and details. These portions are sometimes a little difficult to follow (for example, to grasp the timeline of events). The most interesting part of this book is the inclusion of a lage amount of actual documents pertaining to each crisis. for example, excerpts from presidential correspondence, NSC reports, and other diplomatic materials. This is most interesting, to see the events thru the eyes of the actual participants.

This is an interesting and very personal reflection on Vietnam by Michael Hunt. Not a straight history of the war, so it's neither comprehensive nor without bias. Worth reading for its perspective though.

This book ... runs just over a hundred pages, but Hunt spends the first half of the book showing how it was Truman, Ike's and Kennedy's War, then writes one chapter on Johnson then a brief conclusion. I agree with his thesis that it was Johnson's war; after all Johnson is responsible for the biggest escalations in the war. There's just not much new or illuminating here.

I found the most useful part of the book to be his description of Kennedy's whiz kids and the energy and enthusiasm they bring to the scenario. But that supports an argument that this was JFK's war even if he didn't live to see it to the end. Ultimately it was a war typical of America's tendency throughout the Cold War to see everything in black and white, freedom vs. totalitarianism. Any President, faced with the same choices and domestic political context, would have made the same decisions.

Michael Hunt has written a compact yet thorough history of the U. S. involvement in Vietnam. Hunt's premise, in effect, is that due to ignorance, arrogance, and ethnocentrism, U.S. leaders are prevented from a real understanding of Vietnam before embarking on a series of ultimately tragic decisions.

The title of the work suggests two themes. One, Lyndon Johnson made the crucial decisions and thus made the war his own and is therefore to blame for the resulting quagmire. Two, while it is LBJ's war, it is actually part of a larger struggle, the Cold War, an effort in which the United States ultimately prevailed. This is, perhaps, the proper prism through which Vietnam should be viewed.

This work is particularly strengthened and distinguished by Professor Hunt's exploration of the major criticisms of Lyndon Johnson's prosecution of the Vietnam War. He concludes that Johnson was not candid with the American public, and that he proceeded knowing full well the risks involved. Additionally, while Johnson did go to war with clear goals, utilizing power decisively, he was ultimately strait-jacketed by the times in which he lived.