Part of the author's title is indisputable: the Northern-Southern divide over slavery and all of its attendant subtleties and ramifications was a crisis only waiting to happen in the 1850s. But the author places greater importance on what he sees as the political crisis of that era. Regardless, this book is a fine effort in capturing the richness of the party politics in the two decades leading to the Civil War.

It is the author's essential point that a robust democratic polity requires political parties that compete on a somewhat equal basis, inspire widespread party loyalty and, in essence, control the more fractious issues or interpretations of the times. That is exactly the role that the author suggests that the Second Party system consisting of the Whigs and Democrats played from Andrew Jackson's presidency to the early 1850s. The expansion of slavery into new territories and states was the most contentious issue of the day. The Northern and Southern wings of both the Democrats and the Whigs adopted particular positions on such controversies as the Wilmot Proviso and the Compromise of 1850 that kept the public looking to the political realm for solutions. The author notes that themes of republican virtue, that is, defense of freedom and independence and opposition to tyranny in its various guises, were the basis of the parties' positions.

But that political status quo fell apart as both the slavery issue and nativism could not be contained within the Second Party system. While the author views this development as the beginning of the political crisis of the 1850s, others may see the rise of new political parties as the essence of political responsiveness. The Know Nothing party had a meteoric rise in the mid-1850s but just as quickly the Republicans rose in the late 1850s and elected Abraham Lincoln to the presidency in 1860. The author contends that political elites should be able to manage controversial issues of the day. But the fact is that the adherents of anti-slavery, nativism, and free soil of the 1850s overwhelmed the political alignments formed in the 1830s. The author comes close to suggesting that the Republicans were irresponsible opportunists by forming a party on sectional lines with sectional interests.

The essential question that the author asks is why did slavery become an issue in the 1850s. After all, it had existed for the first sixty years of the nation. But his explanation of Second Party system breakdown seems inadequate. In the first place the Whig Party broke up in the South as a result of the Compromise of 1850. Secondly, a series of slavery-related developments in the 1850s exacerbated the situation. The Kansas-Nebraska Act, the entire state constitution fiasco in Kansas, and the Dread Scott decision all convinced Northerners that an oligarchic Slave Power had gained the upper hand in extending slavery. Those reactions drove political realignment along sectional lines.

However, a salient point of the author's, and in accordance with his political crisis thesis, is that the lack of political competition in the lower southern states permitted the extremism that led to an extra-political solution, or secession. He points out that the upper south retained vigorous opposition parties to the Democrats and confidence in the political system as an avenue for redress. In the author's view, it is not surprising that South Carolina was the first state to secede because a vigorous two party system had never existed there.

The author admits that his book is an "extended dialog" with the earlier work of Eric Foner, author of "Free Soil, Free Labor, ...". Foner emphasizes the essential social and philosophical differences between the South and the North that came to the fore and inevitably led to the Civil War. This author is not entirely dismissive of those sentiments, but chooses to emphasize the possibilities of political containment of those differences and the ramifications of political breakdown. In addition, this book does a far better job of describing the various crises of the era in chronological fashion. Both books are well worth reading.

Footnote: this book does not in any way address the constitutional right to secede as one earlier review suggests.

Volumes of information lend credence to a state's right to secede from the Union. Even the US Supreme Court in 1862 (during the war) ruled that states did, indeed, have the right to secede from the Union, but that the question was currently being decided on the battlefield.

Given that even Southerners were starting to 'see' the end of slavery in the South, and not even considering that after Northerners made their fortunes capturing, transporting, and selling Negroes into slavery, then the question comes down to this - did one part of the country have the right to declare war and invade another section of the country (in violation of the Constitution) when that section being invaded (the South) was acting within its Constitutional rights? Does might make right? Do two wrongs make a right? If slavery was bound to die out anyway, was the loss of life worth it ending 10 or 20 years sooner - given that it had existed for 100 of years - and not even mentioning that the north wanted to free the slaves, but offered no constuctive alternative except "you're free, there's the highway'. (which, in my opinion, is why the black community and youth are still suffering to this day).

Serious students of the Civil War have to address three important questions regarding its origins. First, one must account for the timing of the conflict. Slavery was a national political issue since at least the Missouri Compromise of 1820. What made 1861 different from other flashpoints in the slavery debate such as the annexation of Texas, the 1850 Compromise, the Dred Scott decision, and the recognition of Lecompton? Second, one must account for rise of the Republicans over the Free Soilers and Know Nothings after the demise of the Whig party in the early 1850s. All three were against the expansion of slavery so what made the Republicans unique? Finally, one must explain why the lower South seceded first, the middle South seceded second, and the upper South remained with the Union.

This book attempts to provide answers to these questions by examining the American political system at the time. It does NOT 'dismiss' slavery as a cause of the war but rather adds a much needed layer of analysis to address these sophisticated questions. If war is truly an extension of politics, then this book is well justified in its focus.