I am a former Russian journalist and a documentary filmmaker who has also worked at NASA in the US.

"The Anatomy of Russian Defense Conversion" touches on many more subjects then just Russian Defense Industry. This is a very thorough, informative and important work that analyses the history of US and Russian Defense Industries, weapons exports and conversion, and possibilities of transformation from a militarized to a civilian economy in the new millenium.

The book also reflects on the current state of defense industries in the US and Russia, and "brain drain", or loss of intellectual capital in Russia and other countries after the Cold War.

I found reflections in Arkady Yarovsky's chapter "From the Culture of War to the Culture of Peace" very contemporary, especially in the light of recent events in the Middle East:

"Our time is unfortunately still characterized as "the culture of war." The culture of war is evident first and foremost in the hostilities between people and states, between nations and faiths, and in the inability to solve conflicts by peaceful means... Humanity has made it into the third millenium because the lust for power has been restrained by fear of nuclear war, but this restraint is not to be counted on permanently... The danger hidden in the separateness of people of different countries, unfortunately, remains a legacy for the next century... If humanity renounces the legacy of the culture of war, it can start down the road of cooperation, peaceful creation, and enlightenment. This is the only road leading to the culture of peace."

One can imagine that I, as a small child living in San Antonio, Texas, next to three Air Force bases and an Army base, living through the Cuban missile crisis, thought about the threat of the Russian military. I also met my parents' wonderful emigre' friends, and to this day have had warm relations with Russian people.

This book tells of the enormous cost to the Russian people of building and maintaining their war industry for so many years, a militarized economy where people got second best. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, defense industry just about shut down, but civilian industry has not grown great enough to support the population. There are horrendous unemployment, and terrible health and social problems. There is some danger that the path of least resistance for Russia, if we neglect the situation, could be to re-start weapons production, for export at first.

In my opinion, the United States also, to a lesser degree, has neglected the manufacture of quality consumer goods, importing them instead, and has let its physical economy deteriorate, despite much activity in the financial sector. We, too, have been insufficiently careful of the environment. This book provides some idea of what these trends could lead to, if carried to extremes.

Perhaps the involvement of United States companies in Russia, could lead to more of a recognition here, of the importance of the physical economy. Hopefully, both countries could also work to put industry on a healthy environmental footing as well.

There is awareness of the problem of Russian defense conversion, at high levels of our government. I hope this book helps educate people and sustain that interest.

For those interested in military history, "Hooves, Wheels and Tracks" is excellent reading. From its beginnings as a cavalry regiment in Colonial Australia of the 1800's; we are taken on a detailed yet gripping narrative of the 4th/19th Prince of Wales's Light Horse Regiment's history - to its formation in World War I as the Victorian 4th Light Horse Regiment which fought cavalry actions in Palestine against Germany and Turkey - to its reformation in World War II as an Australian Armoured Regiment fighting as an ally of America in the South-West Pacific and again in the 1960's in the jungles of Vietnam. David Holloway (himself a former officer of the Regiment about which he writes) has produced an accurate and interesting historical record of one of the most elite military units of Australia' Armed Forces.

This book is perfect for anyone who owns a home--especially and older home. From the first chapter, which describes in detail how to strip a room down to its bare bones, to others which describe how to make repairs to staircases, wallpaper around arches and other obstacles, lay flooring, etc., this book is packed with information and step by step instructions. Each chapter is divided into different tasks (for instance, the chapter on refinishing a hardwood floor separates out the tasks of sanding, repairing cracks, replacing a damaged board, and others), and each task is summarized with an approximate skill level, working time, and tools needed.

Great book.

I was most interested in who had the first hydrogen bomb (the first real plan, the ideal materials, a way to make it, and a test device) and I didn't mind reading about "some radioactive indicator which is formed with the participation of fast deuterons" (p. 304) to find out. Sorting out the physics, which can be revealed to those who care to know, with a comparison of alternate paths to the same result, reveals something far more substantial than the usual plot, based on the politics of world domination, the main concern of Stalin and the author of this book. Stalin gets some sympathy for facing a stark post-war reality, based on his comparison of what World War II did to Russia and Germany, compared to the damage which the few atomic bombs which existed in his lifetime could produce, and it might be said that he acted accordingly in attempting to maintain countervailing threats whenever he was pressured. Any notion of absolute justice, or even feasible military advantage, seems to be as elusive for the superpowers (and one still exists today) as for the petty despots and warlords that often become characters in this book about how such weapons came to be. I didn't mind the revelations about certain events: a war in Korea at a critical point in this book even makes the question of when Mao ordered the Chinese divisions into Korea an interesting question to be considered. In most of these books, I like the events which influenced Sakharov most, the best. The description of the shock wave from the November 1955 test on pages 316-7 includes, "All of this triggers an irrational yet very strong emotional impact."

David Holloway, a professor at Stanford, has published an intriguing history of Soviet nuclear weapons development in _Stalin_and_the_Bomb_. This volume interweaves two main themes--the technical difficulties in designing and fabricating nuclear weapons, and the political motivations commanding these efforts along with their strategic implications.

Many of the major participants are familiar to readers of Soviet history, such as Stalin, Beria, Molotov and Khrushchev. However, the important actors in this drama were the technical experts who created these engines of destruction on behalf of their masters. Many prominent scientists labored to provide the theoretical and experimental support demanded by Stalin for rapid industrialization, laying the groundwork for the tremendous infrastructure needed to duplicate the achievements of the Manhattan Project years later. Research in radioactivity eventually led to the first spontaneous fission experiment in 1940, but this did not attract attention in the West, where restrictions began for publication on nuclear physics.

Work on fission continued during the war, but the lack of uranium prevented much advancement. Holloway, in examining the directives during this period, found priorities unchanged following the Potsdam meeting, in contrast to the subsequent demand for uranium production after Hiroshima. He attributes Stalin's casual reaction to Truman's mention of a new weapon to skepticism regarding its importance. But the bomb as a colossal reality, not merely as an intelligence phantom, presented Stalin with a new strategic contention. His response was to show resolve in the face of anticipated intimidation coupled with orders to develop this technology independently. However, he only recognized the bomb as an instrument of Anglo-American policy, and refused to consider it militarily decisive in any potential conflict. When challenging US policy over Berlin, for example, Stalin carefully applied pressure while keeping his options open and took care not to escalate tensions beyond retraction.

The achievement of creating an atomic bomb, given the devastating post-war depravation of the Soviet Union can be credited primarily to Igor Kurchatov, the scientific director of the nuclear project from 1942 until his death in 1960. Kurchatov was a well respected figure in Soviet physics, but he also provided a methodical and systematic orchestration to a project with many difficult sundry en-gineering obstacles to overcome, not to mention the menacing oversight by Beria, head of the NKVD. Although awarded privileged status in the post-war Soviet Union, the scientists recognized their position as predicated on successful completion of this task.

The primary obstacle remained the inadequate supply of uranium metal until 1948 when the first production reactor was built. Uranium isotope separation and plutonium precipitation were tackled with indus-trial vigor. The gaseous diffusion facility, modeled on the Oak Ridge plant involved particular engineering difficulties to be solved before uranium enrichment could proceed. Yulii Khariton, director of the secret nu-clear research laboratory Arzamas-16, led the study on the physics of detonation. Implosion was needed to compress the plutonium a few microseconds in order to start the chain reaction. Their first atom bomb was exploded August 1949 at Semipalatinsk with a yield of 20 kilotons of TNT. Thus the Soviet Union joined the nuclear club.

While espionage yielded useful information at the West's expense, Holloway argues that Klaus Fuchs saved the Soviets only about a year or two by giving dimensions of the plutonium implosion design. He compares the first Soviet atom bomb explosion in 1949 with the first British demonstration in 1952 despite much closer collaboration with the Americans than anything obtained clandestinely by their Soviet counterparts. Holloway also contends that the contribution by captured Germans was comparatively minor and sped the project by only a few weeks or months--principally in the area of processing uranium.

While the bomb was being developed, Stalin initiated orders on delivery systems--bombers by Vladimir Myasishchev and rockets by Sergei Korolev. In Stalin's view, another war was inevitable within two decades, and the atomic bomb would serve as merely another policy instrument. After he died in March 1953, his successors embarked on a less confrontational rapproachement with the West.

After the Soviets demonstrated their ability to create weapons based on nuclear fission, Truman decided to pursue the hydrogen bomb, because there was no indication that Stalin would reciprocate a policy of restraint. After some false starts, a method to use X-ray compression from fission to implode the thermonuclear charge was discovered, enabling a yield limited only by the quantity of nuclear fuel. The Mike test in November 1952 verified this concept with an ungainly 60-ton refrigerated assembly. Meanwhile, the Russians embarked on fusion independently. A young physicist, Andrei Sakarov began work in 1948 and joined the Arzamas-16 facility, developing the "Layer Cake" which resembled the boosted fission weapon, before advancing on the two-stage Super. The first thermonuclear bomb was exploded in August 1953, and apparently alarmed Kurchatov, being 20 times more power-ful than the first Soviet fission bomb four years earlier. In November 1955, the first two-stage thermonuclear bomb with a yield of 1.6 megatons was exploded.

The first Soviet fusion explosion produced a profound change in the attitudes of politburo members about the same time that Americans realized that this new weapon represented a far more potent destructive force than the fission variety. In the aftermath of this revelation, a more conciliatory "peaceful coexistence" doctrine began to develop. Khrushchev's increased dialog with western leaders also facilitated long dormant communication between Soviet physicists and their colleagues beyond the Iron Curtain. Kurchatov's visit in 1956 was well received at Harwell, the British power station. From this small privileged enclave, a civilizing influence was nurtured within a totalitarian society. Eventually, Sakarov went beyond the usual misgivings of Soviet society to become a dissident and human rights advocate.

_Stalin_ concludes that the arms race between the two blocks was contingent solely on Stalin's intentions. Holloway believes that in the post-war years the bomb probably restrained the use of force but also made Stalin less cooperative to avoid seeming weak.

The book is not without flaws--some identifications to the KGB presumably belong to NKVD, the American arsenal in June 1946 lists a grossly exces-sive nine atom bombs taken from the _Bulletin of_Atomic_Scientists_ compared to _The Winning_Weapon_ by Gregg Herken which identified a single partially disassembled weapon in the inventory in January 1947, and an annoying transliteration of two Cyrillic characters as "ia" and "iu" instead of "ya" and "yu" as more conventionally employed. Otherwise, _Stalin_ is a tremendous addition to our knowledge of Russian capabilities in physics instigated by a repressive regime at the dawn of the nuclear age.