This sobering book, authored by a former head of State Department Intelligence during the Kennedy Administration, warns against the delusion that "mutually assured destruction" continues preventing nuclear warfare. Indeed, at the rate the world is progressing, nuclear warfare is likely. Can we comfortable look at crises in India-Pakistan, the Middle East, Iran-Iraq, and the two Koreas and conclude that nuclear war is impossible? Further, should the current government in Russia fall, can we be certain its replacement will not be one that rekindles some Cold War aspects?
Roger Hilsman's book is fascinating in two aspects. It first serves as a detailed yet readable history of nuclear weapons policies. It then presents a thoughtful yet controversial proposal on what the author argues will prevent nuclear war.
Nuclear war can be started by nations or by terrorists, Hilsman warns. Leaders can miscalculate, be insane, or lose control of situations. During war, all three such possibilities can easily occur.
Hilsman's conclusion that a world government replacing nationalistic desires (which causes most wars) and that is capable of policing rogue nuclear threats is the only solution is a conclusion bound to provoke dissension. Indeed, even Hilsman realizes such an eventuality will be impossible for some time. National pride is too strong for nations to give power to a higher governmental authority. Still, the thought this is the only way to prevent a nuclear catastrophe should create concern. If the world can recognize the dangers and begin moving in this direction (which is possible as evidenced by Europe's acceptance of the European Community), there is hope.

This book is truly thought-provoking, and Dr. Hilsman deserves high praise for even tackling the subject of what we can do to avoid a nuclear war. He has written superbly of past nuclear policies, such as deterrence strategies of the United States and Russia. It is quite apparent that he was close to the centers of power during much of the most dangerous time, and he offers insights into the Kennedy administration especially.

His possible solutions, including a world government, are less satisfying than his recounting of the history of the problem. He himself admits we are not likely to see a true world government which could be the legitimate exerciser of power, but he does propose some other measures which could lessen the possibilities of nuclear war. He makes a valid point in that in some ways our present international organizations are carrying out some of the functions of a world government and causing nuclear war to be less thinkable.

The book is well worth reading, even if you don't agree with the author's conclusions. His summations of the history of the nuclear situation are truly masterful and should be read by all serious persons who know how close we have come to the final nightmare and how we are not yet free of some high risks.

While this book is a serious piece of work, I enjoyed it as a perfect complement to Umberto Eco's 'Foucault's Pendulum.' Too bad this book is not more widely read.

I read this book in 1980-something and I still remember it. It helped me to understand the models that politicians use (used?) to make important decisions in the face of uncertainty. While I am sure better techniques - including game theory - are currently used, the good old black box/grey box/blue box methods help explain a number of seemingly foolish decisions that were made by U.S. and Soviet leaders during the cold war.

Make no mistake, this is rather difficult reading for most people. "Most people" refers to those who can't stomach, say, The Economist or Scientific American.

The author went on to have a long and noted career as an academic and government official. He was chief of the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and the Assistant Secretary of State during the Johnson administration.
Roger Hilsman graduated from The US Military Academy in 1944 and was assigned to the OSS, Sent to Burma, the author commanded a guerrilla battalion, ambushing Japanese patrols, blowing up bridges, spying on the enemy, and slipping back into the teeming jungle. later he went to the prison camp in Manchuria where the Japanese had held his father and helped liberate him.
This is an articulate and informative memoir. In the course of his career the author has written many political and policy books. This gives a sense of the man behind the job.

This book basically contends that although the leaders of the two countries acted like school yard bullies squaring off that it was George Bush who kept pushing towards war each time Saddam Hussein tried to slow down the current.

Among some of the interesting items presented against President Bush was the fact that he initially seemed to be pushed around by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who told him at a meeting that he couldn't stand for Hussein's invasion. In the beginning he wobbled and changed stances on the invasion frequently. His public and private statements through diplomatic channels were contradicting. At first he conveyed to Saddam Hussein (before the invasion of Kuwait) that the U.S. didn't care what Hussein did and would not take action if he invaded because it was an Arab problem. But when the invasion occurred he took action against it. Second, President Bush pushed Sadia Arabia to house U.S. troops on their soil even though the Saudi's were against it. Then he announced to the world that the Saudi's had requested the U.S. troops to help protect their land. Third, President Bush announced that the troops in Saudi Arabia would be there for defense of that country only and denied any intention of an invasion force to push back Iraqi troops. This too, turned out to be untrue.

On the opposite side of the spectrum it seems that, initially, Saddam Hussein's grievances were somewhat legitimate, although not for a full invasion of Kuwait. Saddam had come to the U.S. for help and was told to handle it any way he wanted, it was not our concern. You have to understand that in the years before the Gulf War the U.S. government was helping Saddam Hussein in his war with Iran. There was an issue of Kuwait stealing Iraqi oil by a "slant drill" in an oil field. The issue of Kuwait owning islands that blocked the ability of Iraq to transport their oil out of the Persian Gulf (these were given to Kuwait by the British). Atleast four times Hussein had offered a peace agreement and to remove his soldiers from Kuwait after the invasion through many nations, including Jordan and Russia, all to be turned down by the U.S.

Overall I feel this book was interesting and shed some light on some of the causes behind the war. While I believe that these are valid reasons that have been well researched I'm sure there are even more. The path towards war is usually complex.