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Get this book only if you're ready for a shock. I pray we can get some professionals in the agency before something else hits our country.

Baer recounts how he became a CIA agent, during a time when the government was looked on as, to put it politely, worse than dung. He claims he never thought he was going to get accepted. It was amusing to read about the time anarchists'(whose apartment he shared) snake escaped, and the CIA agent, who was supposed to be checking Baer's friends, got lost and ended up at his apartment. He wrote that he tried to get rid of the CIA agent "as soon as possible" and that he was afraid that "at any moment the snake would come slithering around the corner".
I found it chilling when I read about the time Baer and his fellow ground agents came across a petty criminal who was willing to help the CIA by being a liaison in a well-known terrorist group. The CIA head men refused because he was a criminal. Baer points out that the FBI has sources that are criminals, and basically says that to catch a criminal, you can't use good people. The potential liaison in the terrorist group was wasted, and you can't help wondering if we could have prevented September 11th, if the CIA wasn't so picky about its sources.
This book is great read and it'll open your eyes to the political correctness that is so prevalent in today's society. If political correctness has invaded our intelligence agencies, what is next?

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Hersh does a tremendous service to America. He single-handedly destroys the myth that Nixon and Kissinger were dedicated to the swift end of the Vietnam war. To his credit, Hersh documents the formation of Nixon's secret "Madman" policy and how the President and Kissinger employed this risky strategy to prolong the war.
"The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House," is also a serious study of how certain key cabinet members that opposed the manipulation of foreign policy were quickly isolated and discredited. Hersch interviews key individuals that Kissinger personally recruited to work at the NSC to show how significant contributions to foreign policy was wrestled from the State Department and firmly established in the White House. The early consolidation of power by Nixon and Kissinger set the pattern for a long string of dark policy.
The secret bombing of Cambodia, the crisis in Korea, the SALT talks, the Mideast, Cuba, China, the Berlin settlement are all explored in this text. However, the most damaging information to the reputation of Henry Kissinger is how his secret information to the Nixon campaign during the Johnson administrations peace talks in Paris compromised any chance of reaching an early conclusion to the war. Hersh meticulously researches how Kissinger manipulates his contacts in Paris to circumvent the practice of conflict resolution by Lyndon Johnson. Hersh also explains how Kissinger used this secret information to position himself on Nixon's short list of foreign policy advisors after the defeat of Hubert H. Humprhey in the 1968 presidential elections.
There is little flattery of the 37th President of the United States in this book. If anything Hersch displays the ruthlessness of the Nixon White House and how Henry Kissinger would sacrifice everything to implement a dark policy that cost thousands of lives. In conclusion, this book is a bitter pill for the brave young men and women who answered the nation's call in Vietnam.

The Price of Power reveals much about the Nixon-Kissinger administration that would shock most Americans. Focusing most of its attention on the Vietnam war, this book tells how Nixon/Kissinger basically detatched themselves from the rest of the U.S. government in order to do whatever they wanted throughout the world. It seemed as though Nixon/Kissinger based every decision they made on their future political survival. Hersh does a superb job of bring to light some of the truly darkest moments in U.S. History. He also shows us how Nixon-Kissinger were able to get their policies implemented by eliminating and and all opposition. They created such a strong executive with such little oversight that their leadership resembled that of a dictatorship.
After reading this, I felt ashamed to call myself an American. We strongly supported a president who was an alcoholic racist whose paranoia dictated much of his actions. I never realized just how close we came to using nuclear weapons in Vietnam (and this AFTER Nixon campaigned with his "Peace with Honor" slogan). We are quick to point to several leaders of the 20th century and label them "war criminals." By any definition, Nixon and Kissinger should be included on this list of war criminals. Disagree with me? read Price of Power. If, after doing so, you still disagree with me, you obviously did not read very carefully . . .

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On Sept. 1 1983, a Soviet fighter pilot was ordered to shoot down Korean Airlines Flight 007, even though the pilot argued with his superiors and repeatedly identified the plane as a civilian plane. Breaking with usual intelligence policies, the Reagan administration released the recorded conversation between the fighter pilot and ground control to news media and the world.
This breach was made for political reasons. The impression this was intended to create was that it was standard Soviet policy to shoot down civilian airliners. This jeopardized our future intelligence-gathering capabilities, because it gave away to the Soviets just how sophisticated our intelligence-gathering was, and the extent to which Norway was providing us with info.
Many U.S. intelligence officers were dismayed by the way this was done, because the Reagan administration also withheld all information about the intense U.S. military activity that was being conducted in the area with reconfigured civilian aircraft. For the past several years, the U.S. had been routinely flying specially-configured Boeing 707s equipped with electronic communications surveillance equipment over the Barents sea and other areas that KAL flew over. In fact, a Cobra Ball surveillance plane was in the air to the south of the KAL flight path the same day. George Schultz made sure Cobra Ball was safely in its hangar before they made any announcements about the shootdown of a civilian plane.
The U.S. had also performed massive military maneuvers with three carriers and 23,000 personnell just off Soviet Far Eastern waters six months earlier (in March of 1983), and six U.S. fighter jets overflew Soviet airspace during these exercises. While officially the U.S. claimed the overflight by the six fighters was a mistake, this was widely believed among the U.S. intelligence community to be a deliberate provocation by the U.S. military.
Soviets often put civilian markings on military transports, and given all the increased U.S. military and surveillance activity just off Soviet territorial waters in 1981-83, it becomes far more plausible that the commanding Soviet officers on the ground suspected that Americans had done the same thing with one of our electronic surveillance planes.
The U.S. and Canada shared intelligence information, and the Reagan administration was very unhappy with Canada because Prime Minister Trudeau (based on the same intelligence information provided to the U.S.) said he was sure the Soviets made a tragic mistake, and believed they were shooting down a U.S. intelligence plane that, like the six fighters earlier that year, was testing their defenses and their response times.
Want to know more? You'll have to read the book.

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The book has a strong 'honor the vet' edge that leaves a nasty taste in our mouths. If you've had the privilege of reading the scathing expose, My Lai 4 , by this same author you would never believe it's the same guy. This book does do a good job, if you filter well through the politics, of outlining the major physiological issues regarding the Gulf War Illness. With that exception noted, we can only say this: Paper will put up with anything that is written on it.



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My only complaint with the book is that the author could have spent just a bit more time clearly explaining the fears in Israel that drove them to get the bomb. The author touches on this point but I would have liked more detail. Then again it may be difficult to truly understand their mindset given the violent history they have had over the past century. Overall I found the book to be interesting and well put together yet not overly exciting. If you are interested in this part of history or even how US / Israel politics worked in the cold war then you will enjoy this book. If you are looking for an exciting true life spy story then this is not the book for you.

and materials to become a nuclear power. You are shown the spy activities that were used by Israel to make this a sucessful effort.This book leaves little to the imagination.This is a good history of the nuclear movement in Israel.Read this book,you
will enjoy it.


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On Sept. 1 1983, a Soviet fighter pilot was ordered to shoot down Korean Airlines Flight 007, even though the pilot argued with his superiors and repeatedly identified the plane as a civilian plane. Breaking with usual intelligence policies, the Reagan administration released the recorded conversation between the fighter pilot and ground control to news media and the world.
This breach was made for political reasons. The impression this was intended to create was that it was standard Soviet policy to shoot down civilian airliners. This jeopardized our future intelligence-gathering capabilities, because it gave away to the Soviets just how sophisticated our intelligence-gathering was, and the extent to which Norway was providing us with info.
Many U.S. intelligence officers were dismayed by the way this was done, because the Reagan administration also withheld all information about the intense U.S. military activity that was being conducted in the area with reconfigured civilian aircraft. For the past several years, the U.S. had been routinely flying specially-configured Boeing 707s equipped with electronic communications surveillance equipment over the Barents sea and other areas that KAL flew over. In fact, a Cobra Ball surveillance plane was in the air to the south of the KAL flight path the same day. George Schultz made sure Cobra Ball was safely in its hangar before they made any announcements about the shootdown of a civilian plane.
The U.S. had also performed massive military maneuvers with three carriers and 23,000 personnell just off Soviet Far Eastern waters six months earlier (in March of 1983), and six U.S. fighter jets overflew Soviet airspace during these exercises. While officially the U.S. claimed the overflight by the six fighters was a mistake, this was widely believed among the U.S. intelligence community to be a deliberate provocation by the U.S. military.
Soviets often put civilian markings on military transports, and given all the increased U.S. military and surveillance activity just off Soviet territorial waters in 1981-83, it becomes far more plausible that the commanding Soviet officers on the ground suspected that Americans had done the same thing with one of our electronic surveillance planes.
The U.S. and Canada shared intelligence information, and the Reagan administration was very unhappy with Canada because Prime Minister Trudeau (based on the same intelligence information provided to the U.S.) said he was sure the Soviets made a tragic mistake, and believed they were shooting down a U.S. intelligence plane that, like the six fighters earlier that year, was testing their defenses and their response times.
Want to know more? You'll have to read the book.


Collectible price: $10.59

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