Yet again Liddel shows quality. Liddel has taken the data from his postwar interviews with german generals, and produced this little gem. - Why did the germans not push earlier and harder towards Dunkirk ? How serious were the plans of an invasion of England ? Spain ? Why the conquest of Norway ? Jugoslavia ? Greece ? The difficulties of raising a discussion on strategy with Der Führer. Mainly comments on all the major strategic desicions, and the generals view on them.

Excellent book, partly due to the rare and precious opportunity the anthor had obtained to interview those German generals/prisoners. If you are BH Liddell Hart's fan, "the other side of the hill" seems to be one of his favortie phrase. He used this very phrase as the title of this book, reflecting his fondness of the topic. I just want to point out there is a book titled "German Generals Talk", which is recently published. This book, I suspect, is indeed the famous book "The other side of the hill".

I believe many people heard of the Nuremberg Trial, but I doubt many people know much of the details of the Trial. Nor the debate about the Trial ensued for decades after the Trial. Frankly I have to admit that I myself did not have any idea of it until recently when this book happened to cross me. I wish people read this book with an open-mind. And I wish this still be a country where free speech still prevails. I highly recommend this important book which should not escape the sight of any history-lover and professional historians. The power and merit of this book rest on the brave challenge, the sharp criticism on the sensitive subject--the Nuremberg Trial--that have made by those four hundred leading personalities in the military, law, arts, diplomacy, philosophy, history and religion all around the world (on Allied side) who were armed with richly embroidered knowledge of international law and equipped with the historical truth according to their own experience in the Second World War.

The main points of their challenge and criticism lay in the followings:

First, the Trial was a gross travesty on justice and illegal as far as international law concerned, because, in the first place, 'according to the principles of international law universally recognized up to 1945 and explicitly admitted by the Allied and Associated Powers after the First World War, the Allies had no jurisdiction over the citizens of anther sovereign state for acts done in the service of that state'. In the second place, the law on the Trial was based on ex post facto law. They argued that that the definition of the crime and its punishment were fixed only after commission of the acts imputed alone radically has contravened the ancient principle of jurisprudence: 'Nulla poena sine lege, nullum crimen sine lege.'('No punishment without a law, no crime without a law.'); that the Resolution On Human Rights of the League of Nations was founded on this basic principle, which Article 11 of this resolution states: 'No one may be punished for an act if at the time of this act a punishment for it was not pre-established in international law or in the laws of the county concerned.' In the third place, the trial violated one of the basic principles of law that 'he who judges in his own case is not only a suspect and therefore a challengeable judge; he is simply not a judge. If he sits as judge, the illegality of the process and the nullity of the sentence are absolute and incurable'. In the forth place, the Charter of the Tribunal abolished the rules of evidence which in every civilized country have been introduced for the protection of accused persons against prejudiced and unreliable assertions.

Second, the Trial was unfair in the sense of fairness, because if it was really for trial war criminals, it should put all the war criminals of both sides before justice not only Germans. They even argued that as for crimes against humanity, those governments which ordered the destruction of German cities, thereby destroying irreplaceable cultural values and making burning torches out of women and children should also have stood before the bar of justice. Some opinions are even so bold and so sharp as it is stated that there is no doubt that in ordering the destruction of large enemy cities, which represented an important part of the very basis of European culture and civilization, the Allied political leaders have incurred a dire responsibility before the bar of history.

Third, the Trial was dangerous in military sense, because putting military personals on trial and death just because of obedience destroyed the basic principles of discipline and made any national defense impossible and in chaos. They argued how in the name of common sense a military officer could wage any kind of war except an aggressive one without being a traitor to his country, that everyone took an oath when he entered the U.S. Navy to defend the United States against all enemies---and there was not anything said about doing it in a non-aggressive manner, that after Nuremberg Trial practice, maybe we should add a proviso to the oath saying, 'Before carrying out the orders of my superior officers, I will check to insure that they are compatible with our international commitments, the Charter of the United Nations, etc.'

In short, according to their opinion, the Trial is illegal and unjust, the Trial is just a revenge, a lynch like ancient time, merely victors revenging their vanquished.

Another contents of the book is the deep sympathy and touching apology towards Germans including those dead sentenced by the Trial expressed by those leading personals. For instance, Royal Naval Admiral Sir Barry Domvile states: 'Anybody who was a victim of the iniquitous Nuremberg Trials has my deep sympathy.' Once US Army Colonel and President Judge of Pennsylvania Honorable Edward Leroy von Roden wrote: 'This country owes to Grand Admiral Doenitz and to many other men at the least a humble apology for what we have caused them to suffer...Let us hope that Admiral Doenitz and other enemy patriots will be aware of the fact that there are great numbers of loyal Americans who are ashamed of the behavior of those in our government who were responsible for what was done.'

I have recently inherited some family papers that include records of two relatives that died in the First World War. In an effort to discover more I have been researching their regimental histories and other sources of official records. Having found out the details of the actions in which they died, I wanted to read a general history of the war to get a better sense of perspective. Liddell Harts’ book was recommended to me by my Father. I was expecting a dry military history. What I found was a vibrant, in some cases, damning history of what must be one of the most horrific wars of all time. Liddell Harts style is grand and literary. His portraits of the key characters are rich and balanced. His deep knowledge of military strategy and first hand experience of the war makes his account credible. Add to this his impartial professional military eye and his compelling style and you have the best book of military history I have read. His willingness to point the finger of blame was startling and really drove home the horror of the war. His claim that the British command in charge or the second battle of Ypres should stand charges before the national for manslaughter was shocking both in the abstract and personally. For it was in this unsustainable defense of a weak position that one of my relatives died at Hill 60.

First off, as in all my reviews of Dickey's work, or work on Dickey's work: a disclaimer. I knew Dickey from 1991 until his death, and thus my opinion of him must be biased in some way, though I'm not sure in which direction, if any. I simply consider him now, after his death, as I did before our meeting in 1991 and our many phone conversations following our meeting, as the last great poet in America. Hart has done a good job of editing and my hat, if I had one on at the moment, would be off to him.-I don't want to belabor the point. Either you get great poetry or you don't. Hart's selection of the best of Dickey's poetry is exquisite. In particular, "The Sheep Child" a poem written from the perspective of the few seconds of life of a product of bestiality is what Dickey is all about:

"...In the summer sun of the hillside, with my eyes Far more than human. I saw for a blazing moment The great grassy world from both sides, Man and beast in the round of their need,

And the hill wind stirred in my wool, My hoof and my hand clasped each other, I ate my one meal Of milk, and died Staring. From dark grass I came straight....."

This is Dickey at his best, in perfect tune with the wondrous and terrible insights combined with the visionary traumas of what we call "Nature," but which we are tremblingly unsure about, just like the sheep child in his (her?) moment of existence.

A must for lovers of true poetry.-A rarity in these days.

Apart from the gospels and new testament,this is,THE,most rewarding book i have ever read.It stresses with clarity the fundamental importance of becoming aware of our true identity in christ,and equally important of becoming aware of our false self,the self rooted in the ego.The book is a wake up call for all those who would see the spiritual life as a process of self agrandizement.With it's raw honesty and gentleness one gradually becomes ever more aware of just how important the issue of identity is in the spiritual life,and the huge importance merton ascribed to it.This book is a threat to the ego and it's hollow and false little world,that it creates in it's rivalry with god.I advise all christians to read and reread this beautiful book,even if at times,it becomes a little tough.

When I did my BFA some 15 years Mr. Horenstein's "Basic Black and White Photography" was the standard textbook. This new title is more complete and better designed. The web content is superb! Well done!

A must read for both the people and the leaders of ALL the dictatorial regimes around the world (democracies would also surely benefit) . A book for all times to come. His understanding and explanation of where the real power lies is outstanding. What s breathtaking is how relevent his arguments are today and how strinkingly similar the working of all governments turn out to be (as generalized by Hart). He deals with issues such as "patterns and psychology of dictatorship", "power politics in a democracy" and lastly the the "desire for power" and "War".

Even those with little knowledge of the Second World War know the names "Dessert Fox" and Rommel. For those more familiar with WWII history and the great generals, they know a lot of what is general knowledge is hype more than fact. For example, while Field Marshall Erwin Rommel was certainly a brilliant tactician and strategist, he was not - contrary to popular belief - the originator of the Blitz style of armored warfare. Certainly he was one of its most successful practitioners, but not the originator. That credit belongs to English military minds and was put into practice by General Heinz Gurderian (see Panzer Leader by Gurderian). Rommel was a brilliant self-promoter - with humility though. And he was a favored son of Hitler in the beginning, although the "father" forced him to commit suicide in the end. Rommel did have some amazing victories and equally appalling defeats. All are chronicled in this stirring, well-written pseudo-autobiography. The Rommel Papers was written from Rommels own personal diaries made during his numerous campaigns. He was a voracious writer who sat down on a near daily to preserve the events of the day. Thus we are treated to a wonderful story of the Blitz through western Europe in 1939-40, the swift victories in northern Africa and slow arduous defeats that followed, and finally to Rommel's attempts to stem the Allied tide that was threatening to rush the Western shores of France in 1944. This is a fun and insightful read for anyone who wants to see war from the perspective of the German public's most favored Marshall. Certainly worth the time spent reading it! Highly recommended.

Not at all difficult to read, and even a bit intense during his narrations, this is an in depth look at the brillience of Erwin Rommel. Undoubtably the most perceptive and insightful German commander of the war, Rommel exhibits incredible understranding of troops, commanders, and what is possible and impossible on the battle field. His remarkable ability for retrospect provides engrossing lessons and conclusions of modern mechanzied warfare that any military historian or strategy goo-roo craves. Primarily about the African campaigns, and of the fall of France, Rommel recounts the events of every battle, and then analyzes the outcome, and reasons for that outcome without bias. This book will provide a thorough grounding and clear understanding of mechanized warfare, and a great respect for its greatest engineer.

This book is an excellent account of Rommel, his leadership and his tactics.

Rarely do you get the ability to go into the mind of a commander at war. Usually those writings that come out are clouded by the overall victory or defeat. Rommel's early death prevented that. His notes allow you get into what he was thinking, often on the days of the battles. What impact does the 'fog of war' have on troops and units when the shooting starts? How do you get the enemy to react to you? This book is a treasure indeed.

The lessons he learned apply today as well. I found his reviews of the battles; actually explained much of what occurred in the Persian Gulf War. The Allies may have read this book; I feel the Iraqi's may not have. Those who fight in next war in the desert will face similar constraints.

Students of maneuver warfare, armor officers or anyone who may have to do battle in the desert will get much from this book.

Some books you read and discard. This is a keeper in my library.

Haven't read all of Henry Hart's biography of James Dickey yet--just got it two days ago--but it appears to a fair, factual, detailed account of the extraordinary life of an extraordinary man. Reading the introduction has made me see the connection between the title and a subject--lying--that evidently intrigued Dickey for years--I'm glad to know that the title Hart used was actually Dickey's own choice. The language Hart uses is somewhat stilted--I agree with Erica Da Costa in The New York Times that he could have applied "his own poetic imagination".

For all his faults, James Dickey was a writer of extraordinary power and gifts. He redefined nature poetry and wrote of the outdoors with savage beauty. His reputation is in partial eclipse right now, but that is surely a temporary situation. No writer of his importance can stay buried for long. That said, Dickey was, in addition to being a genius, a scoundrel. Certainly not the first literary genius to push the envelope of misbehavior, but he ranks with the best of them. This outstanding biography by Henry Hart has received some potshots from critics for focusing much attention on Dickey's scandalous side. Well, sorry, Dickey's scandalous side was immense and to downplay it would have been intellectually weak. And, sorry again, but dishonesty on the scale Dickey publicly displayed can't simply be excused as a byproduct of "creative temperament." Hart's book is spectacular in the depth of its research, and yet the writing is so strong that the book never bogs down. In the end, once the anger of Dickeyites has subsided, this biography will emerge as the standard Dickey biography, all the more valuable for its unflinching honesty. It's an outstanding portrait of a complex man.

Some reviewers have expressed their concern and dissatisfaction with Hart's concern or possible over-concern with the lies that surrounded Dickey's life. The truth is in the poems and in Dickey's own personal statements. Dickey's poems are narratives mixing both autobiographical and fantastical details; some of which Dickey appropriated from other people's lives. Dickey's public life was a collection of stories...lies. Hart puts the focus of his biography on these lies, because they were so bound up with Dickey's actual life. In his 'Self Interviews,' Dickey himself describes his fascination with lying, both in art and in life. He felt that the poet and artist had the right to lie. If Dickey had not made such a big deal about lying throughout his life, then Hart's biography might seem overkill. But, seeing as Dickey was an admitted liar, provacateur and even suggested the title for the book (which serves as a great justification for the focus of the book), I feel the biography paints a wonderful portrait of a wonderful writer. Hart does not set out to smash the image of Dickey, but to illustrate the different perspectives of the poet's life. Aside from this, the work is beautifully written and the drama of Dickey's life provides ample subject matter for the reader looking for adventure.

I would recommend this book to both Dickey's fans and detractors as a substantial work of literature.

This book was used by the Air Force for training 10 years ago; I don't know whether it still is (it certainly should be). The book is divided into two sections, a survey of military strategy from ancient history through the end of WWII, and then a summation and analysis of the lessons learned (with some discussion of the pros and cons of Clausewitz's On War). While a bit dense, the survey is important as it gives you a much better understanding of Liddell Hart's brilliant indirect approach.

Liddell Hart does not follow the Clausewitz-ian theory that "blood is the price of victory". Rather he views strategy as a way to minimize the need for armed conflict through moral and physical dislocation of ones enemy. He also keeps an eye on grand strategy and the quality of the peace that is to be achieved after a conflict (something that Clausewitz loses track of).

B. H. Lidell Hart has written a masterpiece in "Strategy". His survey of history and it's successful generals all point to one, irrepressible conclusion; that to win, you must do the unexpected. Hart's main contention is that from acient to modern times, the generals who win, and win consistently, do so not by beating their heads against impregnable positions or trying to bring the enemy's main body to battle by direct action. Instead, he argues that in war, the object is to achieve victory at the least cost--in other words, use economy of force. The "indirect method" which he speaks of has been tested over time, and has proven itself repeatedly. Of the truly decisive campaigns from all of history, 90% of them were won, not by direct assault, but by maneuver, cunning, and by forcing an enemy army to prepare for multiple contingencies. In short, this book is not a handguide to winning a war, and does not present itself as such. What Hart does is show what history's successful captains have done, and leaves the reader to draw his own conclusions, and apply the facts that Hart presents. Overall, a well-written survery of military history that tests many of our preconcieved notions military success.

Here Liddell Hart sums up his principles of strategy, illustrating his ideas with examples throughout history. Critics have claimed, with some justice, that he got too wrapped up in his major idea, the "indirect approach," and oversimplified the campaigns he reviewed here to bolster his point. What a reader must realize, however, is that by the time this book was written, much of Liddell Hart's approach had been battle-tested, with spectacular results: among those who credited him were Guderian, Rommel, and Montgomery. If his "indirect approach" is not universally effective, especially against opponents who have also read the book, it is still brilliant and valuable.
Liddell Hart seems to have fallen into disfavor in U.S. military circles, to a degree that cannot be explained simply by his disagreement with Clausewitz about the necessity of destroying the main force of the enemy. While not crediting him, the U.S. applied an indirect approach, emphasizing rapid maneuver, with great success in the Gulf War. Perhaps the explanation lies in a careful reading of the last chapter, added in the 1967 edition, in which he suggests that counter-guerilla warfare must aim to disrupt the guerillas' sources of supply and liaison with allied regular forces nearby -- in short, to win, the U.S. needed to isolate the battlefield. Maybe the U.S. thinkers didn't want to hear this -- and it hasn't helped that, once again, he was absolutely right.
So, by all means, read this book carefully. But then also read
his critics. Nobody, even Liddell Hart (or Clausewitz, or Sun Tzu) had all the answers, and the art of applying past principles to future conflicts keeps changing.