Buy one from zShops for: $14.95
Used price: $4.86
Collectible price: $6.95
Buy one from zShops for: $4.71
A very perceptive, quick thinker caught in "The Most Dangerous
Game" - human War). The book HAS to be read for one to have an opinion, a personal one.
The veracity of his accounts has many endorsements and no rebuttals, as far as I can tell. To this day he has maintained a high visibility, and mud slingers would have no trouble sighting this target.
Bill Schaefer
List price: $13.00 (that's 20% off!)
Used price: $7.74
Collectible price: $9.53
Buy one from zShops for: $8.94
Adam's book addresses errors in the National Power Assessment phase which had a negative cascading effect in subsequent decision making. Flawed enemy strength calculations contributed to flawed strategy development which contributed to a gap between policy and means. When Adams identified the flaw, the Johnson Administration was too heavily committed to a war of attrition to tolerate public exposure of the gaps between policy and means. Strategically, telling the truth about the numbers of enemy forces would have required larger commitments of U.S. forces increasing the strain on public support for the war. The strength of Johnson's political will and McNamara's quantitative analysis approach to war deeply affected the way the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, counted the enemy (called, Order of Battle).
MACV kept three sets of books; The first set of OB was the official version sent to Washington. The second set belonged to the OB Analysts themselves, and the third set was a blend of the first two. The first set was an undercount to keep official Washington placated; the second set was the honest count but did not go anywhere, and the third set went to Westmoreland who kept it close hold.
Adams contribution to the intelligence discipline is his description of how he found the flaw in OB accounting and the political correctness that resisted him within the intelligence community. The key to his breakthrough was to have actually gone to Vietnam, worked the Order of Battle issues on the ground, understand the enemy from "the enemy's" perspective and then double check how U.S. reporting of enemy strength matched that of how the enemy was reporting his own strength. This is when Adams discovered that MACV was undercounting troop strength. He performed a validity and reliability check on MACV and found their procedures and results wanting. The technique he used is described in detail and serves as a lesson learned for today's OB analysts.
The second lesson is how Adams' persistence caused a rift between the CIA and MACV over the integrity of the OB counting. The CIA is evenhandedly portrayed in the book. Individual analysts who looked at the numbers invariably sided with Adams; those in responsive political positions and vulnerable to the political influence of the Johnson-McNamara Administration behave in the subtle manner normally associated with behind the scene politics. Adams illustrates how assessments were watered down, reports delayed, egos clashed in the briefing rooms, and all of the suppressive efforts were brought to bear to keep him muffled and how he countered them. Basically, his operating principle was that the truth should be allowed to surface and he describes how he created those opportunities; back channel copies of reports; boot leg copies of reports, analyst to analyst contacts (CIA to DIA, for example), as well as maintaining contact with the honest brokers at MACV.
This is an important book for students of Intelligence Analysis. It serves as a guide on how to double check the validity and reliability of Order of Battle data; it gives insight to how politics heavily filtered ground truth under the Johnson Administration, and it lets the world see that the CIA wasn't evil incarnate. Like every other agency in Washington, it simply surrendered to political pressure from the White House.
Even more disturbing are Adams' insights into the CIA of the middle and late Sixties. Though deeply entrenched in war in Vietnam, they seemed to take an overall cavalier approach to the mission. Adams notes after Tet-1968 there were "considerably less than 6" CIA agent handlers in Vietnam who spoke vietnamese. These same case officers received a grand total of 2 hours orientation on Vietnam and their enemy prior to assignment.
This book is a MUST read for intelligence personnel, policy makers and anyone who wants to learn how, the hard way, not to run an intelligence organization.
Hack is clearly passionate about all things infantry, but the man suffers from a number of self-admitted character flaws:
-Losing a weapon and covering it up (sorry, this was wrong)
-Tolerance of drug use
-Criticizing the Army while serving as an officer DURING WAR
-..and I've always been uncomfortable with his part in Admiral Boorda's NCM scandal given his personal situation regarding his own awards (Ranger Tab, Hack?).
This aside, all Americans and allies are grateful for Hack's repeated combat valor.
Read the book, but consider his actions in the context of the times. This man is a combat hero, not necessarily a role model.
List price: $27.95 (that's 30% off!)
Used price: $7.33
Collectible price: $17.95
Buy one from zShops for: $8.26
As a combat veteran of Vietnam, I was most taken with his very truthful and accurate description of the many 'perfumed princes' whose goals were ultimately skewed and self-serving. Many commanders in Vietnam were more concerned about climbing the ladder and 'punching tickets' for future promotions than the welfare of the soldiers who served under them. Give Hackworth the highest of credit for two things: molding a tactically sound fighting force and caring enough about those serving under him that American lives lost were kept to a bare minimum as compared to lives lost by the enemy.
For any conflicts that this country may face in the future, the tactical leadership of this country should take a page from Hackworth's accomplishments and study it hard. Sadly, it appears as though the lessons learned in Vietnam have not made an adequate enough impression upon our current leaders.
A wonderful book written by perhaps one of America's last true warriors.
Steel My Soldiers' Hearts is more than a simple primer on combat leadership techniques. It is larger than the historic role it will fill in the library of personal reminiscenses of Vietnam. This book captures well the irrational nature of the war as expressed by the national leadership and promulgated down through the military command structure. It touches a poignant nerve of what might have been.
Hack had to fight much more than the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army although they proved to be as tough an opponent as he had met on any battlefield. He had to deal with the double dealing and backstabbing of career army officers to whom a dead GI or a false report was of considerably less condern than risking the next promotion or decoration.
He was continuously at loggerheads with highers up who saw more benefit in using precious helicopter resources to ferry USO entertainers about than to support American troops engaged in battle. He recounts how his battalion staff, trying to run inteference with him while he led from the front on the ground - something mighty scarce among leaders in that war - had to cope with minutiae and bean counting from higher HQ. Exceeding allotted 'blade time' on helicopter assets meant that you would not supply or maneuver troops in contact, for example. He fought the all too common practice of routinely disregarding or downgrading awards and decorations for combat soldiers while quietly approving them for senior officers who never smelled a sweaty armpit or fresh gunpowder.
In the Vietnam era Army the officer's efficiency report form listed 'tact' as an evaluated leadership trait. It was a point of pride for most of us to get low marks in that category. I am certain that David Hackworth set the standard in blunt truth that many of us strove to match. His most recent work Steel My Soldiers' Hearts has only added to his reputation for direct and honest expression of thoughts regardless of whose feelings get hurt.
Stylistically there are places in the book where I would have suggested different word choice or toning down of expression. To me it got in the way of the narrative. However that might not be Hack. And regardless it ought not get in the way of his core message.
This book is a must read for anyone interested in the Vietnam war as it was not as we hoped it might be. It ought to be required reading for anyone responsible for dispatching, funding, managing or leading troops, especially for the politicians who somehow manage to avoid seeing the product of their failed policies.
What really showed this man as a real leader was where he admitted his mistakes and explained them in detail along with giving his men credit where the credit was due. To take the time that was involved in researching this book with the visiting of old friends and comrads in arms, shows a man who wanted to tell it like it was and share the wealth by involving everyone in this book.
It is not only a pleasure to read David's books, but to learn from them as they show the mistakes and the poor leadership that's been going on in the military by those too concerned with their careers and personal happiness. But, it also mirrors those who were good leaders and soldiers.
Thanks for sharing with us David and good luck in continuing your writing of more good books.
Used price: $1.37
Collectible price: $10.59
Buy one from zShops for: $25.00
List price: $26.95 (that's 30% off!)
Used price: $2.05
Collectible price: $8.47
Buy one from zShops for: $5.65
This exception was well worth it. I enjoyed the book as a good, well done read. The plot about the Military Industrial Complex (MIC) and greed is well thought out. I had a problem with some of the climax because some of it turned into stuff from a really bad conspiracy movie. This is a good solid adventure to be enjoyed.
Finally, I would like to make a comment about Hackworth being an SF groupie. That's total BS. He led the equivalent of a Ranger unit in Korea, and his actions in Vietnam from My Canh to his quest to improve small unit training showed that he walked the walk. I really believe that he respects those who live, not speak, the warrior spirit. And if they happen to be SF types, so be it.
List price: $15.00 (that's 30% off!)
Used price: $5.55
Collectible price: $8.49
Buy one from zShops for: $7.50
Col. Hackworth's brilliant revelations on the self-serving motivations of O-5 and higher officers were invaluable and revealing of the top-heavy, job-preserving nature of not only the military, but of the federal government itself.
I must say that a few of Hackworth's "Perfumed Princes" seem to have read the book and given it a sour-grapes 1 star rating. Mainly because of the blunt writing style. God forbid that we should read the truth about self-serving flag officers in plain language!
Hackworth cuts through today's political doublespeak with a chainsaw. Part of what's wrong with America today is an unwillingness of high-level decision makers to speak plainly, in layman's terms.
Dissertation-dry military books are as full of misdirection and obfuscation as a US congressman. Truth and plain speaking are as rare as hen's teeth in the litigation-cowed tortocracy that is America today.
If you want hoity-toity, quasi-intellectual pabulum, read someone else. If you want the truth, from a warrior who's been there and is willing to stand up the slings and arrows of the entrenched status quo elite, then Col. Hackworth delivers in spades.