Because of Mao Zedong's economic policies of the late 1950s, 30 million Chinese died of starvation. Most of Mao's policies were reversed after his death in1976, and by the early 1980s the Chinese economy had taken off. Some villages took the opportunity in China to set on various economic ventures. Bruce Gilley's "Model Rebels" is the story of Daqiu (pronounced "Da-chew"), which became the richest villages in China.

While his prose style can be better, Gilley has written a very enjoyable book that reads more like a novel and less like social or economic history. Before 1978, Daqiu was the poorest villages in its province. In fact, Gilley includes a common joke from the period:

Question: What's the best way to kill someone in Daqiu without getting caught?
Answer: Bash in his head with a brick. No Judge will ever believe that a person from Daqiu has enough money to own a brick. You are sure to be set free.

But in 10 years, Daqiu was producing 3 percent of China's steel. The villagers owned imported cars, had their own television cable system, and the village treasury held hundreds of millions of dollars.

Gilley doesn't just tell a story of economic growth, but also narrates many of the developments that occurred in the village alongside. The local village leader, Yu Zuomin, a visionary, who leads Daqiu through this economic miracle becomes a dictator and tries to take on the Chinese government. There is everything in this story from greed, corruption, and bribery to murders and cover-ups.

Nathan once said at a conference I was attending that he writes what sells and won't write what does not.

This book like all of his work is shoddy from an academic standpoint. While it might be interesting to read, there is no substantial merit to anything Nathan writes.

He wants to denigrate China's leadership so that he can stay in the spotlight in the US and make money selling his books.

Stay away from this book until Nathan actually backs up what he writes with solid evidence.

The value of this book is severalfold. It gives intriguing hints at the nature of top level Chinese decision-making processes. It contains excellent biographical sketches of top leadership in the Chinese Communist Party -- new and old. And it reveals relationships among the various players that is invaluable in attempting to fathom the workings of a secretive government that sees its relationship with the United States as the core of its foreign policy.

Even with insider information (the secret files), it is always risky business to predict the future, and authors Andrew Nathan and Bruce Gilley are surly aware of this. The fact that they got most of their predictions right isn't as important as examining the ones they got wrong, and trying to figure out what may have happened.

Jiang Zemin stepped down as general secretary and president -- as predicted -- but stayed on as chairman of the powerful Centeral Military Commission. This event was not foreseen. What happened?

Nathan and Gilley forecast that the Standing Committee of the Politburo would consist of seven members. That group today stands at nine. (The PRC constitution allows for seven to nine members on the PBSC.)

One of the seven predicted to attain Standing Committee status, Li Ruihuan, was not chosen. Li, a reform-minded member of the previous Standing Committee, didn't make the cut for this one, even though he would have been young enough to serve another term before "mandatory" retirement at age 70. Credit Jiang Zemin for his ouster.

Three unexpected members were chosen -- Huang Ju, Jia Qinglin, and Wu Guanzheng. Nathan and Gilley discuss these men (and many others) as well as the leaders they predicted would rise to power.

There are brighter red stars than Huang Ju. Jiang has mentored him since Shanghai days in the 1980s. A former mayor and party chief of Shanghai, his daughter is married to a pro-Taiwan newspaperman from San Francisco.

Jia Qingling, a former Beijing party chief, was the best man at Jiang's wedding, and saved by Jiang after a corruption scandal involving Jia's wife.

Wu Guanzheng is secretary of the important Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the CPC. An ally of Jiang, he has close links with Hu Jintao as well.

The new members of the PBSC that were correctly predicted by Nathan and Gilley are:

Hu Jintao, Mr. "Zero Defects" is China's first "resume president." Hu used force in Tibet in 1989 two months before Tiananmin, creating the precedent for the June 4 massacre. Jiang labeled him the "core of the fourth generation."

Wen Jiabao is a protégé of Zhu Rongji and supported by anti-Jiang factions. As premier of the State Council, he will oversee economic reforms. A capable administrator, he has been called "most dazzling."

Wu Bangguo. A Jiang man from Shanghai days, Wu oversaw the Three Gorges dam project. He is said to have a "common touch" and is cautious about reform.

Zeng Qinghong has been mentored by and is the former personal secretary to Jiang Zemin. Zeng is perhaps the most influential member of the Standing Committee, and a possible challenger to Hu Jintao.

Li Changchun is supported by Jiang, but lost the premier's position because of purported missteps in Guangdong. Still, he was able to solve problems in the province and bring it in line with Beijing's policies in the 1990s, making it a favorite of Jiang and where he chose to announce his "Three Represents" campaign in 2000.

Luo Gan. Mr. "Go To" when there's trouble, Luo controls the security apparatus of PRC, including the People's Armed Police. He did Li Peng's bidding at Tiananmen.

At least seven of the nine are Jiang's men.

One of the interesting, if not amazing things that the authors show is that the succession to power of the "fourth generation" leadership in China is the most orderly transition of power in China's history. No small claim. Still, it remains to be seen how these men will govern and engage in foreign affairs.

None of the nine have any direct military experience. Only one has studied outside China (Luo Gan), and only one has had international travel (Hu Jintao). The preceeding leadership "traveled extensively, made diplomatic visits, attended summits, and entertained a ceaseless stream of visitors from abroad."

To varying degrees each man is well-grounded in domestic policy, and they are poised to work together as a consensus team under the watchful eye of Jiang. As Nathan and Gilley point out, and as many China-watchers agree, "stability" will be a key word in making policy at home and abroad.

Last year, some of my Chinese colleagues in Beijing attempted to forecast the future too. "There are others besides Hu Jintao," one high-ranking PLA officer told me. But he missed the mark more than "China's New Rulers" did.

If you're interested in the inner workings of the CCP, and the relationship between different levels and persons of power in Beijing, you'll appreciate the information this book conveys.

Starting late last year, a new generation of leaders -- often referred to as the "fourth generation" -- began to take over the top posts in China. This book is something of a scorecard of what we might be able to expect from them as they lead China.

Based on what is supposedly a Chinese insider's look at secret files on the new leaders, China scholars Andrew Nathan and Bruce Gilley write a highly readable account, focusing mainly on the seven men they expected to form the sixteenth Politburo Standing Committee (the book went to print before the announcement of the new leadership in November, 2002 -- however, most of the Chinese leaders it examines are still in power; with the exception of the early retirement of Li Ruihuan, it appears the authors were mainly correct in their early predictions).

The authors also briefly deal with other PRC leaders, including the top women leaders and those early candidates for leading the fifth generation. One of the final chapters focuses on the way the new leadership sees China's place in the world, including most importantly its relationship with the U.S.

This is a superb book that is not harmed by its being somewhat dated by recent events. Its only flaw is there is no index, leaving a reader to flail around when he wants to reread sections on particular leaders.

For all the talk of China abandoning the practice of personality worshipping its leaders, here comes a non-Chinese citizen engaging in a veritable Jiang Zemin love fest. A nice introduction to the cast of characters in contemporary, post-Cultural Revolution China, but otherwise lacking in value as a serious reference book.

If Gilley seems to paint a favorable immage of Jiang, it is only because he is the only writer yet to look into Jiang the person and not just Jiang the Communist. Gilley does an outstanding job of developing the evolution to the logic of Jiangs values and political judgement: from his "martyr" uncle to his hands-on approach to managing a factory given foolish central orders from above. It must be understood that Gilley had to work under a limited pool of sources. I think he balances in Chinese government sources with good judgement. The problem with his work however, is that it is already quite dated. Being written before the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the 50th National Day parade, much more light has been shed on Jiangs self-immage as an equal Mao and Deng. By 2002, when he is to step down from formal office, this fine book will be quite over due for a replacement.

Gilley has written a thorough and scholarly, well researched book on Zemin, for Sinophiles and political addicts alike. He has an understanding of the motivations of Ziang in wishing to liberalise the Chinese economy, while holding on firmly to communist ideology. Also explained is the relationship between Ziang and Zhu Rongji, which while evident now, has a history steeped in Shanghai politics. A must read for all those interested in contemporary China.