In this book, North Vietnam's head commie General, Vo Nguyen Giap, (Vo Nu-en Yap) raps a bunch of nationalistic commie rhetoric as he explains how North Vietnam reunited with South Vietnam.

It's insightful because it shows the head commie general's strategy for the war. For one, they knew the US was 10,000 miles away. They 'bled' the US to death, knowing they could lose 10 Vietnamese for every American, and they'd still win. They also persuaded the US press to their side, and the US countryside was rife with their political organizers.

I'm not choosing sides in this review, but Giap fails to talk about how most of his units were usually completely wiped out anytime they confronted the US military head-on. But wars are fought on political levels as well as military, and that's where they won. This knowledge is what the book will give you, if you can read past the weird translation and Giap's constant rhetoric. You can have the strongest, best military on the planet and still lose if your country's politicos fail you, and the domestic front doesn't have the 'national will' to back you up.

What makes this work different is that it doesn't pull punches in terms of 'political correctness'. It might therefore upset the odd Frenchman, the occasional American (or even some Japanese readers). Those that might have pre-conceived or ill-informed notions as to the role of their respective nations in the various wars in Vietnam during Giap's years as a commander.

It should be required reading at Army Staff Colleges, such as Leavenworth (if it isn't already) and France's Ecole Militaire at St.Cyr, where it probably is not, although it seems that there is a french translation.

In all, a thought provoking title, and well worth a read by those interested in the subject from whatever angle.

In a career spanning three decades, having only the resources of a small third-world country (though with powerful international friends), Vo Nguyen Giap managed to bring the armies of two major Western powers to their knees. MacDonald tells us the military and some of the political story of this remarkable leader.

What is missing is the personal side. Except for a little information surrounding his first wife's death and his second marriage, the book is silent on Giap's private life. It would be fascinating to know more of this man as a person, but apparently Giap was unwilling to discuss personal matters with MacDonald. Perhaps this is just Vietnamese reticence, but there is no real insight into the man himself.

The political Giap is only a little more fully drawn. The blank spots here are a function of Vietnamese and Communist ways of thinking. Giap was a member of a collective leadership which took the collective part very seriously; no policy or initiative is attributed to an individual, only to the complete Politburo. A few hints of personal positions, a vague suggestion of a possible difference of opinion, and the screen of the collective solid front descends again.

Though primarily a biography of Giap, the book is also a history of the series of armed struggles in Indochina beginning in the late 1930s. The Japanese invasion, the French war (which MacDonald calls the Indochina war), and finally the war with the U. S. are all described tersely but clearly. It is refreshing and revealing to read an account which is designed neither to justify nor excoriate the U. S., but instead is a sober report on the facts.

Especially as the U. S. and Vietnam approach normal relations and as U. S. investment and interest in Vietnam increase, this is a useful and valuable book.

General Giap is a figure that must be studied by any serious student of warfare history. Giap was a arduious student of Napoleon, very serious, totally dedicated to his cause. While the fighting spirit and mettle of the Viet Minh cannot be understated, Giap's victory at Dien Bien Phu was nothing short of spectacular, using his army of barefoot soldiers. His grasp of logistics, and his sense of flexability on the battlefield are unsurpassed in modern warfare. His victory gave hope to colonial peoples all over the world, and signaled the end of colonialism. He proved the indiginous people could defeat a modern, powerful army. He fought the riches, most technologically advanced nation ever known to a standstill.

I have totally enjoyed Cecil Curry's book on Giap. Curry's book does not try to glorify the man, nor does he make him out to be an evil communist. He simply tries to tell his story, and why Giap is the genius he is. Also, Curry goes into the excesses of the Vietnamese communist, as well as that of the French, Vietnamese oposition, and the Americans: He never tries to gloss over anything. Curry has some interviews with Giap, which makes the book even more interesting.

This book should be read by anyone who loves military history, whether professionally or not. Any officer in any army could learn something here. Love him or hate him, Giap was a formidable foe, both to his foreign enemies, and those at home. History will remember Giap, and Curry's book will be the definitive source on his story for a long time to come.

The prevalence of these stereotypes also degrades other aspects of the book: If Colvin can't critically examine stereotypes, can he really critically examine details of battles before reciting them back to us? How can we be confident that the details are accurate and not just rote recitation of whatever Colvin has been told, or of whatever document he happened to get his hands on? We can't. And that's too bad -- because the only thing this book has is a lot of details about some battles. And if we can't even take those details at face value, there isn't anything left....