A wonderful piece of work, especially in terms of translation. Pitty, however, that it does not contain an index with the basic Latin terms in the original text. One has to read it with the Latin edition in his left hand all the time.

Ever heard the phrase "reasons of state"? Here is the princeps woork on it. Phillipe Augustus used it, Richelieu read it, sure Henry KIssinger read it, just did not cite it...can;t have an opinion on political science without this medieval gem.

Alan Gewirth is a true master of looking through the middle age latin state-theory of Marsilius of Padua. He sees and explains the range of Marsilius ideas, and also gives the reader clues of the impact of this highly original, medieval theoretic. It is hard work reading his book, but it is worth the effort. I would recommend this book to people with interest in middle-age philosophy, state-theory and historians he would like to be assured or be persuaded that the middle-ages was not that dark indeed. It is recommended to know your Aristotle before reading this book.

I was surprised to see the above reviewer rate _both_ this work and Nicholas Rescher's _Objectivity_ with 5 stars...the two are incommensurate.

Postmoderns and antifoundationalists will, of course, faint at the very mention of a "supreme principle of rationality." One need not diavow rationalism, however, to quarrel with Professor Gewirth's thesis. My issue with Gewirth is that I do not believe his argument can ever transcend the self-orientated prudentiality of his "dialectically necessary" method of justification.

Does morality truly spring from prudential concern?

Rescher argues against Gewirth's strategy more concisely than I could.

"At this point, someone might offer the following objection:

---------------------- You are quite right to insist that a prudential rationale for morality does not provide for the deontic force of moral claims. But what it can (and presumably does) accomplish is to establish that we a re rationally well advised to deem ourselves (and others) to be morally obligated in the full-blooded-duty-oriented sense of the term. That is, it can show that we are prudentially bound to believe in the deontic force of morality. -----------------------------

However, this tactic still cannot provide a satisfactory rationale for authentic morality. It yields no more than a sham morality, because it does not go to show that we ever actually are obligated to moral action, only that we are prudentially well-advised to think ourselves (and others) to be so obligated . . . " (Rescher, _Objectivity_, pp. 151-154).

To get to the bottom of the issue, even if I, as a prospective purposive agent, realize that I have a right to claim goods necessary to my agency,_and_ that in this respect I am not different from other prospective purposive agents, and that they as well may make the same rights claims, at no point does the dialectically necessary method require that I morally respect the claims of others in the same way that I respect my own prudential right claims.

Gewirth argues carefully and cogently for the existence of a "supreme principle of morality" that he labels the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC). Like Kant's categorical imperative, the PGC supports a universalist morality; yet unlike Kant's principle, it has a certain degree of content. What makes _Reason and Morality_ such an impressive work is its extraordinarily conscientious and rigorous argumentation. Indeed, Gewirth attempts to respond to almost every conceivable objection that anyone could possibly offer against his theory; and just when you think no more objections could possibly be lobbed at it, he answers six or seven more! (Anyone who's read it will know I'm not exaggerating.) While a little heavy going at times, _R&M_ is also in its own odd way an inspiring work, providing an example of analytic moral philosophy at its best.

In this scintillating work, Alan Gewirth attempts an extremely difficult task: deriving a substantive moral principle from nothing more than the rational requirement of consistency/universality. The result, which he calls the Principle of Generic Consistency, is a moral requirement to act in such a way as to take into account the "generic rights" of all who are affected by our actions, these "generic rights" including _both_ libertarian negative rights against interference _and_ positive rights to certain essentials required for well-being.

Gewirth tries to steer a middle course between the extremes of "libertarianism" and "socialism," and as a libertarian myself I must say that he is not always successful; my own opinion is that his strictly political discussion (on e.g. the legitimacy of taxation and the "supportive state") fails to make some crucially important distinctions. But his _moral_ arguments are generally quite compelling all the same. And I heartily endorse, at least in spirit, his account of the "duty to rescue" on which some of his political conclusions are based: under certain circumstances, if one can help to "rescue" someone else whose life is at risk, with no "comparable cost" to oneself, then one is morally obliged to do so. (In my own view, this is so obviously rational that I wouldn't even bother calling it a "duty"; surely it is what any sane and benevolent person would do. Which, really, is Gewirth's point, although he makes it deontologically rather than teleologically.)

In short, this work on ethical rationalism is well worth reading even for those who, like me, may disagree with some of Gewirth's strictly political conclusions. And even those conclusions fare well enough if we may take the liberty(!) of allowing nongovernmental social institutions to fulfill the undoubtedly legitimate functions Gewirth unnecessarily assigns to the "state."

A mostly careful, painstaking, and detailed review of all of the criticisms of Gewirth's theory (the theory that pure reason obligates one to treat others with respect). This kind of meticulous patience deserves five stars, except where it also includes crucial flaws that should be clearly devastating enough for the author to abandon the project. Beyleveld does not confront honestly enough the central flaw in Gewirth that my caring about myself does not rationally obligate me to care about others. Beyleveld rushes by this in three pages, arguing as follows. (To paraphrase:) 'Believing that everyone deserves respect would give a basis for my treating myself with respect. Therefore, I must believe that everyone deserves respect.' It's simply a non sequitor. The rationalists think that one needs some transcendent grounding to care about oneself, and they argue that this grounding commits us to caring about others. But we never get an argument that one needs a transcendent grounding to care about oneself. Who needs that? No one. Avoiding that issue is a deep weakness in this work, for Beyleveld's hundreds upon hundreds of careful pages become a waste of time, ink, scholarly attention. Still, it is hard not to give those pages three stars, since they are in themselves five-star-type work.

The subject of this book is so arcane that most people have given up on it. Yet, it is the underlying principle of almost every economic, philosophical or religious argument: can morality be deduced (not induced) from the mere existence of language-using self-motivating individuals.

Gewirth said so, and Byleveld spends the entire book in upholding his argument, and erecting counterarguments to the peer criticisms of it. This is not for the faint of heart, nor the easily confused. I left the book with a profound tiredness, but it was good tiredness, because I had finally listened to an intelligent explanation of why it is right to have morality: because you want to be free to do what you want.

Read this book if you read this far, especially the first fifty pages. Read carefully and logically. This is the quantum physics of sociology!

Few philosophical voyages are as frustratingly rewarding as the voyage offered by Alan Gewirth's argument for his supreme principle of morality. This comment will seem more than a little bizarre to anyone not familiar to Gewirth's work. On first reading of his Reason and Morality, readers will find hundreds of flaws in the argument. However, further readings often frustratingly reveal many of these "flaws" to be misunderstandings.

Deryck Beyleveld has responding to those who, after re-reading Reason and Morality and Gewirth's innumerable responses to critics, are still left with the belief that the argument fails to rationally justify morality. I doubt that anyone who takes the time to consider the plethora of arguments in Beyleveld's book can doubt that he has addressed many remaining criticisms. Indeed, I believe he has shown Gewirth's project to be successful

Gewirth tries to argue that socialism is still a viableeconomic and political system. But history has consistentlydemonstrated the unreliability of communitarian ideologies, whether in the form of social democracy, communism or fascism. In its essence, Gewirth does not realize the naked reality of human nature, that humans are little selfish creatures that only look for themselves (whether you like it or not!). It has been shown that socialistic systems tend to fail, while capitalist and free market economies tend to flourish, despite the harshness and injustice sometimes imposed on the latter. The other problem with the book resides in Gewirth's emphasis that every human being is entitled to certain rights, whether he or she exercises or not. But what is the point on insisting on rights when the person does not or refuses to exercise such rights. For Gewirth, the State must in some cases enhance (or "force" in other words) such rights on the individual through the State apparatus and bureaucracy. This is an absolute denial of individual freedom and autonomy.

. . . but I'm afraid Gewirth's sequel doesn't quite live up to the promise of _Reason and Morality_.

Here as elsewhere, I think he has simply failed to ask hard questions in the right way: about, for example, which institutions of governance are morally permitted to take on which tasks, and when the use of force is ethically justifiable in the pursuit of an undeniably "good" end.

Actually, with much of his positive moral case I can agree completely. What I disagree with is his all but unquestioned assumption that "welfare" and other such activities can be performed only by a "supportive State."

On the contrary, in my own view there is every reason -- moral and economic -- to leave those activities to "private" (i.e. non-State) sources. Frankly, having the State perform them has led only to the breakup of local communities -- especially religious ones, who undertake such efforts as a matter of observing religious law and who handle them more responsibly than any State ever will.

Criticizing Gewirth's grasp of economics (e.g. his remarks on "full employment and inflation") would take me rather far afield here, so I shall simply note that he disagrees with the economists whose opinions I most respect.

However, my disagreements aside, I do think Gewirth is a morally acute thinker who does absolutely excellent work in ethical theory. I simply do not think he is the most effective "exporter" of those theories into practical economics and politics, where he tends to favor practices that, I think as a matter of logic and history, tend to undermine the entirely legitimate goal of promoting self-fulfillment.