Study the Overland/Petersburg campaign and you'll note that Lee whipped Grant three times (the Wilderness, Cold Harbor, and various assaults on Petersburg), fought him to a bloody draw once (Spotsylvania), and only lost when the Army of Northern Virginia was crumbling from starvation and attrition. Stuck in an impossible situation, Lee forced Grant to take nearly a year longer than he had planned to take Richmond, despite Grant having all the advantages (better supplies, far more men, not having Richmond to defend, etc.). I doubt Grant would have done as well in such a position.

Grant was by no means an incompetant general, but his main attribute was tenacity; he won through stubborness more times than anything else. He nearly let the garrison of Ft. Donaldson get away (and would have if anyone had listened to Forrest), he came within a hair's breadth of losing his entire army at Shiloh, he was frustrated time and again at Vicksburg by an inferior general, his plan to defeat Bragg at Chattanooga was convoluted and shouldn't have worked, and Lee out-generaled him on multiple occasions. What made Grant superior to any other Union general (save perhaps Thomas) was his refusal to give up. Grant understood the advantages he worked with and knew how to use them to win. Put him on equal footing with Lee and the story may well have been different.

The oft-repeated view, especially from Confederate defenders, is that Grant won though he was a drunken butcher indifferent to high casualties whose triumph was inevitable because of superior manpower and supplies. John Frederick Charles Fuller, the British Major General, and along with Liddel Hart one of the top military strategists of the 20th century, provides overwhelming evidence to lay this view to rest. Grant practiced maneuver warfare when he could, and his Vicksburg campaign (not just a siege, rather a series of five battles), along with Jackson's valley campaign, are the two greatest campaigns of the war. In his final Overland campaign, Grant could not maneuver much because Lincoln required that he keep substantial forces between Lee's army and Washington. By a thorough analysis of Grant's and Lee's battles throughout the war, Fuller makes the case that Grant was among the best generals ever, and greater than Lee, who was also great but had his limitations (after Order 191 was lost and recovered by McClellan's troops before Antietam, Lee would only issue oral orders, and his subordinates were often confused by them; Grant was known for crystal clear written orders, following the example of Zachary Taylor under whom Grant (and Lee) had served in the Mexican War). Rating Grant so highly will of course be heresy for neo-Confederates, but there is no question Grant has received unfair treatment even among historians. Another Fuller book, "The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant" adds more details to the defense of the claim that Grant was an excellent general. In assessing the relative greatness of Grant and Lee, one should keep in mind their age difference and the difference in upward mobility on the two sides during the war. Lee was 14 years older than Grant, Lee was already a Colonel when the war started and still serving on active duty, whereas Grant had left the army as a captain after the Mexican War. At the start of the war, Winfield Scott, who had served in the War of 1812 and masterminded in the Mexican War the amazing defeat of a country of 20 million people with 12,000 invading troops, was the greatest soldier on either side. However he was old and so fat he could no longer ride a horse; his campaigning days were over. After Scott, Lee was the best soldier on either side at the start of the war--and Lee was offered command of the Union army but turned it down. However Grant rose through the ranks because he learned quickly from his mistakes at Belmont, Forts Henry and Donelson, Shiloh, and Holly Springs. By the end of the war Fuller's analysis shows Grant was clearly the superior general, and not just because he had superior numbers. Even the oft-cited mistake at Cold Harbor, according to Fuller, is exagerrated. Fuller summarizes the overall casualy numbers during the war: the ratio of killed and wounded to total forces engaged for Grant was 10%; for the whole Federal army it was 11%; for the whole Confederate army it was 12%; and for Lee, it was 16%. One must be fair to Lee and not lose sight of the fact that he was an exemplary, even a saintly individual who must always be acknowledged as among the great American generals. But the simplistic, grossly unfair judgment of Ulysses S. Grant is revealed here as a sham which must stop. Under the razor-sharp and penetrating analysis of Fuller, one of the greatest military historians of all time, the conventional, common opinion of Grant is shown to be balderdash. Ulysses S. Grant was one of the greatest generals the U.S. has ever produced. Though written many years ago, Fuller's book is still relevant to this ongoing national discussion, and is a must read for anyone who wants to compare Union and Confederate generalship. Regarding Grant's drinking, Fuller doesn't discuss this, but this too is greatly exaggerated. He was indeed a binge drinker. When I asked the renowned Civil War historian Ed Bearss about this, he said Grant got drunk about four to six times during the war, always when he was away from his wife (she was with or lived near him during some campaigns and he was always lonely without her). Moreover, in the Civil War one could usually tell when battle was near, and there was usually inactivity during the winter months. The circumstances are not comparable to a modern general's always being on call in the nuclear age. Grant's occasional binge drinking never once affected his generalship, in public functions he usually would not drink at all, being a semi-recovered alcoholic except for the occasional binge. The stereotype is that Grant was constantly drunk during the war. This too is an unfair assessment not based on historical fact. Read this book and will see just how wrong the stereotype of Grant's generalship is, and how good a general he was.

I have to disagree totally with the previous reviewer. While the relative merits of both generals have been argued since the conclusion of the war and will be into the future, the interesting point about this book is that General Fuller began with the assumption that Grant was the butcher of legend who bludgeoned with numbers and that Lee was the battlefield genius. His studies lead him to conclude otherwise (in an intersting appendix he shows that througout their respective careers, Lee lost a higher proportion of his men than Grant).

The main point Fuller makes is that Grant was the first general to understand the totality of warfare in the modern age, including the role of political expectations. He also was a superior strategist and campaigner to Lee, although Lee was probably the better battlefield tactitian. Lee had the advantage in the Overland campaign of fighting on the defensive, and Grant was aware of the approaching elections and the need to produce a result, rather than the traditional Army of the Potomac stalemate, or worse. He additionally had responsibilities for overseeing the Western and Valley battlefronts.

The main point to remember when considering the careers of the two men is that, if my memory is correct, of the three armies that surrendered during the War, Grant received two of them.