While I certainly cannot agree that this book, or its principal subject, Robert Hale, present anything close to "one of the best demolitions" of laissez-faire, this book is quite intriguing; and I think that anyone who is in the business of defending the concepts of laissez-faire or present-day libertarianism would do well to ponder upon Hale's arguments. This is not to say that a full understanding of Hale is essential (it may even be stretching it to say useful) for a complete defense of laissez-faire, but he certainly does present an intellectual and philisophical challenge for it's adherants. Fried does an excellent job of documenting and reiterating Hale's approach to legal theory and the early 20th century thought underlying it - but in the end, we are really only left with Hale's analysis which, while intriguing and ingenious, is little more than an intellectual puzzle the ramifications of which even Fried (an evident admirer) expresses some skepticism.

Hale's attempts to defeat the concept of laissez-faire (linguistically) put him in the position of beating up on traditionalists like Thomas Nixon Carver, without giving us any practical reason as to why they were right or wrong. Even if we were to take Hale's central argument as correct, (he essentially contests the idea of a minimalist state as conceptually incoherent) Hale gives litte to no insight as to why the "coercion" he advocates is preferable to the "coercion" of the marketplace. Only once in Fried's book is the antithesis of Hale, Frederich Hayek, mentioned - whose defense of laissez-faire was primarily based on it's efficiency in conveying vast amounts of interspresed and fragmented knowledge as to the opportunity costs of goods and labor, and contantly changing values and preferences throughout complex societies. Yet it is this argument which is (by far) more central to the debate about laissez-faire - and this argument which Hale essentially ignores - preferring instead to defeat classic liberals on their choice of terms. Even if he were right, Hale gets us absoultely nowhere; not to mention, as does Fried, that Hale's expansive notion of "coercion" to include any form of human conduct tends to embarrass the idea of free speech or the civil rights movement - of which his progressive counterparts have been so active in protecting.

The book does not only deal with the so-called "empty" ideas of liberty and property, but also extends to Hale's analysis of "suplus value" of property and rate regulation of monopolies. There are problems here as well - but by far the most important are his idea regarding freedom and coercion. Hale is a intellectual challenge, but really nothing more - and while he clearly rejects the conceptions of liberty and property as they were conceived in the Lochner era, he gives us no good reason to do the same; and at times it seemed that even Fried wanted to pop Hale's balloon - but for some reason could never quite bring herself to do it.

Asking for Hale's rebuttal to Hayek is foolish because (a) it is anacronistic and (b) Hale was writing in the field of law, while Hayek was writing in economics. The introduction and an excerpt (which you can see here on Amazon) describe the laissez-faire rhetoric that Hale was refuting.

Hale clearly explains why laissez-faire is wrong about liberty: all property is a grant of unaccountable private power from the state. Thus, it doesn't matter if liberty is infringed by the state retaining the power or private owners abusing the power (as in the cases of monopolies, public utilities, and opposition to unions.) Those were Hale's primary interests throughout his career. And interestingly, they are also precisely places where Hayek's social calculation arguments fail.

Hale (and Fried) don't bother explaining why they thought their alternative was better: the progressive case was being widely made elsewhere at the time. Hale's contribution was to specialize in kicking out the supports of laissez-faire so that progressive arguments could compete fairly with extremist capitalist arguments.

This is an essential book for understanding the major changes in legal theory of the progressive era. The change from classical liberalism to modern progressive liberalism was profound, and required the abolition of a number of myths presumed by law and the judiciary. These myths have since been resurrected by the libertarians, and it is enlightening to see the satisfying reasons why they were rejected so long ago. It's easy to tell how threatened libertarians feel about this by the vehemence of their attacks.

College-level reading, and not for those with short attention spans.