Used price: $261.46
Used price: $23.00
and when it is high grade the awailable surgical procdures must be be done.the the treatment of choise in adults is surgery.
our imaging for diagnosis is isotop scan and vcug .
we prefer the isotope scan in childeren for prevent xray sidefects
Used price: $0.95
Collectible price: $6.35
Used price: $0.99
Buy one from zShops for: $9.95
List price: $27.50 (that's 30% off!)
Used price: $17.00
Collectible price: $26.47
Buy one from zShops for: $18.15
Used price: $30.00
Used price: $1.79
List price: $17.95 (that's 30% off!)
Used price: $4.97
Buy one from zShops for: $4.75
That said, the parallels pointed out by the Kagans between the Britain of the 1920s and 1930s and the United States of the 1990s and early 21st century are remarkable. Especially fascinating is the interesting similarities drawn by the authors between the 1919 Treaty of Versailles that ended World War I and the 1991 armistice ending the Persian Gulf War. The Kagans note that the peace in both cases was made with a weakened but not absolutely defeated power. They further point out that, to compensate for this fact, the victorious powers imposed an onerous peace which, in order to work, would require a permanent obligation by the victors to impose their terms. That, in its course, would require the victorious powers to maintain large military forces and a willingness to use them should the terms of the peace be violated.
Here the Kagans have hit on the nut of the matter. As the Europeans, particularly the British and the French, are learning to their great cost in the War on Terrorism, military power and a willingness to use it matters. Despite the best hopes of man and the fondest dreams of Eurofederalists, economics, commerce, treaties and international law do not govern the world, brute force still does. The prudent exercise of power, particularly military power, saves lives and makes for a more peaceful world in the long run. At the end of the day, there is no substitute for the prudent pursuit of a national self-interest.
Ironically, though, this is the point at where the Kagans fall down. They point out that in 1919, Britain was the only power capable of acting as a global policeman, and that in 2002, the United States finds itself in a similar position. They rightly point out that, in order to play that role, armed forces of sufficient quantity and quality are essential. Yet, they never tackle the essential question of whether the role of global policeman is appropriate.
Consequently, the Kagans are left offering American policymakers no useful guide to what constitutes an appropriate foreign policy. They correctly point out that the American armed forces were, and remain, badly overstretched. Yet, they never question whether the United States should have been going into places like Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans. Because of the book's narrow fixation on the necessity of a properly constituted military establishment, the authors never get to the more essential question of when America should use its military power.
The Kagans are not wrong when they say that the phrase, "America cannot be the world's policeman," has become tired and overused by those who are pushing other agendas. However, they are wrong to suggest that the phrase itself lacks a kernel of truth. They ignore the possibility that the United States ought not try to be the world's policeman. Not only because this would not be sustainable in terms of domestic politics, which has to be considered though not slavishly so, but also because being the world's policeman would tend to draw together a coalition of interests hostile to the United States.
The fact is that America is wasting its military resources and its money in the Balkans in a cause in which it has only the remotest of stakes. NATO forms the boundary of America's national interests in Europe, not the Balkans. America currently finds itself leading an alliance of military dependents in the War on Terrorism because, instead of compelling the states of Europe to develop military forces to protect their own Balkan interests, America supplied the forces for Europe.
Similarly, the fact is that, in Haiti, America had no serious interests worthy of a military intervention, but was left with no choice but intervention because American foreign policy was unwisely couched in globalists terms of universal norms. Historically, the United States had been willing to accept any regime in Haiti so long as it danced to America's tune in the global arena. The innovation that the character of the Haitian regime mattered to America's national interest was anomalous and wrong. More importantly, the ability to correct that regime's brutalities is well beyond any power the United States might ever be able to bring to bear.
To be certain, at different times throughout the book, the Kagans make these and similar points. However, in the end, they never make the connection between their contention that America must be a global policeman because it has the power to do so, and that in so doing, America will be drawn into places where its interests are not at stake, and therefore will needlessly fritter away its power. In short, the Kagans conflate the idea that because a nation has the power to do a thing, it must do that thing. They choose the model of a global policeman, rather than the less utopian and more practical model of the balance of power.
For all of that, the Kagans deserve much credit for reminding Americans that an effective foreign policy is inseparable from a strong and modern military. In the global arena, in the final analysis, it is not just 'the economy, stupid.' Unfortunately, they neglect to go beyond that point, and the result is a book that is really nothing more than a pitch, however necessary, for a bigger defense budget. That is important, but it is ironic. In the end, the Kagans, shrewd and insightful historians though they are, have decided that Kofi Anan has more meaningful things to say about America's foreign policy than Theodore Roosevelt.
"While America Sleeps" is an engaging, insightful work of comparative history. Using Great Britain between the wars as a point of comparison for the US today, the authors outline the great dangers we face as a nation. In much the same way that Britain demobilized after WWI, the US has taken a huge "peace dividend" and gutted it's military since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, US foreign policy has been consistently erratic, misguided and timid over the same period.
By using well known examples like Iraq, North Korea and the Balkans, the authors illustrate how the US has failed to make a strong stand when confronted with aggression. Furthermore, when a stand is made, it is usually ineffective and half-hearted.
They describe how the Bush (the 1st) administration had many of the right ideas about the role of a lone superpower, but failed to implement them. This was due largely to a failure to educate the public, and a lingering "Vietnam Syndrome" that continues to plague the military. They go on to lambast (and rightly so) the Clinton administration for both failing to understand the dynamic of global relations, and for utterly misapplying military force.
Make no mistake, while the Kagan's have a point to make, this is not a work of theory. The history is excellent, and makes superb use of primary sources. It is the quality of the research and writing, and the urgency of the conclusion that make this book. The author's opinions are clear, but neither dogmatic, nor partisan.
Used price: $69.00
Buy one from zShops for: $71.91
Used price: $0.68
Buy one from zShops for: $6.98