Not to take anything away from Jac Weller, who wrote some of my favorite books about Wellington, but Ian Fletcher does spend a significant portion of each year leading battlefield tours around Spain,has written numerous books about the Peninsula War specifically, and has made as his primary business the study of this period of the Napoleonic conflict. For purposes of writing the Osprey Campaign Series title about this battle there is nobody better suited.

Fletcher's battlefield descriptions are up to date as he traces out the location of every British battery in relation to contemporary landmarks along with photographs detailing key points of interest. The level of detail is exactly what one has come to expect from the Osprey Campaign Series and, in addition to Badajoz, the seige of Ciudad Rodrigo is also covered in this title.

For a greater level of detail than this title permits read "In Hell Before Daylight", also by Ian Fletcher.

This is an excellent volume of excerpts from numerous primary accounts of the British viewpoint, from the participants, of the War in the Spanish Peninsula from 1808-1814. The author has reinforced his growing reputation as one of the best chroniclers of that war with this exciting compendium of accounts that start with Rolica in 1808, one of the hardest fights Wellington had in his long, spectacular career, and ending with the French sortie from Bayonne in 1814. The entire gamut of the long, costly, and famous campaigns in the Peninsula are covered accurately and convincingly, and the author has added another piece of excellent scholarship to the growing list of Napoleonic titles now in print.

Some of the accounts are from familiar 'voices' and places, others are not,and are a welcome addition to the roster of primary accounts with which all of us can use as reference in our own studies. I will leave it to the curious and studious to find out who they are in this handy volume, which will undoubtedly whet the appetite of those wishing to broaden their knowledge of this fascinating series of campaigns that gave Napoleon a continuous second front and bled the superb regiments of the Grande Armee that fought in Spain.

Volumes such as this have greatly influenced my own choice of reading for the period. Long an admirer of the Grande Armee, I have now gone back to restudy the campaigns in the Peninsula, which, though a secondary theater, the excellent army Wellington developed and fielded was decisive to the allied cause. Ian Fletcher is somewhat responsible for this renewed interest on my part, and he has done us all a great service with this study and his other works.

This work is highly recommended and is another arrow in the quiver for Greenhill, which is continually producing excellent works on the Napoleonic era. Hopefully, the association of Greenhill and Ian Fletcher will continue for the benefit of us all. This book is a rare treat, and if you fail to read it, you are missing out on an outstanding study of the period from the British point of view. It is a worthwhile addition to any library having to do with the British army, the Peninsular War, or both.

This book does a fantastic job of starting out with the basics. It doesn't assume you already know 3D math. I had to re-read a couple parts to make sure I understood what was being taught, however this was due to the nature of the difficult subject, and not because it was poorly written. The book is very well written.

While this book starts out with the basics, it does move into more advanced topics, but because it does such a good job of giving you a solid foundation at the beginning, you are able keep up.

The code samples are excellent as well. They don't get so complicated that you can't understand it...and they help to reinforce how to actually implement a vector, matrix etc. in C.

Thanks to authors for writing a book that a person with very little 3D math experience can pick up and actually get through. I would highly recommend this book to anyone wanting to learn more about 3D math...whether you are a beginner or advanced.

If you are even slightly interested in 3D math and computer graphics or game programming, I would pick this book up for sure. It is the best book I have found yet on the subject.

Our goal in writing this book was not to cover as many topics as possible, like some other books, but rather to hit the most important concepts thoroughly. If you are a beginner, or have some "holes" in your understanding of matrices, Euler angles, left-handed vs. right-handed coordinate spaces, or key graphics concepts like zoom or the lighting equation, this book is for you.

A feature of this book over other books is the extent to which we have tried to develop the reader's geometric intuition, rather than just presenting numbers and equations. We show what the geometric interpretation of each mathematical operation is, why you would ever use that operation, and, in many cases, how the equation was derived in the first place. We do not gloss over "minor details" such as row vectors versus column vectors, or left- versus right-handed coordinate spaces. These "minor details" make all the difference in the world when you are trying to use an equation out of a book.

For the more advanced reader, we offer some of the clearest and complete discussions of some more advanced topics such as quaternions and barycentric coordinates. The book can be used as a reference for many important vector and matrix operations and identities. It also has a toolkit of many important equations for geometric primitives and intersection tests.

Our focus is on theory, so the book is not a big code dump like many books. The code we have provided consists primarily of "utility" classes for vectors, quaternions, and matrices. I think you will find that our code is simpler to read and understand than most code you will find elsewhere. We also offer some unique and thoughtful advice on good class design, specifically targetted to classes for doing 3D math and getting it right the first time, without twiddling minus signs or swapping numbers experimentally until it looks right

When I first heard of this book I was skeptical because of the math because most books take for granted that you are a math wiz. But this book not only explains the theory but also the concepts behind the math and code.

For any one wanting to get into game graphics and game development I HIGHELY recommend this book Fletch and Ian knows how to teach and hope they continue to teach young padawan learners like me by making thoroughly well made books like this.

EVERYONE MUST GET IT!!!!!!!

John Mills wrote home to his family and in his private journal from Portugal, Spain and later in Holland. Here is an excerpt: "Sept. 28 The mining goes on but slowly and as our chief hopes depend upon it, we think the siege doubtful. I went into the trenches at six in the evening and remained till twelve. We broke fresh ground nearer than on the preceding night but though they kept up a very heavy fire of musketry with occasional rounds of grape they did not hit a man. They threw two fireballs one of which fell about ten yards from me and burned for twenty minutes. I wonder much that they do not throw more as during the time they are burning it is impossible for me to work."

Although the Peninsula War of 1809-1814 has attracted a great deal of attention from historians, the extensive fortifications built in Portugal and known as the Lines of Torres Vedras have received very little attention. As Peninsula War expert Ian Fletcher notes in Osprey's Fortress volume #7 on that subject, only two previous books have focused specifically on these defenses which were so critical to the Duke of Wellington's operational planning. Indeed, Fletcher refers to the lines as "one of the best kept secrets in military history" and he describes the role these defenses played in halting and reversing the French invasion of Portugal in 1810.

The Lines of Torres Vedras 1809-1811 begins with a short introduction and chronology, followed by short sections on the design and development of the lines, Wellington's method of defense, the forts, life in the lines, aftermath and the lines today. Fletcher provides one very nice, 2-page color map of the lines, 2 period maps of the lines, and a map depicting Marshall Massena's retreat. The color plates by artist Bill Younghusband are decent, if not great (constructing one of the forts in the line, a cross-section of the great redoubt at Sobral, Forts 40-42, Fort San Vicente, Wellington inspecting French positions, and attacking a scarped hillside).

Wellington, ordered the construction of an extensive defensive position north of Lisbon in October 1809 in order to provide a final redoubt for the British if pressed by French invasion. Thousands of Portuguese civilians were used as the workforce to construct two main lines of defense, centered upon the craggy hilltops north of their capital. Construction required about one year and the result was a defensive system that stretched over 30 miles from the Atlantic coast to the Tagus River. In addition, Wellington's engineers put a major effort into countermobility operations, destroying all bridges and roads north of the lines to impede any French advance. As Fletcher notes, the lines were not a continuous barrier but a series of forts with interlocking fields of fire, barriers and defenses in depth. Wellington also instituted a "scorched earth" policy north of the lines, destroying grain and livestock as well as evacuating Portuguese civilians, in order to deny the French a source of food or labor.

The lines were finished just in time, as Marshal Massena's army approached Lisbon in October 1810. Wellington manned the fortifications themselves with 30,000 Portuguese troops and over 400 cannon, leaving his 29,000 British troops as a mobile reserve to counterattack any French penetration. Massena's army, already punished by a difficult march across Portugal and the painful Battle of Bussaco two weeks earlier, was dismayed when they bumped into the unexpectedly formidable Allied defenses. After sniffing around the east end of the lines for a month - including mounting a minor probe at one small section - the poorly-supplied French army began to withdraw.

In Fletcher's assessment, the Lines of Torres Vedras were "a total success" because they stopped the French invasion dead in its tracks. Fletcher, as some other British historians are prone to do, even refers to the lines as "impregnable." Yet is there really such a thing as an "impregnable defense" or is this merely a tradition of biased hyperbole? As Fletcher describes, most of the forts of the lines of Torres Vedras were built of dirt earthworks, some with stone walls, on top of very advantageous terrain. However, a key weakness was that the forts had little or no overhead cover and were therefore vulnerable to plunging fire from French mortars or howitzers. Fletcher fails to mention that Massena's army had such mortars and that they had been used to reduce the far more impressive stone fortress of Almeida only seven weeks prior. It is also questionable whether the British had a real plan to defend the lines in time of limited visibility, such as darkness or fog (granted, night attacks were rare in this period). In fact, Fletcher notes that the French used the extensive fog in the area to cover their withdrawal. However, the greatest weakness of the lines was logistical. Although the Royal Navy brought in enough supplies to feed the British army, the Portuguese capital jammed with thousands of refugees was vulnerable to starvation. Indeed, Fletcher estimates that about 2% of the Portuguese population starved to death in this brief period of French invasion. What if Massena had merely begun constructing his own double line of defense, say 5 kilometers north of Torres Vedras, to keep the British in and starve the Portuguese out? Since the British had destroyed all the roads and bridges in front of their own defenses, they would have found it difficult to attack out of the lines.

Fletcher is fair in assessing that the lines remain "something of an enigma" since they were never truly tested by the French. Unfortunately, Fletcher is less than fair in assessing why the French failed to test the defenses. Massena's army had an extremely tenuous line of supply back to Spain, much of which was partially interdicted by guerrillas. At best, Massena had about 55,000 troops to try and batter through a fortified line held by about 52,000 Anglo-Portuguese troops. A 1:1 odds attack, virtually out of supply against an entrenched enemy with naval support would have been very foolhardy and could have resulted in the dissolution of the French Army of Portugal. Massena wisely chose to withdraw in order to re-supply. Thus, the Lines of Torres Vedras have always seemed very formidable because operational circumstances were so unfavorable for the French from the start. Yet had Napoleon decided to make a major effort in the Peninsula in 1811 and spend the effort to build up a series of logistical bases and roads into Portugal, Monsieur Wellington might have found that it took a lot more than well-sited dirt forts to stop the Grande Armée.

Editor Ian Fletcher has assembled a wealth of talent including David Chandler, Paddy Griffiths, Charles Esdaile and others, to discuss a number of Peninsular topics to include POWs, the Portugese Army, the guerrillas, and siege warfare. I especially recommend my friend Jack Gill's chapter on Napoleon's German allies in Spain. Fletcher includes a bibliographic essay on Wellington's army as well as a nicely updated Peninsular bibliography. A handy little volume that should find its way into all Peninsular aficinado's libraries.

The narrative for the battle itself was very interesting and you get a good feel for the tension in the air in the days leading up to the battle; as well as the military genius of Wellington. There is a good overview of Wellington, his commanders and the political challenges the "Iron Duke" faced. The illustrations are also outstanding.

I was a little disappointed in the maps - not up to the usual quality of the Campaign Series. The French Commanders get very little write-up, so the reader doesn't have a good feel for what types of men they were, the challenges they were facing or even Napoleon's feelings towards the Penninsula War. The beginning of the book is also a somewhat choppy and is a little tough to follow.

Don't be mislead by my critisms. This is still a good book (I've read it 2 times to date), but falls short of this series high standard of excellance. It is none-the-less an enjoyable read and worthwhile for any Wellington or Napoleonic era buff

This book, while not really shedding any new light on the topic, goes into an in depth look at the battle. Detailed OOB's, photographs of the battlefield today, and excellent 3d maps make this an excellent read for the history buff and wargamer alike. The color plates are excellent, and really give a feel for the time period. My only qualm is that individual unit strengths are not given.

The author, a recognized authority on the British army in the Peninsula from 1808-1814, set out to do a reappraisal of the commonly held belief that the British cavalry of the Napoleonic Wars was well-mounted and poorly led. While this volume is good and useful, I submit that the thesis was not proven.

The book is well-laid out and organized, with the cavalry itself with its weapons, tactics, personnel and horses being discussed as well as such diverse, but essential topics, as picket duty, being scrutinized. The second half of the book is the meat of the study, that being the battlefield and campaign performance of the British cavalry.

A myriad of reliable, first hand accounts are used, but so are some second hand ones that aren't, such as Hamilton-Williams' poorly done book, Waterloo-New Perspectives. Why would such a reputable author use a reference that is widely known as being unreliable? That is somewhat puzzling and doesn't lend credence to his thesis or study, in my opinion. However, such reliable and neglected reliable sources as Fortescue's History of the British Army, are used thoroughly here which help. The resulting product, in my opinion, is useful, but glaringly weak in some areas.

The British cavalry is seldom if ever compared tactically or strategically to the cavalry of other contemporary armies. There is enough work in English, at least from the French (notably Antoine de Brack's excellent Light Cavalry Outposts) which do comparisons between the two which the author could have drawn on. Similarly, while touting some of the British cavalry commanders as excellent (in my opinion only Le Marchant was in that category), no comparison of note is done with their opponents even though some of the best French commanders, such as Montbrun, Kellermann, and Latour-Maubourg, served in the Peninsula.

In the end, the same conclusion is drawn about the British cavalry, which both Wellington and de Brack agree on. They were spledidly mounted, a charge of their heavy cavalry could really 'sweep the field' their horses being larger than their French counterparts, and they were only adequately led at best, and at worst, they were 'horribly' led. Additionally, it should be noted that they were only adequate at light cavalry duties, and they were not good horsemasters. The cavalry of the King's German Legion was undoubtedly the best Wellington had, their main problem being the difficulty in getting replacements for losses suffered.

This book, however, is recommended as an excellent history of the British cavalry, and the author is to be commended for bringing this unusual and neglected topic into print.

Ian Fletcher has established himself as a writer on various aspects of military history of the British Army in the Peninsular War. In "Galloping at Everything", he promises to reinterpret the value of the British Cavalry and explode the myth about their lack of military value. However, this books is marred by numerous inconsistencies and selective referencing.
For example, comparisons should be made with other contemporary mounted units, allies or enemies. However, the author states outright that he will not make comparisons with other contemporary mounted units Later, he contradicts himself by making some comparisons with the mounted units of the King's German Legion and the French cavalry.
The author reanalyses the findings of earlier historians, notably Oman, Fortescue and Napier to reinterpret the role of the British cavalry. These three historians have apparently been at odds in interpreting the role of the British cavalry in the Peninsular war. Generally, Oman is on one side of the debate, with Fortescue and Napier on the other side.
Mr Fletcher especially thinks that Oman has been the main villain in depicting the British Cavalry in a bad light by, misquoting Wellington (who also thinks likewise), highlighting their spectacular failures such as Campo Mayor and Maguilla, overlooking their spectacular successes such as Sahagun and ignoring other numerous tactical successes. Furthermore, by misinterpreting the true nature of some of these actions, Oman has painted the British cavalry as incompetent. The funny thing is that in some of these actions, it is Oman (not Fortescue) who thinks that the British cavalry performed well. Whatever their interpretations, throughout this book, Mr Fletcher picks on the more favourable interpretation of either historian to buttress his argument that the British cavalry was very successful in their tactical role.
A blow-by-blow dissection of his inconsistencies would take up far too much space and I have condensed some of the main points below.
The Introductory chapters take broad swipes at Oman's dominant interpretation of the British cavalry role and Wellington's dismissal of their military value. In Fletcher's opinion, there were only two overall brilliant commanders of British cavalry - Henry Paget and Gaspard Le Marchant, and Sir Stapleton Cotton was just an adequate commander who merely followed instructions from Wellington. To cite from the book directly "Cotton lacked the brilliance of Henry, Lord Paget". A few paragraphs down, the author repeats his assertion that the British cavalry was well led, this time however by three very good commanders - Paget, Le Marchant and Cotton. This contradicts the earlier analysis of Cotton's capability.
The author apparently equates brilliance with flair and dash. For example, Robert Crafurd, Paget and Le Marchant were all brilliant. However, Crafurd was "prone to error of judgement and over enthusiasm" and Paget's abilities "have been called into question". That's brilliance?
Further discussions on the relative merits of cavalry officers appear pointless. The British had a purchase system where they bought their way up the military hierarchy. But there is "no evidence to suggest that officers who bought their way up were inept". If there were any bad officers, "it probably says more about Wellington's inability to rid himself of inept officers". Now it's Wellington's fault if there are any bad officers.
"At Waterloo, the entire British cavalry corps could boast just one peer, thirteen sons of peers, seventeen sons of baronets, two knights, one son of a knight, one Italian prince, one Hanoverian baron and one son of a German countess. This is hardly what one might term an aristocratic assembly". Huh?
Regarding deserters, "the problem was never a serious one, unlike in other armies". The author then cites probably the worst case army - the Portuguese. Why didn't he cite desertion rates for the French?
Chapters on horse care, foraging and arms do not provide clear insights into issues that translate into tactical superiority for the British Cavalry. The author acknowledges that The King's German Legion was always considered better cavalry troops than the British regulars but he will not discuss the KGL further as he wants to focus on the British troops. And that is probably the weakest point of this section - the lack of direct comparison with contemporary units, allies or enemies. In addition, he cites almost exclusively from British primary and secondary sources which would allow a certain amount of nationalistic bias to creep into such selective referencing.
Furthermore, the author thinks that both Paget and Le Marchant were brilliant innovators because they introduced new carbine and sabre models respectively to the British Cavalry. However, as these models were not universally adopted by the cavalry prior to an assessment of their performance, their tactical significance is not measurable except in anecdotal accounts.
Regarding an assessment of the British cavalry in piquet and patrol work, the author states that "it is difficult to quantify the success of outpost and piquet operations" and later, "to assume that all other piquet operations were successful by the mere fact that nothing untoward ever occurred". This is a damning indictment of his bias and use of false logic to make his case.
Later, "At the risk of appearing to be selective, the following incidents demonstrate how good Wellington's cavalry were on patrol". The rest of the book continues on in similar fashion.
He also has this irritating habit of repeating facts and statements ad nauseum throughout the book. There are a lot of non-sequitar arguments in this book.
Ultimately, what Fletcher is arguing for is that the British cavalry was well mounted, but lacked control. They could dominate their French counterparts on many occasions and could lose just as badly. Their commanders were good, and not so good. Thus, there is nothing new here, merely a poor attempt at reassessment of the immutable facts.
The British cavalry was really too small in numbers and many of their tactical successes were not readily converted into strategic successes. Thus they were insignificant by comparison to the strategic value of the French cavalry (Ulm being the greatest example).

Ian Fletcher has established himself chiefly as a writer on various aspects of military history of the British Army in the Peninsular War. In "Galloping at Everything", he promises to reinterpret the value of the British Cavalry and explode the myth about their lack of military value.
However, I was somewhat disappointed and perplexed by the author's very inconsistent treatment of the topic. I would understand that in order to achieve this, comparisons have to be made with other contemporary mounted units, allies or enemies. The author does not do this. He states outright that he will not make comparisons with other contemporary mounted units (he then contradicts himself later by making some comparisons with the mounted units of the King's German Legion and the French cavalry).
In fact, the author will reinterpret the role of the British cavalry by reinterpreting the findings of earlier historians, notably Oman, Fortescue and Napier. These three historians have apparently been at odds in interpreting the role of the British cavalry in the Peninsular war. Generally, Oman is on one side of the debate, with Fortescue and Napier on the other side.
Mr Fletcher especially thinks that Oman has been the main villain in depicting the British Cavalry in a bad light by, misquoting Wellington (who also thinks likewise), highlighting their spectacular failures such as Campo Mayor and Maguilla, overlooking their spectacular successes such as Sahagun and, ignoring other numerous tactical successes. Furthermore, by misinterpreting the true nature of some of these actions, Oman has given the impression that the British cavalry was incompetent. The funny thing is that in some of these actions, it is Oman (not Fortescue) who thinks that the British cavalry performed well. Whatever their interpretations, throughout this book, Mr Fletcher picks on the more favourable interpretation of either historian to buttress his argument that the British cavalry was very successful in their tactical role.
A blow-by-blow dissection of his inconsistencies would take up far too much space and I have condensed some of the main points below.
The Introductory chapters take broad swipes at Oman's dominant interpretation of the British cavalry role and Wellington's dismissal of their military value. In Fletcher's opinion, there were only two overall brilliant commanders of British cavalry - Henry Paget and Gaspard Le Marchant. The former, after eloping with Wellington's sister-in-law, was removed from the scene until his reappearance at Waterloo, and the latter was killed at Salamanca just as he was about to make his mark. Meanwhile, Sir Stapleton Cotton was just an adequate commander who merely followed instructions from Wellington. To cite from the book directly "...Cotton lacked the brilliance of Henry, Lord Paget...". A few paragraphs down, the author repeats his assertion that the British cavalry was well led, this time however by three very good commanders - Paget, Le Marchant and Cotton. This contradicts the earlier analysis of Cotton's capability. My understanding is that the author equates brilliance with flair and dash. For example, Robert Crafurd, Paget and Le Marchant were all brilliant. However, Crafurd was "...prone to error of judgement and over enthusiasm..." and Paget's abilities "...have been called into question...". This is brilliance?
Further discussions on the relative merits of cavalry officers appear pointless. The British had a purchase system where they bought their way up the military hierarchy. But there is "...no evidence to suggest that officers who bought their way up were inept". If there were any bad officers, "...it probably says more about Wellington's inability to rid himself of inept officers". Now it's Wellington's fault if there are any bad officers.
"...At Waterloo, the entire British cavalry corps could boast just one peer, thirteen sons of peers, seventeen sons of baronets, two knights, one son of a knight, one Italian prince, one Hanoverian baron and one son of a German countess. This is hardly what one might term an aristocratic assembly...". Huh?
Regarding deserters, "...the problem was never a serious one, unlike in other armies...". The author then cites probably the worst case army - the Portuguese. Why didn't he cite desertion rates for the French?
Finally his interesting assertion that in 1914, men did not enlist to fight in the Great war out of patrotism, but out of necessity to find work is not referenced.
Later chapters on horse care, foraging and arms do not provide clear insights into issues that translate into tactical superiority for the British Cavalry. For example, the horses were generally not as well-fed or cared for (by comparison with those in the King's German Legion). The author acknowledges that The King's German Legion was always considered better cavalry troops than the British regulars but he will not discuss the KGL further as he wants to focus on the British troops. And that is probably the weakest point of this section - the lack of direct comparison with contemporary units, allies or enemies. In addition, he cites almost exclusively from British primary and secondary sources. Surely, isn't it likely that a certain amount of nationalistic bias would creep into such selective referencing?
Furthermore, I believe that the author thinks that both Paget and Le Marchant were brilliant innovators because they introduced new carbine and sabre models respectively to the British Cavalry. However, as these models were not universally adopted by the cavalry prior to an assessment of their performance, their tactical significance is not measurable except in anecdotal accounts.
Regarding an assessment of the british cavalry in piquet and patrol work, the author states that "...it is difficult to quantify the success of outpost and piquet operations...". "...to assume that all other piquet operations were successful by the mere fact that nothing untoward ever occurred...". This is a damning indictment of his bias and using false logic to make his case.
A few pages on, "...At the risk of appearing to be selective, the following incidents...demonstrate how good Wellington's cavalry were on patrol...". Really? It's not obvious to me. The rest of the book continues on in similar fashion.
He also has this irritating habit of repeating facts and statements ad nauseum throughout the book. There is a lot of non-sequitar arguments in this book.

Ultimately, what Fletcher is arguing for is that the British cavalry was well mounted, but lacked control. They could dominate their French counterparts on many occasions and could lose just as badly. Their commanders were good, and not so good.
Although the author doesn't make direct comparisons with the cavalry of other nations, the British cavalry was really too small in numbers and many of their tactical successes were not readily converted into strategic successes. Thus they were insignificant by comparison to the strategic value of the French cavalry (Ulm being the greatest example).
Exactly what I understand from reading Oman and others (ho-hum).

While the book is well written and very informative, it is sorely lacking in color plates. Color plates are essential in a book dealing with uniforms. Black and white pictures just don't cut it for uniform descriptions. There are only about 5 or six color plates in the entire thing.

Amin