I do not understand why it is always said that Sellars' language was so difficult. I found his philosophical style quite straight-on. Unfortunately, Sellars' main work is punctuated by some passages of superficial and/or incorrect reasoning, at which passages some may assume that they do not understand Sellars' argumentation - though it "has to be profound" (because of Sellars' reputation). The most important issue in this essay is the impossibility of reporting sense impressions without using language (with all implications that come along with that), and the repercussions of this circumstance on the philosophy of logical empiricism in its early stage (though Sellars obviously thinks his ideas impact on all forms of empiricism, which is not true). Along that line, Sellars has many good points that should be considered in the philosophy of science and in common sense reasoning, yet his reputed final dismantling of the "myth" of the given never takes place; in Sellars intentions, maybe, but his arguments are a far cry from being a stringent refutation. They are simply too superficial and too colloquial for that. (Cf. Putnam's model-theoretic arguments against realism, for a contrast.) What is really unfortunate for Sellars' essay is that, in this edition, it is framed by Rorty and Brandom. The philosophical humorist Rorty has contributed a foreword in an attempt to assimilate Sellars serious philosophical project into his radical-relativist historicizing outlook of philosophy, thus completely misleading the unknowing reader. The bright, but misguided, Brandom offers a study guide, which is no study guide, but an attempt to direct the reader at those aspects of Sellars' essay, which Brandom's own inferentialist philosophy is supposed to stem from. Unfortunately, these aspects are exactly the most questionable. So, while Sellars' essay is a profitable classic of analytic philosophy, the reader should be warned to read Rorty's foreword and Brandom's study guide cautiously and critically and to thoroughly consider, if these really reflect Sellars' essay correctly.

I have come back to this essay be Sellars again and again for over thirty years, and have never failed to impressed and inspired. Sellars can always get me to think at a deeper level than I'm used to. Second only perhaps to Wittgenstein in influence, Sellars is a philosopher's philosopher: understanding him requires a thorough grounding in the history of philosophy, and this essay in particular takes it for granted that you understand 20th century empricism and "sense data" theories pretty well. Even so, the writing style can be both dense and difficult, but reading it aloud can untangle any number of tricky passages. If you're not quite so well versed in history of philosophy, a similar critique can be found in J.L. Austin's "Sense and Sensibilia," which is more accessible but not nearly as profound. In the course of showing the futility of finding incorrigibile foundations for empirical knowledge in sense experience, Sellars simultaneously develops a strictly behavioristic psychology that legitimizes all the goodies, all the mental vocabulary, that folks like Skinner forbade. A tour de force unequalled in 80 years. Bob Brandom's explicatory essay is very helpful, and untwists several tricky knots in the text.

"Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" is an essential epistemological text of the twentieth century. It is difficult: each sentence is difficult. Sellars is said to have shown the existence of a private language by writing in one. The guide by Brandom does not much clarify and simplify the argument of Sellars for two reasons. It is impossible to do this. And Brandom wants to and does contribute significantly to Sellars scholarship. Sellars writes for the professional philosopher. If you plan to be such, or if you want to encounter philosophy at its most profound, you should study the book.