A project by the Center for International Policy, founded by Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), this book brings together a series of chapters that are largely anecdotal (but reasoned) pieces from former foreign service officers recalling all the terrible things CIA did or did not do while they were in service. It includes a chapter by Mel Goodman that some thought was to have been a full-blown book. The chapter by Richard A. Stubbing on "Improving the Output of Intelligence: Priorities, Managerial Changes, and Funding" is quite interesting. There is a great deal of truth in all that is presented here-Ambassador Bob White, for example, was in El Salvador when I reported, a graduate thesis on predicting (and preventing) revolution in my past, and I remember vividly our conversation about the need to suppress the extreme right if we were to stabilize the country.

Most thoughtful observers agree that our intelligence community (Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of State, National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Office and National Imagery and Mapping Agency) remains structured for the Cold War and badly needs reform to meet the challenges of the new century. And they tend to agree on its principal weaknesses, a familiar litany for those who follow these matters: inability to produce analysis useful to policy makers, politicization of intelligence product, emergence of an "intelligence-industrial complex", wasteful spending, damaging and counterproductive covert operations, inadequate legislative oversight, overly restrictive secrecy regime and so on.

But when it comes to what should be done, the consensus breaks down. The Center for International Policy, editor Craig Eisendrath and the ten other contributors to this volume have provided a comprehensive assessment of the community's current ills and prescribed remedial actions. Their numbers include: a former director of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, a long-time chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), a former CIA analyst and division head, a former OMB budget examiner for intelligence, two former career ambassadors, and the former chief investigator for the SFRC and the Iran-Contra investigation. All bring extensive experience with or within the intelligence community to the table, provide a wide range of practical knowledge and argue the case for reform persuasively.

For the most part the reforms they recommend seem reasoned and reasonable, though many, as they note, strike at the heart of bureaucratic and vested interests and are likely to be difficult to implement. There was, however, one glaring exception to my "reasoned and reasonable" rule: several of the contributors suggested that at least part of the CIA's covert operations responsibility be transferred to Defense. I can think of no worse solution to the quandaries posed by maintaining a covert operations capability.

In sum, this is an extremely important and readable book on a subject that should be high on the next administration's list of priorities. Most of its recommendations deserve very serious consideration and, hopefully, adoption.