I was a research consultant on this book project under contract with TN Dupuy's think tank, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization. I worked up some data and battle studies for the 1947-49 hostilities and naval actions for all the wars. Knowing first-hand the amount of research that the late Col. Dupuy put into this book, I can vouch for his efforts to get the Arab side of the story. The research team corresponded with many spokespersons from all antagonists... except the Syrians, who simply recycled their canned wartime propaganda. The battle analysis is based on Dupuy's Quantified Judgement Method, a formula to gauge relative combat effectiveness. This formula has been challenged with respect to German versus American forces in Europe, 1944-45, but I believe that it is essentially sound for the various Mideast combatants.

I would say that the book should remain in print-- as of late 1999 it is still available in some bookstores (Borders and B&N)but is not currently in print. Any reissue, however, should at least have a new preface commenting on research and reviews since the book's 1978 publication date. (the new edition would get five stars, in my not so humble opinion).

For my own part, I know that some of the conclusions on the 1948 fighting need to be modified in light of recent work on Arab preparations and strengths.

This book is remarkable for what it is not: it is not a diatribe, it is not political, and it is not biased. It is a steadfastly-neutral account of the Arab-Israeli wars of the past sixty years and reflects the integrity and professionalism of the author. He is absolutely dedicated to presenting the perspectives of both sides of the conflict. It is meticulously researched and contains extraordinary detail about all military aspects of the conflicts. The book does not stray far into the political or diplomatic realms, and anyone interested in the personalities of the conflicts should look elsewhere. This is a professional military history that, while intended for a professional military audience, is accessible by most any reader with at least some basic knowledge of the conflict. Finally, at the risk of being repetetive, it is fair and unbiased, which is truly extraordinary, given the nature of the conflict. If you can find a copy, get it, and if you are the publisher, re-print it. Please.

I've been reading military books for 14 years and this book is very good. Highly recommended

The impetus for writing this book came while Trevor Depuy was constructing a mathematical model for a World War II wargame based on the records of actual engagements between the Germans and Allies. Much to his surprise, he learned that even after several years of total war, homeland bombardment and facing numerically superior enemies, the Germans still retained a 30% edge in combat effectiveness. That is, on the battlefields of Europe in 1944, 100 German troops were the equivalent 130 US or British troops. He wanted to know how and why these "defeated" German armies could fight so well?

The answer to the riddle of superior German combat effectiveness, Depuy says, has nothing to do with genetic or cultural traits of aggressiveness or obedience to authority, as others have suggested. Rather, he argues that the superiority was a deliberate product of the German General Staff, which was incredibly successful in its mission of institutionalizing military excellence through extremely competitive officer selection processes, advanced training, an emphasis on military history and individual initiative in combat, and a commitment to objectivity in planning and analysis. Indeed, Depuy says the General Staff was able to institutionalize military genius, usually found only in rare individuals such as Hannibal, Gustavus Adolphus, Napoleon and others in the pantheon of military greats. As abhorrent as Nazi policies may have been - and as culpable as the officer corps may have been in the atrocities of the Nazi regime by either direct collaboration or failure to intervene - Depuy argues that nothing can take away from the fact that the German army consistently out-planned, out-manuevered, and out-fought the Allies. Moreover, they often accomplished these feats against incredible odds, including significantly smaller forces, lack of air superiority, and the complete compromise of their operational plans through successful Allied code-breaking efforts.

It should be noted that while Depuy's work is highly readable and sound on facts, it is far from original. His citations - which are few and far between - come almost exclusively from secondary sources. Depuy doesn't make any significant contribution to our understanding of the General Staff, its genesis, development and accomplishments beyond what Ritter ("The Sword and Scepter"), Craig ("The Politics of the Prussian Army"), Goerlitz ("A History of the German General Staff") and others have already made. These three sources, in particular, clearly were the foundation of Depuy's work, although he does, at times, take issue with some of their conclusions.

Its lack of originality doesn't mean the book is without value or virtue. Indeed, for those looking for a concise review of the history of the German General Staff with a distinct focus on how it influenced combat effectiveness, and not wishing to delve into a book long on details and thoroughly academic in nature, Depuy's "A Genius for War" may be the right book for you. If, however, you are interested in a more complete study of the General Staff, including the critical issues of civil-military relations and one that puts German military developments in the context of the European state system of the times, this reviewer would strongly suggest that you stick with Craig, Ritter and Goerlitz.

I would like to add these points to the comments of the Texas reviewer:

This is more than military history - it's a rigorous and convincing demonstration that organization matters, and the correct approach to organization development can affect the course of history.

The book had its beginning in Dupuy's discovery that his standard simulation did not match the facts. Rather than ignore the discrepancy, he set out to find out what was wrong with the simulation, and the result is this admirable book.

Counter-historians can ask what would have happened if the king of Prussia had not been able to have Gerhard von Scharnhorst head his Military Reorganization Commission after the disastrous defeat of 1806.

Authors between projects can ask themselves why there is no biography in English of Scharnhorst.

Right at the very beginning, and at the conclusion, Dupuy corrected some of the most common stereotypes in our minds: the Prussia/German armed force has no monopoly on discipline nor soldierly quality; historically speaking, German people has no obvious warlike nor militaristic tendency, compared with Romans, Celts, Vikings, Mongols, Turks; from the outstanding performance of the current Bundeswehr, a democratic and constitutional government can go hand in hand with military effectiveness; from the expansionist colonial policy of Britain, France, and US in 19th century, and that of Rome and Athens in ancient time, democracy does not necessarily prevent military aggression; military genius like Napoleon, Hannibal etc are not free from making bad mistakes, we call them genius partly because their opponents outblundered them.

This book gives very thorough and insightful analysis of how military genius and effectiveness are systemmatically institutionalized ever since General Scharnhorst proposed this concept in late 18th century. General Scharnhorst, after the Prussian defeat at Jena, together with Gneisenau, Boyen, Grolman and Clausewitz (the 5 "Reformers") pioneered in theories of General Staff as a self-perpetuating institution in maintaining an armed force at the highest readiness for war, and transforming theories into doctrine and organization.
The unmatchable military excellence of the Prusso-German General Staff and Army were demonstrated throughout the 19th-20th century, and chronologically illustrated in the book . Its influence endures up to now and future.
Ever since 1807, Prussia-Germany no longer has to count on the rise of genius like Napoleon or Frederick the Great to win battles; the General Staff respond and adapt to changes, continuously update and upgrade itself, study military experience and history with seriousness and objectiveness, produce intellectual and intelligent officers to direct, plan, coordinate and prepare for wars, and even defeat opposing armies that were led by genius!
Dupuy has written such a splendid book of wisdom, I highly recommend this book for anyone who is interested in modern European military history, probably one of the best of its kind.

As a Canadian, I have very little knowledge of American history in general and the Civil War in particular. This book walked me through the war in great detail and provides an excellent base for future studies.

I love to read nearly anything and everything I can find about WW2 history. This was one of those rare instances, however, where I picked up a book, read about half of it, then put it back down never to finish it. I just couldn't force myself to read any more.

Although the Battle of the Bulge is without a doubt one of the more interesting episodes of the war, and Dupuy provides a detailed account, in my opinion he's just a little too detailed. This book is written for someone who has a little more serious interest in mind than just an amateur historian such as myself. It is dry and choppy in its presentation. The thing that I found most distracting was the frequent digressions into mini-biographies every time a new general or other major figure was introduced to the narrative.

For example, a division commander is mentioned for the first time, and immediately the author cuts to a two page synopsis of the man's life and military career. He then abruptly shifts back to the main narrative after having led the reader on a merry rabbit chase. And he does this over and over and over again. Very hard to read unless you're a person who likes that sort of thing. I'm not one of those, and would not recommend this to anyone who is not a bit more serious student of WW2.

In their preface, the authors recount how this book initially came about from a research project for the US Army. Seeking a way to validate a computer combat simulation model, the authors focused on the Battle of the Bulge (which they go on to point out was really more a campaign than a single battle), as it was the only modern combined arms engagement on which they had sufficient detailed statistical and historical data available.
As a result the book reads as just that, a research project. The various movements, dispositions, strengths, weaknesses and so on of each unit are painstakingly recorded. Blow by blow accounts of every engagement, action and battle during the campaign are presented, almost down to platoon and squad level in some cases. The odd combat anecdote or portrait of a commanding general are thrown in here and there. The latter are interesting enough to make you wish the authors had spent more time on the personalities involved in the battle. SS General Sepp Dietrich's misgivings beforehand (which only appear as a footnote here) certainly hint at unexplored possibilities.
In spite of all that, the wealth of detail somehow weaves together and at the end you'll come away with a far greater understanding of the battle than when you started. As it stays away from cliche or from spending inordinate attention on the more well known events of the battle (i.e. the "Nuts" incident) the sober, impartial and objective narrative is certainly effective in dispelling any "illusions" or misconceptions you may have had. At the same time, possibly the most obvious preconception is reinforced, i.e. that the Germans had almost no hope of succeeding.
3 stars I think is justified, in that the book succeeds in what it sets out to do in presenting a scholarly, academic analysis of the Battle of the Bulge. For that reason, it will appeal to those with a serious interest in military history and the Second World War and is a worthy addition to the existing body of work on the Battle of the Bulge. However, a little more detail on the background of the campaign and, as mentioned above, on those involved could have only improved this book. Those seeking a page-turner should approach with caution.

Research is the strength of this work, not the telling of a major battle. It is difficult for the reader to grasp the overall view of this clash as it is layered over with detail upon detail. From mass movements to small skirmishes, it is told in the driest of writing style. The usual complaint levied against military books, inadequate maps, can not be claimed here. The maps are numerous and like the work itself, detailed. As a reference tool the book is invaluable and for this it merits the rating given. An interesting read it is not but it does belongs on the shelf of those with a serious interest in the Bulge.

Dupuy presents his Quantified Judgment Model (QJM) and employs if for the analysis of historical combat data. After describing the model, he provides detailed analysis of data from World War II and the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli conflicts. A few other battles are surveyed as well, from Austerlitz to The Somme. He also provide trend analysis in a number of military dimensions. The book has three target audiences: military OR analysts, military historians, and conflict simulation hobbyists. (This review is based on the original edition.)

I was quite disappointed with this book. There are a number of errors that I have found in the materials that I am most familiar with which causes me to doubt most of what is said about the things I am unfamiliar with. Dupuy seems in most cases to merely be parroting back popular American conceptions of history, which often have little to do with what really happened. The mis-labeled cover photo (it's an M-60 not an M-1) is definitely a warning sign that should be heeded.

Attention Publisher: Cover Photo is not an M-1 Abrams tank, it is an M-60. Although this error may distract from the book, we will not judge its contents by the cover. Reccomended for novices and experts of military history alike. An interdisciplinary work to provide a coherent framework to the technological evolution of warfare.