This book explores the philosophical themes of the existence of "an external world" and the reality of thoughts and feelings other than the author's. The first essay centers around George Edward Moore's "Proof of an External World" and the second around the theme of Solipsism.

The author has done an excellent job, in addressing the subject of psychology and good and evil, by employing the well-known case of Dostoijevskij's Raskholnikov. This makes the book not only thoughtful and useful, but also thrilling, as it takes us back to Dostoijevskij's marvellous novel, exploring the patterns of good and evil in Raskholnikov's life.

I had to read this book for a class on the subject of free will and was appalled by Mr. Dilman's biased account of many of the most prominent philosophers and their views on free will. The chapter on Plato is GROSSLY mistaken and wrong. Mr. Dilman constantly reads into the philosophy things which simply are not there. He is obsessed with Simone Weil and attempts to work her "moral gravity" into every chapter; there is no evidence of such in Kant, Schpoenhaur or Plato despite what Mr. Dilman attempts to say. DON'T buy this book if you are looking for an unbiased and accurate account of the history of free will.

Professor Ilham Dilman's book on FREE WILL is undoubtedly one of the most comprehensive historical and philosophical studies of the subject to date. It is virtually an intellectual odyssey into a realm of the human mind that has continued to challenge the greatest thinkers and sages for well over two millennia. All the most significant landmarks in this long course of philosophical history are covered in a most lucid and engaging presentation.

The backdrop of the discussion is indeed vast - ranging from the works of the Greek greats (Homer, Sophocles, Plato and Aristotle) through those of the great thinkers of Christianity (St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas), and of modern philosophy (Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, Kant and Schopenhauer), down to the works of some of the most influential thinkers of the twentieth century (Freud, Sartre, Wittgenstein and Simone Weil). The book begins by asking a question that appears fairly simple despite its profundity: "What is free will and in what way is it distinctive of and grounded in human existence?" The answers to this question, however, have been anything but simple, as we soon realize in going through this extensive examination of views which span the whole spectrum of the freedom versus determinism question.

Among the sources of this problem of freedom and determinism, Professor Dilman identifies the roles of "chance and necessity in human life" and the "apparent incompatibility between human free will and the general law of causality." Indeed, he is quite on the mark in claiming that the book could well have been entitled "Human Freedom in a World of Cause, Chance and Necessity." After all, we are "flesh and blood beings" in a physical world ruled by causality, and we are members of a society shaped both by the cultural forces and historical necessities, while at the same time being subject to the vagaries of chance throughout our lives. It is in the midst of all such limitations, the author claims, that we are to "find our share of the freedom of which we are capable as human beings" (p.7).

The overall position adopted in this book may best be summarized in the succinct statement made several years ago by the non-professional philosopher Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India: "Life is like a game of cards. The hand that is dealt you represents determinism; the way you play it is free will." Of course, the real problem is to decide what aspects of our lives fall under each of these categories. By sorting out these various aspects in the workings of the human mind, Professor Dilman has greatly advanced the scope of the discussion on this subject.

More than a hundred years ago, in his paper on "The Dilemma of Determinism," William James had provided one of the best pragmatic recipes in his well-known observation that if we are free, our first act of freedom ought to be to affirm that we are free. The arguments for free will provided by Professor Dilman indeed constitute just such an affirmation of freedom. By predicating human freedom on self-knowledge, his inquiry into free-will shows us that such freedom implies responsibility, not a license for irresponsible expressions in words or deeds.

I think it was Bertrand Russell who once said that when he wanted to read a good book, he would write one himself! It seems that Professor Dilman has done the same. My only regret is that this book did not come out some years ago before my retirement; it would certainly have been on the required reading list for my course on Philosophical Psychology.

Professor Dilman's book will be of great interest to all fair and broad-minded scholars in philosophy, psychology and literature. It may also be highly recommended for the general readers interested in a broad-based examination of a central psycho-philosophical issue.

Mohammed Mujeeb Rahman, Ph.D.

Unless you're a die-hard Quine scholar, I don't suggest this book. Dilham's critique is rambling and incoherent. The book is full of references which the reader may or (more likely) may not be familiar with. Much of the book seems unmotivated and directionless. He may very well have some valid points, but it's hard to tell, and it's not at all clear that it's worth working through this book to find out.