Gordon Craig's history of the Prussian officer corps and its relationship with the state it served is a true classic of military history. The primary focus of the book is on the civil-military relations of the Prussian state beginning with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and tracings its evolution and influence to the Second World War when Hitler and the Nazis crushed the political influence of the officer corps. In addition, the book also addresses a number other issues in exquisite detail, including the formation of the German General Staff, the strategy developed before the First and Second World Wars, and the social conflict of the unified German states.

Craig's conclusions on the Prussian officer corps, their reforms and their performance are rather "standard" as far as historical interpretations go - but that is due in no small part to the fact that the author in many ways set the standard. The most salient theme of the book is that for all the German military got right in planning, strategy and innovation, it was never able to effectively solve the civil-military relationship issue, and it was that failure that led to the disasters of the First and Second World Wars.

In Craig's opinion, the opportunity for success was formulated but squandered early in 19th century. After the devastating defeat at Jena in 1807 at the hands of Napoleon, the once vaunted Prussian military had to assess how and why the disaster had occurred. The solution presented by the great military reformer Scharnhorst was the institutionalization of military genius in a centralized, elite general staff and the accountability of the armed services to the German people through an oath of allegiance to a republican constitution, rather than personal fealty to the monarch. The former was adopted and proved a stunning success, especially in the wars against the Danes, Austrians and French in 1866-1872. However, the conservative officer corps' unwillingness to embrace the more liberal reform set forth by Scharnhorst kept the military at odds with the nation it served and ultimately led to the military's political dominance in World War I and political subjugation in World War II.

If you have a keen interest in civil-military relations, German history, or the development of the General Staff system this book is simply indispensable.

This excellent volume was one of my textbooks in college, and I completely underestimated its importance for years. Being deeply involved and interested in Napoleonic military history and the campaigns of the Grande Armee, I have again started to use this book as there is now a 'revisionist' (read 'excuse')school of Prussian history beginning to emerge, revolving around the disastrous, for the Prussians, Jena campaign of 1806. For this period, and indeed for the periods up to the end of World War II, this book is invaluable.

The author uses myriad German source material for his references, and the story he tells is accurate, lively, and riveting. He knows his material, and his subject, and is unflinching in calling a spade a spade when necessary. While I am only interested in those portions relating to the Napoleonic period and its immediate aftermath, students of the Prussian/German Army will find this book invaluable.

Craig's bona fides are impeccable and he writes with authority, verve, and accuracy. His analysis of the Prussian Army's beginnings in the aftermath of the Thirty Years' War set the definition and trends for what the Prussian Army would become, something apart from the people of Prussia and an army supported by a dynastic state. His demonstration of the effectiveness of the instrument under the Great Frederick, and of his policies, and those of his successors after the Seven Years' War, tell the tale of why is became nothing more than a 'parade ground facade', made up of half-foreign mercenary strength, which were two of the many reasons for its defeat and destruction by Napoleon and the Grande Armee in 1806.

The coverage of the Prussian reformers is also excellent, and dispels many myths, some of which unforunately are resurfacing under the guise of 'recent scholarship.' The War of Liberation from Napoleon was in actuality a war of liberating whatever German territory Prussia could grab in the chaos of the aftermath of French hegemony in western Germany (they took the Rhineland, most of Westphalia, and about half of Saxony, keeping the Saxon king, Napoleon's ally, as a prisoner of war). Additionally, force had to be used in Prussia to get the manpower required to fight the Grande Armee. The end of the tale is also excellently told-that of how the reformers, so necessary to Prussian resurgence, were treated and eventually disposed of politically, the Prussian monarchy almost completely retrenching to pre-1806 'values.'

All in all this is an excellent volume for students and historians of the period or of the Prussian/German army in particular. It is highly recommended.

Gordon Craig is the doyen of America's historians of Germany. Now retired from academic life, he is highly respected at home and in Germany, and is sought after for sound and temperate reviews and commentary in the media. No other survey has superceded The Politics of the Prussian Army, although it is now over 40 years old. (However, Gerhard Ritter's important, multi-volume "Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk" covers a lot of the same ground, with a more conservative viewpoint. There's an English translation) There are two basic reasons for this, I think. One is of course the book's very high quality. Craig became throughly familiar with all the most important source material available, and his fundamental conclusions are unquestioned: that the army was the keystone and guardian of the Prussian monarchy and its conservative social order, and always at work to hinder the progress of democracy and the achievement of popular over monarchical sovereignty. The authoritarian (N. B.: as distinct from totalitarian!) sympathies and traditions of the Prussian officer corps survived after the end of the Prussian monarchy in 1918 and carried on in the Reichswehr of the Weimar Republic, and then in the Wehrmacht. Eventually the officer corps sold its soul to the "Austrian corporal" (Hindenburg's disdainful reference), Hitler, believing they could control him for their own ends, and that he was in any case the best available political option. But Hitler was nobody's fool, and his ultimate aim always remained to undermine the social authority and prestige of the regular army and in its place install himself, his party, and an absolutely fanaticized and obedient military force (the Waffen-SS). A sense of duty not to Hitler but to the German people and their civilization flamed up and extinguished in the assasination attempt of Oct 1944, led by Wehrmacht officers of the old Prussian nobility. Recent research (in English, cf. for example Omer Bartov) has tended to see more ideological sympathy for Nazism in the officer corps of the Wehrmacht more than Craig does here, though his focus is less on ideology than on the army's involvement in political machinations at the highest level. German historians and journalists are debating this issue at the moment, as new publications argue that the Wehrmacht committed war crimes on a greater scale, esp. on the Eastern front, than previously admitted, and that it fought unrestrained by professional ethos or conscience. A second reason for the book's longevity is that most of the Prussian military archive was destroyed in a 1945 bombing raid, which makes significant new discoveries impossible for the period before World War II. One has to rely on published sources, and as I noted, Craig read the most important of them. New histories of the Prussian army would be new interpretations of the same sources. One could, for example, to take a more sympathetic view of the army's 19th-century ideology and ethos - that it was defensive - in view of Prussia's vulnerable geographical position, the hostility of its neighbors, and the rise of the socialist movement. But in the early 20th century Germany was far and away the dominant power in Europe, and the question arises of what "went wrong" and led to Germany's (in my view) unprovoked attack and reckless strategy in World War I. Note: Despite the title, the book is really a history of the army after 1806, with an introductory chapter on the period before.

Gordon Craig gives a clear and highly readable account of the most infuential battle of the 19th century. This should be required reading for anybody trying to understand modern German history. The author uses excellent source material to bring a contemporary narretive and evaluation to this historical milestone.

This is a very good book on Zuerich during one of its more turbulent and innovative periods. At this time (summer '98) the German version of this book "Geld und Geist - Zuerich im Zeitalter des Liberalismus" is still widely available.

A brief history of Germany, with a comprehensive Bibliography for anyone who wishes to further their reading on the subject. This book was written in 1982, with an Afterword written by Gordon Craig in 1991, addressing the unification of East and West Germany. As a novice to the subject of German history, I found this book to be a basic introduction, with many things referred to within the book not given a clear definition, and therefore to get a better understanding one would absolutely need to read other material.

I liked that chapters were divided into subjects such as "Religion", "Women", and "Literature and Society", but not knowing more about the different time periods that are referred to (such as the Weimar Republic), I was left feeling that the book was incomplete as a general history.

Over all the books on Germany I have read, Gordon A. Craig has written the most fascinating book comprehendable. It exceeds far beyond the crude and stereotypical portraits that are displayed in many other books, but instead looks deeper into the study of european history and culture. Craig's introductions are insightful and entertaining. The book is composed of a collection of long essay's which prove Craig's neutral outlook on a country that is foreign to him. This book is the best way to better understand the German phenomenon explained by the greatest diplomatic historian of Germany, Gordon A. Craig.

Written in 1982, before the Berlin Wall fell or the Cold War ended, this question is the essential one of the book. It often sits in the background, undisturbed, but it is always present. What Craig means by this is, will West Germany turn out to be a failed experiment in democracy, as the Weimar Republic did?

Although we can assume fairly safely that it will not (the conclusion Craig came to as well), this is a marvelous and fascinating book. Craig is a diplomatic historian by profession, and in any study of European politics, the underpinnings and history of Germany have to play an important role. The book is organized by topic, beginning with a three-chapter brief history. The second part has chapters on religion, money, relations with Jews, sexual relations, educational relations, literature, the military, and the unique situation of Berlin, among others. It even has an appendix on "The Awful German Language". The chapter on Berlin in particular was fascinating, although if that is your interest, I would recommend Faust's Metropolis: A History of Berlin by Alexandra Richie.

This is an excellent book. I originally picked it up because of my deep respect for the author (see my review of Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time) and my fascination with all things foreign. I didn't put it down for any length of time until I finished. Perhaps the best way to understand the German phenomenon short of living in Germany.

Alexander L. George has built his career around the premise that American policymakers do a poor job managing international affairs and that scholars could help them do better if only (a) policymakers listened to scholars and (b) scholars had anything useful to say. In "Force and Statecraft," George and Craig offer thick, lavish descriptions of various diplomatic crises but very little in the way of either prescriptive or theoretical principles for managing them. In other words, they have little to say, so it's unlikely policymakers will pay much attention to them.

The first half of the book consists of lavish -- almost tedious -- descriptions of various foreign policy realms of the past, with chapters built around a curiously (for George) systemic view of international politics. Though individuals flit in and out of the narrative, the "system" does carry a lot of the variance in this book.

The second half of the book consists of a review of "tools" of statecraft but these, again, lack theoretical rigor or for that matter prescriptive reliability. Instead of variables we get "conditions" for success. Whether or not policymakers are able to discern if these "conditions" obtain is, one supposes, non-random but, if so, George hasn't much to say about this.

Like the tools he promotes, it appears that management of any diplomatic situation is "context-dependent." Readers looking for theories of diplomacy, international politics, or even George's own creation, coercive diplomacy, are likely to be disappointed. But if all you want is a once-around-the-great-power-world recounting of some 19th-20th Century history, you could do worse.

Okay, maybe not an entire IR degree. Most require classes in economics and geography as well. However, this was a required text for one of my international affairs classes, and it was one of the few books that I refused to sell back at the end of the semester, despite being the quintessential starving college student. Although it is clearly written and easy to understand, it is not simply a collection of truisms that any first year student would take for granted.

Force and Statecraft really does contain just about everything you need to know for an IR degree. It is organized by topic, which many of my classmates found boring. However, I found that this allowed for the clearest exposition of the ideas possible, and allowed the authors to examine each idea in detail before moving on to the next.

The pairing of the authors is excellent. Alexander George is a political scientist specializing in foreign relations, and Gordon Craig is a historian specializing in diplomatic and interstate history. I am convinced that it is this pairing that allows Force and Statecraft to have such a broad scope without losing any of its expertise, as often happens in books by a single author. Both are excellent writers, and their other books are highly recommended as well.

This book begins, as many IR degree programs do, with a diplomatic history course. This is essential to understanding international relations today, and Craig makes it exciting and interesting. It should be noted that this first section also covers the importance of economics and domestic opinion in the making of foreign policy, something that is often overlooked by other books. The book then goes on, topic by topic, to discuss the major topics in foreign policy, paying particular attention to the techniques of diplomacy and foreign policy, something also lacking in most books in the field. This is a book anyone interested in foreign policy should have on their bookshelf.